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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Agent-Based Model in Social Sciences
The history of agent-based models can be traced back to Von Neumann (1966) ma-
chine, a \theoretical machine" capable of reproduction. The concept was then widely
developed in the eld of biology (Crist and Haefner (1994), Percus and Torney (1999)),
ecology (DeAngelis et al. (1994), Grimm (1999)), epidemiology (Longini et al. (1986),
Eubank et al. (2004)), and etc., thanks to fast-growing computer technology. In con-
trast to the wide range of computer simulations as a methodology in nature sciences,
the introduction of computer usage is a comparatively recent approach in the social
sciences (cf. Zeigler (1976)). Schelling (1971) was the rst researcher who used agent-
based programs to simulate interesting processes people come across in real life1. Later
on this method started to become popular in explaining many other social phenomena,
including opinion formation and voter dynamics (Tessone and Toral (2005), Lambiotte
1Thomas Schelling was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2005 \for having
enhanced our understanding of conict and cooperation through game-theory analysis" (cf. \The
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005" from Nobelprize.org.).
Schelling (1971) explains a dynamic model of segregation, where he shows that if every agent in the
model slightly prefers his neighbors to be the same color, it will nally leads to total segregation.
1
et al. (2007)), culture and language dynamics (Dunbar (1993), Steel (2000)), trac and
crowd ow design (Sanford (1994), Helbing and Molnar (1995), Hughes (2000)), diu-
sion of news and innovations (Guardiola et al. (2002), Elkink (2006)), spread of World
Wide Web (Huberman and Adamic (1999), Adamic and Huberman (2002)), dynamics
of nancial stock markets (Lux and Marchesi (2002), Feng and Jo (2003)), and so on.
Recent books discussing large-scale agent-based modeling in economics or sociology are
Epstein and Axtell (1996), Krugman (1996), Gilbert (1999), Axelrod (1997), Sawyer
(2005), Schelling (2006), Miller and Page (2007), Batty (2007), among others.
By denition, social sciences comprise academic disciplines concerned with the study
of human groups and individuals in social life. If the society can be built into a huge
agent-based model, the social scientists seek to understand not only how individuals
behave, but also the scaling outcomes of many interacting individuals, i.e., how the
aggregate outcome can be more than the summation of all parts.
An agent-based model should be quite suitable for the objective of social scientists. It is
a method for studying systems exhibiting the following two properties: (1) the system
is composed of interacting agents; and (2) the system exhibits emergent properties,
which are properties arising from the interactions of agents that cannot be deduced
simply by adding up the properties of these agents. When interactions of agents are
dependent on past experience, and especially when agents continually adapt to their
experiences, mathematical analysis is typically very limited in its ability to derive
dynamic consequences, but agent-based modeling might be more than aordable to
complete this task.
The breakthrough in computational modeling in social sciences came with the develop-
ment of multi-agent systems (MAS). Standard MAS model a collection of autonomous
decision-making entities called \agents". These agents \communicate" via messages
passing among them through a dened \environment". Here \agents" refer to broadly
dened entities who are the constituent parts of a computationally constructed envi-
ronment. Examples of possible \agents" range from passive receivers to sophisticated
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rational learners. They can be either physical entities (e.g., molecules, cells and atoms
in biology or physics), or individuals (e.g., consumers, producers), or social groups (e.g.,
rms, families, markets). In the later cases, agents can be composed of other agents,
permitting hierarchical construction. In typical agent-based models, each agent in-
dividually assesses its situation and behaves strictly according to a set of rules, and
its movement has autonomy (i.e., can be fully controlled by itself). Besides, agents
are considered to be \intelligent" or partially \rational", with the characteristics of
being proactive (i.e., being able to inuence others), reactive (i.e., being inuenced
by others), and social (i.e., in an inter-connected network) (cf. Wooldridge and Jen-
nings (1995)). Meanwhile, agents need to execute various behaviors according to the
system's design, for example, producing, consuming or selling goods. Repetitive inter-
actions among agents are essential, which rely on the power of computers to explore
certain dynamics out of pure computational mathematical methods. In the end, the
constructed MAS framework should be able to provide insights into both the macro
structure and the micro behaviorial rules, which includes analysis of strategies that
evolve automatically, rather than by human intervention. Agent-based models applied
by sociologists usually contain the following features2, (the articles in parenthesis are
representative works talking about certain respective features):
 Bottom-up:
The model is built from bottom-up, which aims at the micro-macro link, with
a view to assess the eects of the community as a whole. (Epstein and Axtell
(1996), Tesfatsion (1997))
 Complex system:
Agents live in a multi-dimensional complex system, with complicated interactions
among each other, which evolve over time. (Kirman (1997))
 Heterogeneous :
2Some of the features are drawn from Epstein (1999) and Fagiolo et al. (2006).
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Agents are heterogeneous, the common method of homogeneous \representative
agent" in macroeconomics may lose grounds in agent-based modeling. (Stoker
(1993), Kirman (1992))
 Bounded rationality :
Two components related to \bounded rationality" are: agents' bounded infor-
mation and bounded computing power. In agent-based models, although agents
are rational and adaptive, they do not have global information as well as innite
computing power. Typically, they make choices based on local information, and
interact only with their neighbors. This character coincides with most decision
making processes by human beings in our life. (Makowsky (2006), Simon (1982),
Rubinstein (1998))
 Learning capacity :
Learning based on certain algorithms is a natural ability for agents. These al-
gorithms can be simple rules of thumb, or sophisticated learning algorithms in-
corporating ideas from articial intelligence and cognitive science. (Dosi et al.
(2005))
 Non-analytical :
The aim of agent-based modeling is not to nd its analytical solution. In fact,
most of the micro and macro variables within agent-based models are governed by
complicated stochastic processes which can be hardly solved analytically. (Fagiolo
et al. (2006))
 Indirect calibration:
Agent-based models help to explain social phenomena by replicating some stylized
facts using indirect calibration. Validations are done at the aggregate macroeco-
nomic level, mostly with no restriction on parameters. (LeBaron (2006))
 Generative experiment :
So far, the object of many agent-based models has been conducting laboratory
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experiments to gain knowledge on the underlying causal relationships in real
life. This kind of model attempts to explain how deterministic and nite rules
interacting with each other to generate indeterministic and innite behaviors.
(Doran (1997))
 Data-free:
Agent-based researchers are often interested in explaining the emergence of qual-
itative aggregate patterns. After knowing that experiments cannot perfectly
mimic the real world, they are more interested in generating practically per-
suasive outcomes (distributions), instead of perfect matching of data. The later
is usually considered as a \top-down" classical approach. (Gilbert and Terna
(2000))
In a word, a well-designed agent-based model should be able to
\. . . situate an initial population of autonomous heterogeneous agents in
a relevant spatial environment; allow them to interact according to simple
local rules, and thereby generate | or \grow" | the macroscopic regularity
from the bottom up . . . "
| Epstein (1999), p.42
At present, standard tools for interpreting the collective behaviors in agent-based mod-
els are still lacking, but some techniques can be nevertheless suggested. For instance:
(1) one could study the clusters of agents to see how their behaviors can be inter-
preted (such as the grouping of agents as dierent classes as we do in Chap. 3 and
subsequent chapters); (2) it is also interesting to check the direction of movement for
certain variable (such as the cyclical behavior of the wage-share discussed in Chap. 4);
(3) moreover, by keeping the actions of some social groups unchanged, it is possible
to analyze the behavioral tendency of a particular group, and test out which group of
agents are more likely to aect the aggregate outcome (such as the small rm dynamics
discussed in Chap. 5).
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1.2 Agent-Based Model and Mainstream Economics
\Mainstream, axiomatic economics is right: the invisible hand is truly in-
visible. It continues to be out of sight simply because it is of a completely
dierent nature than we were used to think so far or it has never been where
it has been looked for . . . "
| Delli-Gatti et al. (2008), p.4
Generally speaking, the conventional way of building up economic models, carried on
by mainstream economists, is based on a particular type of reductionism (Delli-Gatti
et al. (2005)), which assumes that:
 the functional relationships among the variables are linear ; and,
 there is no direct interaction among the agents.
In other words, by assuming independence, it images the macro phenomena as the
summation of micro individual behaviors, ignoring distinctions among them. A trick
that many seminal economic models adopt is to suppose that all agents in the model
are \perfectly rational" holding \perfect information", totally \independent", and the
relationships among them can be described by linear functions. Following this tradi-
tion, it is popular to use a \representative agent" to describe the \typical" individual of
a certain type, such as a \typical consumer" or a \typical rm" in general equilibrium
models. Then, economists try to create mathematical models with simultaneous equa-
tions to explain economic phenomena by optimizing \representative agents". Since all
agents (in the same category) are identical to each other, the aggregate behavior of a
certain group can be treated as the total summation (i.e., Nn=1f(x), where f(x) can
be a certain function, e.g., production) of each isolated entity. Similarly, the optimal
aggregate solution can be achieved by simply adding up all optimizing agents. In the
end, even if the model can not t the data, it is the fact that the model does, to
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some extent, explain \something" plausible, which makes the research exciting. There-
fore, the traditional approach provides a reasonable simplication for a huge system.
As a matter of fact, most mainstream economists acknowledge that agents should be
\heterogenous". They argue that in reality, even if the system contains dierent \rep-
resentative agents", the sum of their choices may still be mathematically equivalent to
the decision of one individual or many identical individuals, so that their models are
an admissible approximation to reality.
Given all the advantages of classical modeling, non-mainstream economists started
to post the following questions: is the dynamics of aggregate behaviors the same as
the \representative agent"? is it reliable to treat each individual as identical? is the
system optimization reached at the same time when its individual reaches optimum?
are the correlations among dierent entities fully described by those parallel equa-
tions?. . . Some renowned researchers have pointed out the apparent weakness of the
\representative agent" approach almost on the foundation of mainstream theory:
\. . . There are no assumptions on . . . isolated individuals which will give us
the properties of aggregate behavior which we need to obtain uniqueness
and stability. Thus we are reduced to making assumptions at the aggregate
level, which cannot be justied, by the usual individualistic assumptions.
This problem is usually avoided in the macroeconomic literature by assuming
that the economy behaves like an individual. Such an assumption cannot
be justied in the context of the standard economic model and the way
to solve the problem may involve rethinking the very basis on which this
model is founded . . . "
| Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988), p.239
Following Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988)'s study, Stoker (1993) states that the idea of
\representative agent" is at odds with empirical evidence: he reviews the empirical lit-
eratures and proposes that heterogeneity matters since there are systematic individual
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dierences in economic behavior, which \account for skewness and clustering of eco-
nomic distributions". In addition, it is not possible for a modeling strategy based on the
\representative agent" to reproduce the aggregate behavior of heterogeneous economic
agents. Axtell (1999) claims in his study of rm dynamics that \given the power law
character of actual rms' size distribution, it would seem that the equilibrium theories
of the rm . . . will never be able to grasp this essential empirical regularity". Delli-Gatti
et al. (2005) argue that \the adoption of the scaling perspective in economics implies
rejecting the very denition of a representative agent because the dynamics of the sys-
tem originate from the interaction of heterogeneous agents . . . as a consequence, the
occurrence of scaling laws in economics is incompatible with mainstream economics".
Other similar research that questions the aggregate properties of models based on the
assumption of a \representative agent", can be found in Lebwel (1989), Kirman (1992),
Carroll (2001). As an alternative, agent-based modeling is suggested by most of them
to overcome the existing problems in the classical economic models.
Compared with the classical approach, the agent-based researchers believe that most
social phenomena are sometimes too complicated to be analytically solvable via the
pure summation of their subsystems, especially when non-linear relationship and scal-
ing3 properties are involved. The economy may not \behave like an individual", scaling
emerges because the sub-elements of the system are heterogenous and interacting with
each other. Following this line, agent-based research is usually conducted in the fol-
lowing way: At rst, the stylized facts are examined. Then the basic rules of the
model are dened, in particular how each agent interacts in a huge stochastic system
to generate aggregate behaviors. Once a single agent's action rule is gured out, the
multi-agent system can be established. As this kind of models sometimes ts even bet-
ter to empirical data, with reasonable explanations and predictions, it starts to draw
more and more attention from young economic researchers. In the meantime, some
3The law of \scaling" refers to a set of properties associated to complex systems either in their
spatial organization or during their temporal development (cf. Pumain (2003)). Such a complex system
usually has nonlinear relations among the attributes of their subsystems.
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cross-subject areas, such as \Econophysics", \Neuroeconomics", have been introduced
as up-and-coming elds in graduate studies, oering new insights into human behavior
and social phenomena.
The debates among agent-based researchers and mainstream economists will certainly
continue. Although the researchers working on agent-based modeling are sceptical on
the foundation of the mainstream approach, their standpoint is not well accepted by
the mainstream economists either. According to the study of Richiardi and Leombruni
(2005), by the year 2004, the number of published articles using agent-based models
account for only 0:03% in top economic journals, showing that this area did not win
much recognition among economists. Most of counterarguments or criticism are con-
centrated on saying that simulations \do not prove anything". The major concerns can
be boiled down to the doubt that (1) agent-based simulations are dicult to interpret
and generalize, and that (2) they can not arrive at a xed \equilibrium" as a steady
state solution as for classical models. Our reasonings are as follows:
Many mainstream economists do not \believe" simulation can be as sound as mathe-
matical models, especially some agent-based models do not even oer a compact set of
equations, as well as algebraic solutions, which can be easily generalized or interpreted.
We argue that, in fact, there are well-designed sets of intrinsic equations behind the
computer programs. This is easy to understand because the computer conducts its
calculations in accordance with the rules given by the researcher. What might be
a little cumbersome is that, most of the programs for such models are written in a
\text-based" algorithmic tool called \pseudo code"4, which is a high level version of an
algorithm, and may be either deterministic or stochastic. For instance, a typical kind
of agent-based models looks like a three-dimensional chessboard, with agents sitting in
4Most publications on agent-based models only contain descriptions of the general algorithms
instead of detailed programming code. This is because even today programs are often not easily
portable from one machine (or one operating system) to another, and there are always a wide variety
of programs for choice, e.g., MATLAB, C++, GAUSS, or other special programming tools, such as,
StarLogo, Swarm, Lisp-Stat, and so on. All of them are not directly transferrable to each other.
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a network and having lattice-like neighbors both in the space and time domain. The
location of a particular agent and his responsive and purposeful behavior are encoded
in algorithmic form using simulation rules. Once the program starts, the simulation
generates a \history" that is able to reveal the dynamic consequences of many de-
signed assumptions, so that watching phenomena emerging from agents' interactions
becomes possible (cf. Parunak et al. (1998)). At the end of the simulation, the resulting
distribution should be unique with a statistic equilibrium of the macro dynamics.
In spite of that, most agent-based models may be highly dependent on the structure
parameters or initial conditions (Richiardi and Leombruni (2005)). Take the SA model
which will be introduced in Chap. 3 for example. Sometimes even a small modication
will change the quality of results, or slightly change the nal distributional form, which
makes generalization of certain results dicult5. Since computer calculation capacity
gives an upper limit for running simulations, agent-based models should always be
executed under reasonable guesses on particular combinations of relevant parameters
within a system of limited sample size.
\Equilibrium", as the opposite to \disequilibrium" (cf. left part of Fig. 1.1), is believed
by most economists to be the optimal state of the economy, as well as the principle or
ultimate goal of solving many economic models. A popular measurement in standard
macroeconomic textbook is that market equilibrium should be a xed intersection de-
termined when supply meets demand in an \ecient" market. If the market reaches
equilibrium, it will stay there forever in case no shocks hit the system, such as in the
right part of Fig. 1.1. This ecient market relies on the homogeneity6 of individuals
and perfect information7. In such a system, while all agents are homogeneous, equi-
5However, it does not mean that any modications applied to agent-based models are not possible,
and actually trial and error is a common way to construct better models. It is believed that, if the
design of experiment is suciently close to reality, and the sample can be as large as real population,
it is totally possible for simulation to replicate the \real world".
6There are some general equilibrium models with heterogeneity, yet only few of them allow direct
or indirect interactions among their entities.
7Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) point out that the assumption of perfect information runs into
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Disequilibrium Statistical Equlibrium Fixed-point Equilibrium
Figure 1.1: Disequilibrium, statistical equilibrium and classical xed-point equilibrium. The left
part is obviously in \disequilibrium", it is a converging time series where we typically observe smaller
and smaller variances. As the variance becomes steady, the regular uctuation part shows \statistical
equilibrium" that agent-based models are going to predict. Finally, the last part of a \xed-point
equilibrium" is only theoretically possible in classical modeling, but will never be realized either in
our simulations, nor perhaps in the real world.
librium of the whole system means that each of its components reaches equilibrium as
well.
In contrast, the concept of \equilibrium" in agent-based models is quite dierent. In-
stead of demanding equilibrium of all sub-elements, it only requires the aggregate
distributional form of the system to be \stable" or \quasi-stable". This distinct way of
looking into \equilibrium" is usually named \statistical equilibrium" (cf. middle part
of Fig. 1.1), which results from interactions among \slowly changing, age-dependent
characteristics of a population which ages and renews itself only gradually . . . (Steindl
(1965) (p.142))". As a consequence, statistical equilibrium emerges as a state of
\macroscopic equilibrium . . .maintained by a large number of transitions in opposite
logical paradox, and if information is not perfect, the market cannot be ecient. Delli-Gatti et al.
(2005) add that, \market failure leads to agents' interaction and to coordination failures, emerging
properties of aggregate behavior, and to a pathological nature of business uctuations".
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directions . . . (Feller (1957), Vol. I, p.395)". Note that the word \statistical" is empha-
sized instead of \deterministic", meaning that our agent-based simulations are based
on randomness and scaling outcomes, with the whole process growing from diverse
causes and incomplete knowledge. We quote Delli-Gatti et al. (2008)'s saying that
\direct and/or indirect interaction among heterogeneous agents at the microeconomic
level is a sucient condition for macroeconomic regularities to emerge". A system is
in statistical equilibrium when it reaches a stationary distribution, with xed mean(s)
and variance(s). It is not surprising that, no matter how much random noise is added
into the system, after all, the agent-based model which is in statistical equilibrium will
still achieve a new \stable" statistical equilibrium. In other words, the model will often
stay roughly unchanged even if enlarging the system, prolonging simulations or adding
up additional disturbances. It is perhaps also interesting to note that, most of the
variables in statistical equilibrium will look normally distributed when their behaviors
in the time domain are collected and plotted in an aggregate level. This holds almost
\vice versa", which means if we nd that a variable follows normal distribution, this
variable is more likely to be in \statistical equilibrium", because: (1) there is a strong
tendency for the variable to take a central value; (2) positive and negative deviations
from this central value are equally likely; (3) the frequency of deviations falls o rapidly
as the deviations become larger. Since a variable that is in statistical equilibrium com-
pletely satises all these rules, as a result, we may observe many distributions in our
daily life actually turn out to be bell-shaped (i.e., the random variable follows Normal
or Gaussian distributions in aggregation).
1.3 Contribution of Study
The thesis will be divided into two parts. The rst part of study will be focused on
a recent agent-based model of social production, whereas in the second part, a simple
model of interaction of agents in a particular setting will be introduced and estimated.
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The signicance of the rst part is to provide a social simulation model (inspired by
Wright (2005)). This agent-based model produces many distributions, that can help to
understand various social phenomena, ranging from rm/individual behavior, to social
wealth, or GDP and business cycle, etc. Normally all these topics are studied in an
isolated manner8, whereas this model connects them within a simple causal network.
As far as complexity is concerned, the models discussed in our study may be more
complex than replicating a single phenomenon, while those agent-based models which
emphasize one target are not able to mimic the whole network of social relations.
After reviewing the recent research on agent-based modeling, we feel that a complete
model of production relation, which should be able to simulate a large variety of social
phenomena, is still lacking.
Apart from \one model for all" character, we will show that the non-vanishing propor-
tion of unemployment, business uctuations, the existence of wealth inequality, and so
on, are actual outcomes of complex interactions of rms and individuals. In classical
economic thought, the above mentioned phenomena are all considered as \transient"
or \non-stable". It is believed that social \equilibrium" is reached only when \supply"
meets \demand", where there will be full employment, no growth (or forever growth)
and equal wealth distribution . . . By creating models of a recurring process of em-
ployment, production and consumption, we will show that this seeming instability is a
\statistical equilibrium" consequence of numerous interacting individual entities having
impacts on each other. In a statistical framework containing collective and cooperative
properties of economic units, it is the long-lasting (relatively) stationary distribution of
aggregate behavior, which should be emphasized. Our later models will demonstrate
that, after the economy reaches a statistical equilibrium (in a relatively short period),
the number of employers/employees/the unemployed are displayed always as relatively
xed proportions (instead of xed numbers). Meanwhile, the number of rms, the
8In order to study rm growth or agents' wealth, usually separate models should be built responsible
for each task, using one model to describe two or more than two distinguished facts is comparatively
rare.
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growth of the economy, and many other variables are all uctuating around their mean
values, which shows that the system has no tendency to deviate from \equilibrium"
over time.
When mentioning unemployment, it will turn out that a relatively small but xed
proportion of unemployment is the result of competition within a complex system
of production relations. That is to say, under the current way of social production
relation in most developed countries, there will always be a small amount of people
who suer from layos. This means the common belief in macroeconomics under a
\supply = demand" system, that there is full employment (i.e., the unemployment
rate is zero), will never be realized in the modern economy. Consequently, given no
outside enforcement from the government in a competitive market, there should be
a permanent level of frictional unemployment, which consists of workers temporarily
searching for new jobs.
Furthermore, our models are able to reproduce the ubiquitous Pareto principle (or
\80/20 rule"). The principle was suggested by management thinker Joseph M. Juran. It
was named after Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, who observed that 80% of income in
Italy was received by 20% of the population. As a matter of fact, the 80/20 proportion
is only a symbolic approximation, which points out that most results in many situations
are determined by a small number of causes. The exact ratios in real life may vary
from cases to cases. The 80/20 rule is universal around us. For example, one may nd
80% of support comes from 20% of his/her friends, 80% of important work is done in
20% of time, 80% of national total income is earned by 20% of population, and many
other cases in life. At the rst glance, it looks like an \imbalance", yet it actually can
be an outcome in a statistical equilibrium. The interesting ndings of the \80/20 rule"
in our models include, e.g., most wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small number
of rich people; a large majority of workers are hired by a small minority of rms; small
rms account for a large percentage of existing rms, but they only contribute to a
small percentage of social output, and so on.
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Moreover, we have also devoted a detailed discussion to rm dynamics and wealth
dynamics in Chap. 5. It is proposed that many emerging distributions can be treated
as a combination of individual Gaussian distributions. At an aggregate level, some of
them will display multiple modes, and some of them remain uni-modal with certain
skewness. Take the income distribution for instance. The common approach is to
truncate the data and convert the income graph into a log-log form, then the upper
tail and lower tail of the income distribution are studied separately. This approach
has apparent shortcomings: by adopting a log scale and cumulative density, the up-
per tail of income will be enlarged and emphasized, which only includes extremely
rich people who constitute less than 20% of the whole population. The lower income
class which represents 80% of population, is condensed and limited to a small region,
so that the \knee-shape"9 of the lower tail gets blurred. During examing the wealth
dynamics from our simulations, a multimodal Gaussian distribution has been success-
fully tted. It is known that the Gaussian distribution is very common. If one studies
certain object which is composed of several sub-groups which is individually Gaussian
distributed, these Gaussian distributions may easily overlap each other in the aggre-
gate level, and a multimodal Gaussian will arise. For example, Schilling et al. (2002)
explain that the height distribution of humans is bimodal, which can be understood as
a mixture outcome of two distributions Z1 (males) and Z2 (females) with weight  and
. Nevertheless, even if two Gaussians have dierent means and variances, their mix-
ture distribution does not necessarily look bimodal if their means are close enough to
each other compared with their standard deviations. On the other hand, it may easily
become extremely complicated if a unimodal mixed-Gaussian distribution is treated in
a normal way, then some distributions will look very odd, and it is almost impossible
to nd an existing functional form to describe the entire region of the distribution10.
9The overlapping area of lower income and higher income area is usually observed to be a
\knee-shape", showing an uneven transition from the lower income class to the higher income class
(cf. Chap. 5).
10For example, it seems possible to replicate the prot rate distribution in Wright (2005) by a
weighted mixture of two Gaussian distributions, whereas originally he uses a 6-parameter functional
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We are going to show that, not only the income distribution, but also the wealth dis-
tribution (either for the poor or for the rich) can be treated as special combination of
Gaussian distributions without using any truncation. In our experience, if a multiple-
Gaussian distribution helps in explaining certain distribution, usually a mixture of up
to three Gaussian distributions is sucient for a good t (with R-squared 99:99%).
Besides, despite the complex interactions among agents, the computational capacity
required for our models is not too demanding. One typical model contains a main pro-
gram of less than 100 lines, a standard run of 1,200,000 iterations (i.e., 1,000 Agents 
100 years  12 months) takes only 15 minutes with MATLAB (cf. program codes in the
Appendix), less than 1 minute with GAUSS, and 2 seconds with C++. Due to the fact
that most of the agent-based models may easily reach the upper boundary of computer
capacity, this relatively small demand ensures possibilities of further extensions to the
current model. Future research can be easily developed based on this framework, e.g.,
with currently simple rules regulating rms or individuals, it is expected that more
detailed rules can be added into the model, such as rules to regulate the reinvestment
of rms, the rationality of individuals, the role of banks and government, and so on.
To sum up, the rst part of thesis focuses on setting up a well-developed agent-based
model, with the aim of simulating and explaining the \social relations of production".
The baseline model is simple but robust in explaining many empirical distributions,
and most of them are not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively in agreement with
the documented reality of developed capitalism, such as the power-law rm size distri-
bution, the Laplace rm growth distribution, the Lognormal rm demise distribution,
the exponential recession duration distribution, and etc. In addition, the model also
touches a wide variety of social phenomena which still lack empirical support, (per-
haps) due to the complexity of data collection in real life, such as the GDP growth
distribution (of a certain country), the wage-prot rate distribution, the relation be-
tween the number of small rms and business cycles, and so on.
form to describe this unimodal distribution.
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The second part of the thesis will be devoted to models with \animal spirits" or \senti-
ment dynamics". \Animal spirits" is the term John Maynard Keynes used (in Keynes
(1936)11) to describe emotions or ideas which inuence human behaviors and other
social activities. As agent-based models are becoming more and more popular, inter-
est in building the \animal spirits" into agent-based simulation or behavioral models
has consequently been quite high as well. Among them, several leading researches are
the ants' model by Kirman (1993), the active walker model by Helbing et al. (1997),
the compromise model such as in Weisbuch et al. (2001), the neighborhood model as
in Galam (2002), the voter model as in Liggett (1999). Recently, at least two books
(i.e., Pasquinelli (2008), Akerlof and Shiller (2009)) with a focus on \animal spirits"
have been published to promote the understanding of the role played by emotions in
inuencing economic decision making.
In order to better understand the possible inuences caused by human sentiment to
our economy, in Part II of the thesis, we will build up VAR models and opinion dy-
namics models including both sentiment and economic reality. First of all, we use
consumer condence, industrial condence and industrial production indices, to con-
struct a concrete VAR model, this forecast-oriented VAR analysis will provide a grasp
of how the trust or condence of consumers or industry will aect real output. In the
later chapter, we will study a simple model of interactions (inspired by Weidlich and
Haag (1983), Lux (1995)) that can be estimated. Apart from showing a signicant
eect of sentiment on output, this model is able to reveal the underlying mechanism of
11The original passage in Keynes (1936) reads \Even apart from the instability due to speculation,
there is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our
positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations, whether
moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full
consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result
of animal spirits | a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a
weighted average of quantitative benets multiplied by quantitative probabilities."
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periodic switching of the \animal spirits" between two attitudes. We will prove again
that there is a strong causal relation among industrial sentiment and the outputs.
1.4 Outline of Study
In general, agent-based models can be understood as a class of computational models
for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous agents. This thesis contains
studies of two dierent types of agent-based models: the rst one focuses on simulations
of social relations, and the second one focuses on simulations of opinion formation. The
7 chapters are structured as follows:
After the introduction in Chap. 1, where we discuss the application of agent-based
modeling in social sciences and the relevance of our study, in Chap. 2 we will provide a
literature review of most distributions and stylized facts that are going to be mentioned
as outcomes of our simulation, including rm dynamics, income, business cycle, and so
on. Then, the rst type of agent-based model of social relation will be described from
Chap. 3 to Chap. 5.
Chap. 3 introduces the baseline model from Wright (2005). The idea is to build up
a model involving the elementary relationships of modern production. The model is
characterized by its originality and creativity. It is simple but straight-forward, with
many realistic hypothesis. When compared with many other models which try to repli-
cate empirical facts, this model is more vigorous at using simulations to approximate
reality. Nevertheless, when exploring and replicating this model, we nd some serious
shortcomings which might impede its explanatory power of model. After a number of
experiments, we oer some amendment suggestions. In order to support our reasoning,
comparisons of simulation results with and without these changes will be provided.
In Chap. 4, we put together all suggestions discussed in Chap. 3, and try to recover the
whole series of simulation experiments of Wright (2005) in our new model. The model
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will be named \Agent-based Model of Employment, Production and Consumption
(EPC)", to better characterize its basic feature of describing social production relation.
The improvement of the new simulation results against the original model will be
presented.
In Chap. 5, we extend the EPC model and take endogenous wages into account. The
model will be called EPCE (EPC model with endogenous wages) model. This extension
oers the possibility of studying certain new characteristics of agents' behaviors, and
we are thus able to explain some interesting economic phenomena at the micro level,
which can not be captured in the previous models, such as the role of small rms in the
economy, the relationship between rm numbers and business cycles, income inequality,
and etc.
In the last two chapters, we will dig into agent-based models of opinion formation.
The aim of our study is to nd out whether the subjective opinion dynamics may, to
some extent, inuence objective economic variables. Particularly, we will investigate
how consumer sentiment or industrial sentiment can help to explain or predict the
movement of industrial production. As a benchmark, in the subsequent agent-based
model, Chap. 6 oers a forecast-oriented VAR analysis. Dierent kinds of VAR models
with various lags will be estimated and evaluated with respect to their overall forecast
abilities for industrial production.
Taking nonlinearity and interactions among sentiment and industrial production into
account, Chap. 7 sets up an agent-based model of opinion formation following the
pioneering work of Weidlich and Haag (1983) and Lux (1995), to model the joint
dynamics of sentiment and output. A nonlinear Fokker-Planck equation is added to
help in explaining the transient density of this stochastic model. Then the model
is further extended into two dimensions. We observe a strong causal relation from
industrial sentiment to the output.
Finally, in Chap. 8, a short conclusion with the major ndings of our studies will be
provided.
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Part I
An Agent-Based Model of
Production and Exchange

Chapter 2
Stylized Facts from
Macroeconomics and Industrial
Organization
In this chapter, we are going to present those typical stylized facts of macroeconomic
data, that can be more-or-less partly recovered later by our models. It is worth men-
tioning that, many of these stylized facts are quantitatively extremely robust, yet their
specic functional characterization is still controversial, and most of them are not ap-
plicable to all countries (economies) in the world. Sometimes, our models are able to
generate distributions which are in accordance with some empirical studies, but this
does not necessarily mean that the distributions of all countries will follow this rule.
On the other hand, if our models do not generate the same distributions as certain em-
pirical studies, this might not be the failure of models either. Our aim is to study how
agents interact to generate scaling characteristics, instead of proving (e.g.,) whether a
distribution is closer to the power law or the Lognormal1. More specically, it may
1If a logarithmic scale is applied, the power law and the Lognormal distribution will display similar
upper tails, thus it is sometimes hard to dierentiate between them. However, what we emphasize in
our study is that some of their characteristics are common, e.g., they both satisfy the \80/20 rule".
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happen that the distribution generated by our model can be tted well by more than
one statistical distributions, depending on dierent truncation methods applied. We
insist that it is not that relevant to decide which one of the distributions is more accu-
rate, but it is more important that we have successfully built up a simplied model to
generate various distributional forms which shed some lights on explaining complicated
interactions in our society.
2.1 Firms, Employees and the Unemployed
In industrialized economies, the total population can be categorized into employers2
(rm owners), employees (workers), as well as the unemployed. Because their group
proportions vary across dierent countries and from time to time, it is dicult to
provide an ideal percentage of each class. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that
there should be only a minority of rm owners employing a majority of workers, and
the remaining small percentage is the unemployed class.
According to the \Survey of Business Owners" by the U.S. Census Bureau3, in the
year 2002, there are altogether 5; 524; 784 rm owners with 110; 766; 605 employees.
This means in the U.S., the number of employees is more than 20 times as high as
the number of employers. In spite of this large dierence, the exact percentages of
employers and workers also vary from sector to sector. For example, in the mining
industry, there are 19; 324 employers employing 534; 478 workers in 2002 | namely
the number of workers is nearly 28 times larger than the employers, whereas in the
forestry & shing industry, there are 29; 250 employers against 250; 838 employees,
which means the number of employees is less than 9 times more than the employers
2The \employer" in Social Architecture (SA) Model by Wright (2005) is called \capitalists", since
the model is originally invented within political economics framework.
3Statistics are from \2002 Survey of Business Owners (SBO)" by U.S. Census Bureau, released on
09.14.2006, available at http://factnder.census.gov/. The number of \employers" has already taken
\self-employed employed persons" into account.
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: : : As a matter of fact, providing a target percentage of employer-to-employee ratio
for each country and each sector is perhaps tedious and an unnecessary task, yet it
might be easier to accept that an industrialized economy should have a small number
of employers hiring a large majority of workers.
Unemployment is usually measured using the ocial unemployment rate, which is de-
ned as the percentage of those in the labor force who are available and willing to work
but are currently without jobs. Keynesian economists believe that unemployment re-
sults from insucient eective demand for goods and services in the economy (cyclical
unemployment), others point out structural problems and ineciencies inherent in the
labor market. Classical or neoclassical economists tend to focus more on rigidities
imposed on the labor market from the outside, such as minimum wage laws, tax regu-
lations which may discourage the hiring of workers (classical unemployment). A certain
part of unemployment is thought to be due to voluntary choices by the unemployed
who might take the time to nd a new job (frictional unemployment).
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment rate in the U.S. (1950{2010). Source: http://www.bis.gov/data/home,
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey.
Dierent countries experience dierent levels of unemployment during dierent periods
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of time. The unemployment rate of Singapore dropped to 1:6%4 in 2007. China's
ocially registered unemployment in urban areas stood at 4:3%, and in some of the big
cities the unemployment rate was below 2:3% in 2009; other cities like Hongkong and
Macao kept their unemployment rates around 3% at the same year5. From historical
data, the U.S. has a lower unemployment rate than most European countries, with
some variants among them, such as U.K. and Denmark who had lower unemployment
rates than Italy and France over many decades (cf. Schmitt et al. (2009)). Fig. 2.1
records the U.S. unemployment rate throughout the past 60 years. It gives us an
impression that the U.S. unemployment rate is uctuating year to year, following a
cyclical style6. The unemployment rate may drop to as low as 3% or rise to as high as
9:6%. Overall, the extreme cases are relatively rare, the unemployment rate is by and
large persistent over the past decades. In fact, there is no country in the world that has
ever realized full employment. As 3% unemployment rate is possibly the lowest rates
for the U.S., it may be understood as \frictional" unemployment rate, which contains
people waiting to be hired or searching for next job opportunities. To some extent,
although full employment is not realistic, the lowest unemployment rate in a certain
economy can be set as a reliable target unemployment rate for the government, which
can be achieved with some eorts.
2.2 Firm Size Distribution
There are many models studying rms, and most of them focus on rm size or growth
rate of rms. These models presume certain rules for rm birth, growth and death,
4Refer to http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ by the Singapore government.
5Refer to ocial report \Labor unions help relieve employment pressure during crisis" on March 9,
2010, from http://english.gov.cn/ by Chinese government.
6Keynesians argue that this type of cyclical unemployment has similar pattern as the business
cycle. The cyclical unemployment rises during economic downturns and falls when the economy
booms. Typically, in an economic recession, the demand for goods and services falls, less production
is needed and consequently fewer workers are needed, which leads to mass unemployment.
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and it is demonstrated through simulation that in the long horizon the rm sizes
typically follow a Lognormal distribution. For example, Gibrat (1931) was the rst
to investigate the so-called \law of proportionate eect"7. He proposes to use log
annual growth rates r = ln(St+1
St
) (where S is rm size) for all rms in nite time.
His interesting nding is that, if we assume that all companies are independent, born
at roughly the same time with similar initial sizes, and obey an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) growth rate r, then the cumulative statical distribution
of rm sizes will approach Lognormality. Some extensions to Gibrat (1931)'s model are
proposed in Kalecki (1945), Simon (1955), Steindl (1965), Chesher (1979), Cabral and
Mata (2003), and others, with similar ndings of Lognormally distributed rms sizes.
Many empirical papers (e.g., Ijiri and Simon (1977), Silberman (1967), Hall (1987))
look into real rm sizes in practice, and nd a clear concave parabolic density in the
upper tail of the rm size distribution, which supports Gibrat's nding. An overview
of steady-state rm size distributions resulting from diverse rm dynamics models can
be found in Wit (2005).
On the other hand, some empirical studies point out that \the size distribution of
rms conforms fairly well to the Lognormal distribution, (but) with possibly some
skewness to the right" (cf. Hall (1987), p. 584). Hart and Paris (1956) observe for
British data from 1885 to 1950 that rm size distribution can be tted into Lognormal
distribution reasonably well, but the distribution is \somewhat skewed to the right
and slightly leptokurtic", which indicates a deviation of the true distribution from
Lognormal. Later on, Quandt (1966) proposes the Pareto distribution8 (also known as
power law) based on dierent tests, and rejects Lognormality for Fortune 500 rm sizes
based on both the 1955 and 1960 databases. Stanley et al. (1995) study 4,701 publicly
7A random process of a variable is said to obey the \law of proportionate eect" if the change of
variable at any step of the process is a random proportion of its previous value.
8The probability density function (PDF) of Pareto distribution can be written as: f(x) = C 
x (+1), where C is a constant term. The Pareto distribution is in fact a power law distribution
written in a special form.
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traded manufacturing rms in the Standard & Poor's Compustat (database), and nd
that the Lognormal distribution ts the data reasonably well expect for the upper tail,
where deviations from Lognormality are statistically signicant. Axtell (2001) argues
that rms covered by Compustat are not representative of the overall population of
U.S. rms (because only large rms are considered). Instead, he collects data from the
U.S. Census Bureau of all rms with more than one employee in 1997, and shows that
the upper tail of rm size distribution satises a special case of a power law, called
Zipf's law9. Furthermore, investigations carried out by Ramsden and Kiss-Haypal
(2000) show that the power law upper tail (with perhaps dierent exponents) in rm
size distributions are also common for more than 20 countries of America, Asia and
Europe. Given a number of dierent ndings on the rm size distribution announced
by empirical researchers, Sutton (1997) concludes that probably there is no general
density function that describes the entire region of the empirical densities well.
So far, most of the articial models are not able to show that there should be an upper
limit for rm size. Gibrat (1931) and its companion models are all simulated for a
short time, because in a longer horizon, the biggest rm generated by simulation tends
to employ the whole population10.
Concerning the empirical rm size, Teitelbaum and Axtell (2005) study the U.S. Census
Bureau's Statistics of U.S. rms surviving from 1998 to 199911, they nd that the
9The power law distribution can be written as P (x) / x (a+1). When plotted in a log-log scale,
it displays a straight downward sloping line with slope  (a+ 1). If a = 1, this special case of power
law is known as Zipf's law.
10The EPC model and the EPCE model introduced in Chap. 4 and Chap. 5 are able to demonstrate
that rms may not grow continuously. When the system reaches statistical equilibrium, there should
be always reasonable proportions of employers, workers and the unemployed. Only one rm employing
all working population is not a statistical equilibrium solution.
11In fact, the year 1998 and 1999 are the very peak of so-called \dot-com" boom. Large volumes
of venture capital were pouring into high-tech areas, and there emerged a lot of start-up rms which
experienced extremely fast booming. Consequently, data collected from these years might not be a
good representation of an average year.
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modal rm size in the U.S. has only single employee, while the median is as few as 2-3
employees (depending on whether or not self-employed persons are taken into account),
the mean is only somewhat higher than 20. A study carried by Headd and Kirchho
(2007) based on the same dataset reports that rms with less than 100 employees
constitute 99% of all rms in the U.S., with the median rm size of only 4 employees
and the mean of 23 in recent years; besides, they also discover that most rms start up
in the 1-4 employee size class, but might not grow beyond this size class throughout
their lives. In general, all these statistics point to the fact that the typical business in
the U.S. is extremely small, and there is a large number of small rms coexisting with
a small number of relatively large rms.
2.3 Firm Growth Distribution
The study of rm size goes often hand-in-hand with the study of rm growth rate. If
there is high relation between rm growth and size, Gibrat (1931)'s famous assumption
that \rm growth rate is independent of size" may not be realistic. The relationship
between size and growth of rms, has previously been modeled by a number of re-
searchers, such as Sutton (1997), Richiardi (2004), Christopher and Rodrigues (2005),
Coad (2007), among others. The main assumption of the above-mentioned models is
that rm growth rate decreases with rm size. In other words, smaller rms should
enjoy faster growth rates than large rms. This conjecture is, to some extent, in accor-
dance with some survey studies. Alhade and Alhade (1964) compare growth rates of
the largest 200 U.S. banks between 1930 and 1960 and state that smaller banks tend to
enjoy fastest growth; later on, Rhoades and Yeats (1974) provide evidences of diering
average growth rates for dierent sizes of banks. Other similar ndings outside banking
industry include Hart and Paris (1956)'s research on business concentration based on
British data, Piergiovanni et al. (2002)'s study on Italian rms in hospitality industry,
and so on.
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However, the same distributional forms may not hold for all countries or all industrial
sectors. Quite opposite to the above ndings, Pagano and Schivardi (2001) focus on
R&D rms in the European union, and obtain a positive association between average
rm size and growth; they explain that rms with larger size are more able to take
advantage of the returns on R&D in order to foster productivity growth. Meanwhile,
it is also obvious that the growth rates of dierent rms might be highly correlated
with their past performances, and even interact within the same industry. Goddard
et al. (2009) research into the growth performance of \Federally Chartered U.S. Credit
Unions" and their sizes during 1991 and 1997, they nd out that most of larger credit
unions grow faster than their smaller counterparts over the sample period; interest-
ingly, they also discover that rms experience growth rate uctuations regardless of
their sizes: a credit union with \above average" growth in one period tends to expe-
rience \below average" growth in the next period; nonetheless, large unions seem less
susceptible to extreme uctuations in growth, whereas small credit unions might have
more inconsistency in their performances.
In the meantime, there is an abundance of studies on the shape of the distribution of
growth rates. Teitelbaum and Axtell (2005) look into the North American Industry
Classication Systems' (NAICS) 20 major industry sectors, and reveal that rms be-
longing to dierent industrial sectors may have diering mean growth rates, but the
empirical rm growth rates across these sectors have similar distributions and vari-
ances, which can be characterized by a tent shaped \Laplace distribution"12. Since the
Laplace distribution has much heavier tails than normality, this implies that the U.S.
12The Laplace distribution is a continuous probability distribution named after Pierre-Simon
Laplace. It is sometimes called \double exponential distribution", because it can be considered
as two exponential distributions. The PDF of Laplace distribution can be written as: f(xj; b) =
1
2bexp
   jx jb , where  is a location parameter and b > 0 is a scale parameter. At the rst glance,
this PDF expression looks very close to a normal distribution. However, the normal distribution is
expressed in terms of squared dierences from the mean , whereas the Laplace density is expressed
in terms of absolute dierence from the mean. Consequently, the Laplace distribution has fatter tails
than the normal distribution.
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rms experience much stronger uctuations than in the case of a normally distributed
rm growth rate distribution. The same Laplace distributed rm growth rate has been
proposed in Stanley et al. (1996)13 in which they study all publicly-traded U.S. man-
ufacturing companies between 1975 and 1991, as well as in Bottazzi et al. (2002)14's
study of Italian manufacturing industry, among others. However, their studies are
not completely in line with others. Fu et al. (2005) look into pharmaceutical industry
database (PHID) of 21 countries from 1994 to 2004, as well as U.S. publicly-traded
rms from 1973 to 2004 of all industries. They discover that the rm growth distribu-
tion may be more leptokurtic than Laplace, and it can be understood as a combined
distribution with exponential (Laplace) in the central part and asymptotically power
law tails decaying as f(x) = x  where  = 3. This kind of exponential power distri-
bution, also known as Subbotin distribution15 includes both Gaussian distribution and
Laplace distributions as special cases. It provides a better t to some other empirical
statistics as well, such as the rm prot rate distribution (cf. Alfarano and Milakovic
(2008)). Reed (2001) oers a simple but reasonable explanations of why many empir-
ical size distributions in economics and elsewhere exhibit power law behavior in the
upper tail. We would like to emphasize that no matter whether realistic growth rate
distribution is closer to Laplace or Subbotin distribution, it suggests that uctuations
in the growth rates are very common, and in fact, \such uctuations are largely respon-
13Their other research papers on similar topics can be found in Amaral et al. (1997), Amaral et al.
(2001), Buldyrev et al. (2007).
14Their other research papers on similar topics can be found in Bottazzi et al. (2001), Bottazzi et al.
(2003), Bottazzi and Secchi (2003b) and Bottazzi and Secchi (2005).
15The original reference of Subbotin distribution can be found in Subbotin (1923). Later on, this
distribution was rened in Bottazzi and Secchi (2003b). The functional form of the Subbotin family
in the symmetric version is given by: f(x) = 1
2ab
1
b  (1+ 1b )
e 
1
b j x  jb , where a > 0, b > 0 and  () is
the Gamma function. The Subbotin distribution is thus characterized by three parameters: a location
parameter m, a scale parameter a and a shape parameter b. If b = 2, the distribution turns out to be
Gaussian, while for b = 1 the distribution is Laplace. As b gets smaller, the tails get heavier and the
peak of the density becomes more pronounced. Some detailed descriptions of Subbotin distribution
can be found in Castaldi and Dosi (2007).
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sible for what makes the small business sector so productive, an engine of economic
growth" (cf. Teitelbaum and Axtell (2005), p. 1).
Apart from that, many researchers nd out that the empirical rm growth rate dis-
tribution is actually asymmetric. A recent report by the U.S. Small Business Admin-
istration, Oce of Advocacy (cf. Perline et al. (2006)) looks into comprehensive data
on U.S. rms extracted from the Census database over 1998{2003. They show that
the observed business growth rates have a tendency towards slight asymmetry over
longer horizons, and negative rates appear more volatile than positive rates. A similar
study carried out by the same institution (cf. Headd and Kirchho (2007)) highlights
several interesting facts that: (1) \growing rms are generally a constant share of the
economy with a minor business cycle eect; rms with employment growth outnumber
rms with employment decline"; (2) the fast growing rms (dened as having a 50%
or more increase in annual employment with at least a 5-employee increase) are just a
small share of all rms (around 3% in 1992); (3) about 35% of rms have no employ-
ment change from one year to the next, about 25% shrink in employment, while only
about 28% of rms will grow in employment each year.
2.4 Firm Entry and Exit
Theoretically, as in many models, rms could live forever (or until the model breaks
down). Likewise, rm could grow or shrink as needed in order to stay competitive as
designed. In Lucas (1978)' seminal paper on rm size, he predicts that the world would
be taken over by large businesses, which means the existing rms will grow larger and
larger with franchise (e.g., monopoly) in certain areas and prevent small rms to enter.
This has simply never occurred, and in fact, there are very few rms lasting more
than 100 years. The development of technology, the diversication of consumer tastes,
the better nancing, and other factors allow continuous birth of new rms, and keep
forcing uncompetitive rms to exit. Cook and Ormerod (2003) reveal in their U.S. rm
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life-cycle study, that about 611,000 rms die each year out of a total 5.73 million from
1989 to 1997, which tells a yearly rm demise rate of approximately 10:7%. The same
evidence is also found in Headd and Kirchho (2007), where they calculate around 11%
of rms close down each year in the U.S. from 1992 to 2002.
It is easily imagined that the newly born rms are usually small and more fragile |
they account for most of the entries and exits happening everyday in industry, and at
the same time, create and destroy most of the job opportunities. This phenomenon
has drawn many empirical researchers' attention in the past 30 years. Midrigan (2007)
analyzes the U.S. \Survey of Business Administration" data and argues that most rm
turnovers happen with small rms, and rms with less than 20 employees together
account for 18% of the total U.S. employment; he also points out that the dying
rms are concentrated in rms with less than 20 employees. Other similar ndings
are documented in Hijzen et al. (2007)'s study on U.K. small businesses, Sakai et al.
(2005)'s study on Japanese rms, and so on. A very comprehensive review of the
research related to rm formation in the 1980s and 1990s can be found in Kirchho
(1994) and Caves (1998), more recent research is summarized in Haltiwanger et al.
(2008).
As far as the rm demise or survival rates are concerned, according to Headd and
Kirchho (2007), the survival rate for U.S. rms is only 50% after four years with
little uctuations over time, which is in line with an earlier empirical study by Birch
(1987) on American rms' life expectancy. If the rms' survival rates do not uctuate
too much, it seems that the number of rms' entry and exit may remain more-or-less
steady throughout years. Cook and Ormerod (2003) mention in their research of U.S.
rms from 1989 to 1997 that the number of demises bears little connection with the
overall state of the economy, namely, the total number of rm demises varies very little
from year to year in economic booms and recessions. For example, in the recession
year 1991 the U.S. real GDP fell by 0:5%, and in the boom year 1997 it grew by 4:3%,
yet the number of demises was very similar in both years, being 630,000 and 648,000
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respectively. This stylized fact has suggested that the rm demise distribution (i.e., the
number of yearly rm demises recorded in a histogram) should be relatively stationary
throughout the years, which in aggregation, may follow a bell-shape close to normal
distribution.
Meanwhile, the study on causal relation between rm size, age and growth rate is
also popular, which may date back to Prais (1976) and Evans (1987). More recent
eorts in this area include Lotti et al. (2003), Headd and Kirchho (2007), Shanmugam
and Bhaduri (2002), Rodrguez et al. (2003), Yasuda (2005), Phillips and Kirchho
(1989), Sanghamitra (1995)'s studies across dierent industries of both developing and
developed economies. Their general ndings are: rm size and age have a negative eect
on rm growth; a rm's survivability appears to rise with its size and age (until a certain
limit), with the exact survival rates and rm ages diering across countries or sectors.
Fig. 2.2 presents the nonparametric estimate of rm failure rates (= 1  survival rate)
conditional on the given ages for Spanish manufacturing rms (cf. Farinas and Moreno
(2000), p. 11). It displays that the failure rates decline steeply over rms with ages
under 20 years old; for rms within the range of 20{40 years old, the exit rate attens;
and nally, for rms over 40 years old, no clear relationship in failure rates and rm
ages is obtained.
Although all these empirical rm dynamics are interesting to economists, so far, there
is still no unied theory to explain why rms grow, decline or close in such a way,
and no theory will tell us why 10% to 12% of rms enter or exit each year, and how
some new rms grow while the others shrink or die. In the later chapters, we will use
agent-based models to explain what actually occurs to the rm dynamics, and how the
continuous entry and exit happens.
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Figure 2.2: Relation of rm age and failure rate. The x-axis represents rms' age in number of years,
and the y-axis represents rms' failure rate. Source: Farinas and Moreno (2000)'s study on Spanish
manufacturing rms (p.11).
2.5 Prot Rate Distribution
Despite the existence of non-protable organizations around us, a clear goal for most
rms is to earn prot in order to grow, to stay competitive, or to survive. There
has been a dominant tradition in economic thought that the prot rate tends to be
uniform in the long run, which is the result of free and perfect competition. In other
words, capital will look for industries where prot rates are higher than average, then
more labor will be attracted to these industries, output will be raised and price as
well as rms' prot will be lowered down until the average level is reached. However,
this traditional belief of classical competition has raised more and more debates. Ernst
Mandel and Alan Freeman's (cf. Shaikh (1984)) argue that \the concept of uniform rate
is neither necessary nor reasonable for understanding accumulation, price formation
or prot formation. Indeed, . . . a uniform rate and free competition are contradictory
concepts that cannot be reconciled". A similar opinion is expressed by Emmanuel
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Farjoun and Moshe Machover (cf. \Laws of Chaos" by Farjoun and Machover (1983))
who stress that: \it is perfectly well understood by most that in reality rates of prot
are never actually uniform. This is always explained by a deviation of reality from the
idea of perfect competition".
A number of models have been proposed for the prot rate distribution. For example,
Farjoun and Machover (1983) propose that the industry prot rate might be approxi-
mated by a gamma distribution16; Wright (2005) derives a six-parameter distribution
to match the model-generated prot rates, and suggests that \empirical rate-of-prot
distribution will be consistent with a parameter-mix of a ratio of normal variates with
means and variances that depend on a rm size parameter that is distributed according
to a power law", and this conjecture is tested in Wright (2004a). Julian (2007) uses
a U.K. company account database to demonstrate that the prot rate distribution is
highly right-skewed, with an upper tail close to a power law, that appears longer than
the lower tail (in normal scale). Alfarano and Milakovic (2008) design a statistical
equilibrium model which predicts an exponential power (or Subbotin) distribution of
rms' prot rates, with successful empirical application on the Forbes Global 2000 list
of the worlds' largest companies. All of these studies tell that, although the empirical
distribution of prot rate is still in question, it should be obviously not a uniform dis-
tribution. We agree with Alfarano and Milakovic (2008) that, in general, \the average
prot rate corresponds to a measure of central tendency, while the complex movement
of capital in search of prot rate equalization translate into a measure of dispersion
16The Gamma distribution is a right-skewed distribution, it is widely used in engineering, science
and business, to model continuous variables that are always positive and have skewed distributions.
The PDF of the Gamma distribution is: f(xj; ) =
 
x

 1
exp
 
  x

 () , where x > 0.  () is the Gamma
function, and both the parameters  and  are positive (i.e., ;  > 0).  is a shape parameter: when
 6 1, the Gamma distribution is exponentially shaped and asymptotic to both the vertical and
horizontal axes; when  > 1, the Gamma distribution assumes a unimodal but skewed shape, and the
skewness reduces as the value of  increases.  is a scale parameter, having the eect of stretching or
compressing the range of Gamma distribution. Finally, a Gamma distribution with  = 1 is known
as standard Gamma distribution.
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around the average".
The measurement of the rm prot rate distribution is actually very close to rm
growth distribution. There are commonly two dierent ways of measuring rm growth,
one is in terms of employee numbers (i.e., the size of rm), and the other is in terms
of sales (or revenue) amount. Since prot is usually calculated as \revenue { cost", it
is plausible to believe that there are close relations among rm size, growth and prot
rate too. In business, the \optimal" rm size is usually considered as the size where the
ratio between prot and capital invested in the rm is maximized17. Related studies
of inter-relationship among size, growth and prot rate can be found in Gort (1962)
(in which time series models are set up and estimated), and more recent research with
diverse results from dierent countries or industries such as in Luis (1995), Ballesta
and Lema (2003), Liu and Hsu (2006), Ishikawa (2007), among others.
2.6 GDP Growth and Business Cycle
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a basic measurement of a country's economic output.
There are three dierent ways to calculate GDP: the product (or output) approach,
the income approach, and the expenditure approach. All three approaches should in
principle provide the same result. Among them, the most direct method is the product
approach, which sums the outputs of all industries and rms to arrive at the total. The
expenditure approach works on the principle that all products must be purchased in the
end, thus the total value of products must be equal to consumers' total expenditures.
The income approach is also commonly used, as it is believed that the income of rm
owners and their workers must be equal to the value of their products, and the nal
GDP is calculated by summing up the overall income in a population.
The literatures on the distribution of the growth rate of GDP is quite sparse, neverthe-
17Because there is a great diculty in determining the best proportion of reinvested capital as well
as prot margin, it is consequently dicult to evaluate the correct size of \optimal" rms.
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less, a few eorts have been devoted to understand the inherent characteristics of GDP
growth rates across countries or within a country. Fu et al. (2005) study growth rates
of GDP in 195 countries from 1960 to 2004 based on the World Bank database, they
nd out that distribution of aggregate GDP is close to the Laplace distribution. Lee
et al. (1998) and Canning et al. (1998) analyze the uctuations in GDP of 152 countries
for the period 1950 to 1992, and reveal that the distribution of annual growth rates
decays with \fatter" tails than a Gaussian, in particular, the tails of the distributions
scale as a power law. These ndings are in surprising accordance with the study of
rm growth rates18.
Another topic closely related to GDP is business cycle. In reality, the time that GDP
continuously rises is usually called \economic boom", and \recession" is named for
the opposite, when GDP keeps declining. Burns and Mitchell (1946) estimate that
the duration of a business cycle, including booms and recessions, would be minimal
5-7 quarters and maximal 33-35 quarters in the U.S., and 45-47 quarters in U.K.,
according to data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) during
1885 and 1931. Everts (2006) uses a dierent procedure to analyze the duration of
business cycle since 1955, he indicates that the mean duration of recessions is around
2.6 to 3.25 quarters, which means the majority of recessions should be less than 1 year;
meanwhile, he also argues that the business cycle is highly sensitive to both the course
of time and industry sectors; for example, business cycles tend to become longer in
the post-war period with longer booms than recessions (which is conrmed by Burns
and Mitchell (1946) and Sichel (1991) as well), and the frequency of the cycles is much
higher in the agricultural sector than in the service sector.
The debates on the distribution of recession duration have not come into an agreement
either. Ormerod and Mouneld (2001) study 17 western economies over the period
18Note that our later models are all based on a single economy instead of many dierent economies.
Therefore, we are not able to show that GDP across countries may follow a Laplace distribution. We
track the GDP growth rates of our typical economy, and nd that the GDP growth rate is closer to
a Gaussian distribution (cf. Chap. 4.3.5).
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1871{1994, and demonstrate that the duration of a recession is power law distributed.
Wright (2004b) reinterprets this data and argues that the frequency of recession dura-
tion follows an exponential law instead of a power law. The same but extended dataset
is later studied by Ausloos et al. (2004). They conclude that it is not entirely clear
whether the duration of recession follows a power law or exponential law throughout
the whole period, but the duration of booms seems to follow a power law.
2.7 Wage and Prot Share
If GDP is a standard for measuring a country's economic output, prot as a proportion
of GDP can be understood as a rough measurement of the share in output that rms
get, and the leftover proportion is wage share that workers get. Many countries publish
national accounts to show how income is distributed in the economy, namely how var-
ious groups in the economy earn their incomes (e.g., corporations earn prots, workers
earn wages and salaries, etc.). Foley and Michl (1999) study the income distribution
in U.S., U.K. and Japan for a period over 100 years. They show that the prot share
(normally lower than wage share) is between 0.25 and 0.4 of GDP, with very rare cases
that the prot rate can be as high as 0.5. Kalecki (1954) nds the prot share in the
U.S. is on average 0.46 between 1929 and 1941.
In reality, wage and prot share in the economy is not always stationary, it can be very
dierent across countries and industries. For example, the prot share for Japanese
rms is known to be much lower than the U.S. rms, and sometimes even as low as 8%.
Fig. 2.3 provides adjusted wage shares as proportions of GDP for Germany (FRG), the
U.S. and Japan throughout the last four decades, which illustrates some dierences in
the average wage share among these countries.
Economists believe that the wage share is a (rough) indicator for the distribution of
income between capital and labor. In the short term it moves counter-cyclically to the
business cycle. Some empirical researchers nd evidence of an upward trend in the
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Figure 2.3: Adjusted wage share as proportion of GDP for Germany (FRG), the U.S. and Japan,
1960{2005. Source: Ameco database from European Commission sta oces (Ameco-Datenbank der
Dienststellen der EU-Kommission).
prot share since mid 1980s in most developed economies (cf. Ellis and Smith (2007)),
which can be partly observed in Fig. 2.3 as well. Russell and Dufourr (2007) study the
growing economy of Canada between 1975 and 2005, and indicate that development
in economy and productivity is not reected in real wages for workers. The stagnant
average real wages have led to a decreasing share of GDP going to workers, with an
increasing share going to corporate prots. In a prolonged dataset, they even observe
the prot share following a \U" shape: between 1961 and mid 1970s the prot share
dropped from 30% to 25%, but this trend has been reversed in the latest 30 years,
and the prot share rises hand-in-hand with the growing economy to as high as 33%
in 2005, leading to a downward trend for the wage share. Similar facts are found in
many economies, e.g., the U.S., China, Australia, Germany and France19. It seems
19Refer to \Not sharing in the gains" in \The New York Times", August 2006, available at
www.nytimes.com; \China: wage share plunges" in \International News, Green Left Weekly Issue",
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that there is an international claim that economic growth has failed to deliver real
benets to workers since World War II. Studies by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF (2007)) say that this trend of increasing prot share mainly comes from a slightly
increasing trend in skilled sectors, a steadily increasing trend in high skilled sectors
but a more signicant decreasing trend of wage share in unskilled sectors. Possible
explanations for the nonstationary empirical trend can be global trade, immigration,
or increase in productivity, which might erode workers' bargaining power, so that the
wage share is decreasing continuously.
It is still an open question how the distribution of the wage/prot (share) ratios will
look like in reality. Farjoun and Machover (1983) claim that \at least one parameter
| the ratio of prots to labor costs (= the ratio between a rm's annual gross prot
and its annual wage bill) | is much more narrowly distributed, and therefore much
closer to uniformity". The calculation and comparison of the wage/prot share is a
relatively dicult task, since dierent (skilled or unskilled) sectors may have dierent
ratios.
2.8 Wage and Income Distribution
The discussion of which distribution better represents the wage or income distribution
has been going on for a long time. Pareto (1897) was perhaps the rst to investigate
personal income distribution and introduced the well-known Pareto distribution. Later
on, another signicant contribution to this area is from the philologist George Kings-
ley Zipf (1949) who introduced the Zipf's law. Since then, there are a lot of debates
regarding how well an inverse power law ts income data. Discussions of income dis-
No. 728, October 2007; \Corporate prot growth | slowing but not collapsing" in \AMP Capi-
tal Investors", Edition 32, November 2005; \Wage share variations in France and Germany since
1970: what does really matter?" by N. Canry and A. Lechevalier, available at http://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/14/05/29/PDF/Canry and Lechevalier.pdf, respectively.
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tribution are (1) the Lognormal (or generalized Lognormal) type, as in Montroll and
Badger (1974), Brunazzo and Pollastri (1986), West and Deering (1995), Aitchison
and Brown (1957), yet the curve tting is usually unsatisfactory in the tails; (2) power
law type, as in Guilmi et al. (2003), Kim and Yoon (2004), Clementi et al. (2006),
when truncation of the datasets at the lower tail is applied; or recently (3) exponen-
tial Boltzmann-Gibbs law, as in Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2000), Chatterjee et al.
(2005), Chakrabarti et al. (2006).
Truncation is a statistical tool often applied in curve tting tests. Sometimes, it helps
to support the argument of the author. It has been pointed out that many examples
used by Pareto, Zipf, as well as some other researchers have truncated datasets. Perline
(2005) argues that if one looks more carefully into the lower tail that has been originally
excluded, the power law behavior tends to break down at certain point. He categorizes
the \power-law-like distributions" mentioned in the literature into three kinds: besides
a true power law that completely ts the data, there is also a \weak power law" where
the power law only ts the upper range of the values, and a \false power law", which
refers to some \Lognormal-like" distributions which can convincingly mimic a power
law only when truncation is applied. His study reminds us that perhaps the true
income distribution can not be explained by any of the single distributional forms
discussed above. More recent research by Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2001, 2003),
Reed (2003), Silva and Yakovenko (2005), Gallegati and Clementi (2005) have shown
that the empirical income distribution might be separated into a lower wage-income
region and a higher property-income region, passing from an exponential distribution
to a power law distribution.
It should be noted that, dierent studies usually rely on dierent datasets for income,
hence they will result in diering explanations, e.g., some researchers use wage data
from various sources and the others use income data reported by the government. Since
we are going to explain how the wage and income are distributed as a simulation result
of our agent-based models, it is worthwhile to dierentiate between wage and income
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strictly. \Wage" is dened as compensation, usually in nancial form, received by
workers as exchange for their labor. \Income" is dened as the consumption (or saving)
opportunity gain by an entity (e.g., household or individual) within a certain period;
it is the sum of all wages, salaries, prots, interests payments, rents and other forms
of earnings received. As a result, wage is only one part of income, and is not equal to
income. For those employees who work for salary only, wage might be their only source
of income, yet for employers who own rms and pay the workers for their labor eorts,
they might have many other sources of income, such as rents, interests, prots from
selling products, and so on. Because wage is narrower than income, the empirical wage
distribution might be more narrowly distributed than the income distribution as well.
In reality, income data is an important indicator of the economy situation especially in
the cross-country comparison, but reliable statistics on income is extremely dicult to
collect. This might be due to the fact that the real income from rich people is not easy
to collect. As a rough comparison, most of the data describing income distribution use
wage data as approximation.
In the past decades, increase in income goes hand-in-hand with technology and pro-
ductivity growth. It is a pity that the above-mentioned studies cannot explain the
ever-changing empirical income distribution, because most of their selected cases are
limited to the income distribution based on a specic year (or within a short period).
Fig. 2.4 provides the income distribution plots for Japan20 at two selected years 1970
and 1998. Although the right gure looks very close to a Lognormal distribution (note
the x-axis is in logarithm), the left gure looks much more complicated with more than
one peak, which looks like a multimodal distribution.
As a matter of fact, the multimodal distribution, which is a continuous probability
distribution with two or more modes, is not rare in our daily life. For example, a his-
togram of the heights of students in a high school class would be bimodal when the class
contains a mix of boys and girls (Iversen and Gergen (1997), Devore and Peck (1997),
20Provided by Swedish software company \Gapminder", http://www.gapminder.org/
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Figure 2.4: Income distribution of Japan in 1970 and 1998.
Source: http://www.gapminder.org/downloads/income-distribution-2003/.
Wild and Seber (2000)); however, when the heights of boys and girls are examined
separately, both their distributions are actually unimodal. Other phenomena having
the same character include the age of incidence of certain diseases, e.g., Hodgkin's Iym-
phoma (Stein and Morgan (2003)), the spatial distribution of earthquake dispersion
(Zhu and Long (2000)), and many others.
The nding that the entire region of income distribution follows a bimodal or so-
called \twin peaks" distribution has been mentioned by Quah (1996, 1997, 2002), Jones
(1997), Martin (2006), and others. Martin (2006) examines the World Distribution of
Income (WDI) data by integrating individual income distributions for 138 countries
between 1970 and 2000, and plots the evolution of country specic income distribution
for many countries. Fig. 2.5 provides plots for China, India and the U.S. in the year
1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. Note that all the countries' density functions of income
\shift" to the right over time, reecting increases in income. For the case of China,
the enlarging variance shows that the rich citizens increase their incomes much faster
than the poor, which implies signicant raise in income inequality. This situation
is comparatively better in the U.S. and India. In addition, Martin (2006) also use
some other countries' empirical income gures to show that bimodal or tri-modal is
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FIGURE IIa
Distribution of Income in China
FIGURE IIb
Distribution of Income in India
FIGURE IIc
Distribution of Income in the United States
Figure 2.5: Income distribution of China, India and the U.S., source: empirical plots from Martin
(2006).
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quite common in the income distribution, which reveals a hidden fact that income
distribution may be made up of more than one income groups. Nevertheless, in some
years, clear multiple modes are perhaps not directly visible. It might be because the
means of these underlying distributions are not far away from each other to display
additional modes. In Chap. 5, we will use our agent-based model to more-or-less
simulate this multi-modal distribution in the aggregate income distribution.
2.9 Summary
This chapter provides a literature review of some empirical distributions, which will be
mentioned or recovered later by our agent-based models. In general, it gives an overview
of the rm dynamics (rm size, growth, age, entry and exit, prot, etc.), the GDP
growth distribution, the income distribution, and other closely related topics. Since
our world is full of random eects and is much more complicated than the model, it is
not surprising that most of the studies discussed above have not reached an agreement.
As far as modeling is concerned, only very few inuential factors can be taken into
account. Therefore, it is not possible for a model to exactly replicate the empirical
distributions. It is our hope that through modeling and simulation, we can have a
better understanding of how the interactions among dierent factors could exhibit
scaling behaviors (laws) in the real world.
What's more, through reviewing the literature, it is interesting to nd that most of the
size distributions display power laws in the upper tails. Here \size" can be rm size
measured by total employees, sales, assets or capitals, income distribution of dierent
countries, the trading volumes in stock market (e.g., Mu et al. (2008)), the distribution
of city size (e.g., Garmestani et al. (2008)), GDP across countries (e.g., Guilmi et al.
(2003)), and etc.
Meanwhile, if we use the logarithm on the size increment to describe the growth dis-
tribution, the aggregate growth rate distribution may be close to a tent-shaped or
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bell-shaped distribution (i.e., Subbotin class distribution, such as Laplace, Gaussian,
and others). Studies on growth rate distribution range from the rm growth rate dis-
tribution in terms of sizes, sales (e.g., Teitelbaum and Axtell (2005)), to the growth
rates of industrial production (e.g., Fagiolo et al. (2007)) and outputs (GDP) (e.g.,
Fagiolo et al. (2008)), among others.
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Chapter 3
Reconsideration of the Social
Architecture (SA) Model
3.1 Understanding of the SA Model
Our base line model is named \Social Architecture" (SA) model by Wright (2005).
Before we extend the model, it is necessary to introduce the idea of the SA model,
the author's general ndings, as well as our understanding and motivation for further
model replication.
The fundamental relation in modern society is the \relation of production", which
includes manufacturing, sales and consumption. The SA model describes the social
relations of production within an advanced capitalist economy, in that \a small class
of capitalists employ a large class of workers, organized within rms of various sizes, to
produce goods and services for sale in the marketplace. Under normal circumstances,
the capitalists, as owners of rms, collect revenue and workers receive a share of revenue
in the form of wages" (cf. Wright (2005), p.590). The model was invented on the belief
that many striking phenomena of capitalism are results of structural features in the
social production.
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We interpret \social relation of production" as in Fig. 3.11, where we have a production
cycle and a monetary cycle. It looks straight-forward that the two cycles always go
in opposite directions. This innite process constitutes the operation of our modern
economy. The production cycle starts with the individual agent, each one represents a
single household, or an self-contained economic entity, such as a rm. The rm owners
are responsible for hiring workers and producing goods, and the workers oer labor in
exchange for wages. As a result, rms convert workers' labor into various products,
sell them in market and pay the workers. In order to survive, the workers use their
wages to consume, so that money goes back to rms for possible further investments,
e.g., hire more workers or produce more goods. More specically, the entire production
process is carried out in a way that something enters the process (inputs such as labors),
something is transformed, and something utilizable comes out (outputs such as cars).
Because all the input and output quantities during this process are heterogeneous, it is
equivalent but more convenient to reduce them to a common denominator and express
everything as monetary values2, so that all materials, labor, resources can be treated on
monetary basis. This means when building up economic models, the relations among
dierent production factors can be quantied and reproduced in terms of monetary
factors, thus directly modeling the perplexing \production cycle" can be avoided. The
SA model and other models described in this study apply this methodology. Although
the whole process of production as well as consumption is simplied as the ow of
\money" among rms, workers and the market, it actually replicates the inherently
much more complicated production cycle of modern economies. For example, \assets"
redistribution in the SA model can be represented by exchange of \coins", which may
be cash or physical products in reality. To realize the exchange, the rm owner trades
his goods in market and gains \coins" as revenue; since these \coins" can always
1The gure is inspired by Jurgen Mimkes's presentation \Dierential forms | a new tool in Eco-
nomics: from biological models to Econophysics", when he discussed the usage of dierential forms in
Econophysics, at the Econophysics Colloquium Kiel, August 2008, Germany.
2This \money" in reality, takes the form of value items such as banknotes, nancial papers, con-
tracts, leases, and so on.
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Firms
Labor
ProductsHouseholds
Figure 3.1: Production cycle and monetary cycle
counterbalance the products been traded, the exchange behavior will be observed in
models in the way of \having prot" instead of \selling goods".
Agents' behavior in the SA model is described in sequence of steps using pseudo code.
The system consists of three components: a set of rules, a working memory and a rule
interpreter. Each rule includes a condition, which species when the rule should be
executed (e.g., \ring"), and an action part, which determines what is the consequence
of the rule \ring". After the program starts, agents' actions are recorded in the
working memory, while the rule interpreter takes the job of considering each agent
or each rule in turn, and repeats this cycle. As the loop goes on, agents have the
potential to learn about their environment and the other agents through adding to
their \knowledge" (held in their working memories). The behavioral rules and the rule
interpreter, however, remain unchanged.
Apart from that, agents in the SA model exchange states continuously, such as shown
in Fig. 3.2. Every single agent in the model must hold one (but no more than one) of
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Employer
Unemployed
Employed
Employer
Unemployed
Employed
Figure 3.2: Exchange of states in the SA model
the stages | he can be either an unemployed, a worker (i.e., employed) or an employer.
As illustrated, it is possible for an unemployed agent to remain unemployed, become
employed, or start a business as an employer in the next period, but it is not possible
for a worker to become an employer directly (or vice versa) without an intermediate
stage that he becomes an unemployed (loses current job) in the rst place.
3.2 Simulation of the SA Model
The SA model describes a \closed" economy (i.e., an autarky that is self-sucient).
This economy does not take part in international trade and is not aected by the rest
of the world. The system consists of a complex local network of N economic agents,
with i = 1 : : : N;N  1, who may be either an employer (capitalist, denoted by C), an
employee (denoted by E) or the unemployed3 (denoted by U). Each actor belongs to
only one class, C \E \U = ;, and the total population set is A = C+E+U (A = N).
3Although \unemployed" and \non-employed" is not the same in empirical research, we don't
dierentiate them in the SA model: an actor who is neither an employer nor an employee, should be
in an unemployed stage.
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As introduced before, all agents are proactive, reactive and social. They are free
to exchange states when certain requirements are met. At the beginning, there are
no rms or employment relations: every agent is considered to be unemployed, a
household is treated as a single actor. It is also imposed that each rm should be
owned by only one actor, and there should be at least one person other than the rm
owner employed by a rm, which means co-owners of rms or self-employment is not
possible. Consequently, the number of rm owners should be always equal to the
number of rms.
Money is used as a counterbalance for exchanging goods and services. The rms
produce goods and services, the workers are paid for their labor by salaries, and at
the same time, the consumers (including workers themselves) pay for the goods and
services in the market. In the whole process, every payment must be counterbalanced.
The value of money maximizes simultaneously the utility of all buyers and sellers.
What is interesting for us is the amount of money being exchanged, instead of which
product to be traded (or in what form), hence only the amount of money m that
changes hands will be recorded in the model. Unlike reality, where the maximum value
of a paper money note is (sometimes) not more than a hundred, and the minimum
note is (sometimes) not less than one cent, the \coin" using in our model represents a
unique currency, which is assumed to be non-negative (i.e., debt is not permitted) and
indenite divisible, mi(t) 2 R+. At initialization time t = 0, each actor i holds an equal
amount of \coins" mi, thus the total \coins" hold by all actors is M =
PN
i=1mi(t).
Meanwhile, a market4 is created with initial value V = 0, where the actors can do fair
trade. As time goes on, money coins are free to be exchanged among actors, or ow
into the market. The total money in circulation is W = M + V . Note that in the
original model, since only exchange of money between actors and market happens, and
money in circulation is always conserved, consequently, V increases whenM decreases,
and W 6=M immediately after the model starts.
4Wright (2005) denes V as \market value". In his later paper Wright (2008), he explains V as
\eective demand", which consists of personal and productive consumption as well as investment.
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The character of an actor can be fully described by a state variable Si(t) = fmi(t); ei(t)g,
which indicates agent i's money holding and employment state at the time t. If
ei(t) = 0, the actor is not employed, otherwise if ei(t) = j, the employer j hires i
as one of his employees. The state evolution from S(t)! S(t+ 1) is determined by a
set of 6 simulation rules, which take place at each unit of time, measured in \months".
In fact, the interval length of time can also be either \years", \days" or \hours", and
\month" is chosen here typically because most of the employment and payment are
happening once per month in real life. As simplication, no matter how many times
consumptions are made, we suppose that the sum of money spent within that month
is computed at once at the end of the month after a monthly account balance (i.e.,
workers receive salaries, rm owners pay their workers, etc.).
Here is a short description of the simulation rules5:
1. Actor selection rule:
Randomly select an actor a from the set A according to (a draw from) uniform
distribution.
2. Hiring rule:
(a) If actor a is unemployed, then his potential employer can be either an ex-
isting capitalist or an unemployed who tends to become an employer in the
next period (potential employer set H = C [ U).
(b) Choose an employer c for a according to the probability function of Eq. 3.1,
that weights potential employers by their wealth:
P (c) =
mcP
x2H mx
(3.1)
(c) The wage interval w = [wa; wb] is an exogenous parameter, and the average
wage is w = (wa + wb)=2. If c's money holding exceeds the average wage,
mc > w, then c hires a.
5For detailed description of the simulation rules, please refer to Wright (2005).
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3. Expenditure rule:
Randomly select a consumer actor b from the set fA  fagg and an expenditure
amount m from b's money holding [0;mb] according to uniform distribution. Add
m coins to the available market value V (as expenditure by consumer b). Hence,
mb is reduced by m, and the market value V is increased by m.
4. Revenue rule:
(a) If actor a is not unemployed, a can be either an employer or an employee.
In both cases, he works for the rm, and gains prot m from the market.
The amount m is uniformly selected from the market value [0; V ].
(b) If actor a is an employee, then transfer m coins to the employer. Alter-
natively, if actor a is an employer, then transfer m coins to himself. All
transferred money is counted as rm revenue.
5. Firing rule:
(a) If actor a is an employer, he determines the number of workers to re ac-
cording to function 3.26, so that the rm's workforce is reduced to a size
that the wage bill is payable.
u = max

jWaj  
hma
w
i
; 0

(3.2)
(b) Select u actors from the set of employees Wa according to uniform distribu-
tion, and re them.
6. Wage payment rule:
For each worker in a's employee set, pay a certain wage amount w, where w
is uniformly selected from a minimum and maximum wage interval [wa; wb]. If
6The employee setWa shows the number of workers already been hired by employer a. The number
of employees that a can hire is determined by his wage bill (ma) divided by the average wage (w).
This formula means no worker will be red if employer a's ex-ante wage bill is payable from his current
money holding.
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employer a has insucient budget to pay the selected wage w, w should be re-
selected from the discrete interval [0;ma] according to a uniform random draw.
To simplify the simulation procedure, the following happens during each month7:
- If an actor is unemployed, he may remain unemployed, or get hired by an existing
rm, or form a new rm and become rm owner. As an unemployed, he may not
have income, but still he can spend some money from his own savings, so that
the market value is increased by his expenditure, and his own money holding is
lowered down.
- If an actor is an employee (worker), he may maintain the current state, contribute
to the rm revenue by his labor, and receive wage as compensation. Otherwise,
he may get red and switch to be an unemployed when his employer does not
have sucient money to pay him. In both cases, the actor needs to make con-
sumption in the market to survive.
- If an actor is an employer, his wealth is increased by the rm's revenue from
selling the products (made by workers) as well as eort from himself. At the end
of the month, he should pay wages to current workers, decide how many workers
to re or hire, and his own consumption amount. In case the employer res all
his workers, he does not own a rm any more, and enters the unemployed class.
Alternatively, Fig. 3.3 displays a graphic structure of the 6 simulation rules for better
understanding. Basically, when an actor a is selected, the computer rst checks whether
he is unemployed or not. If actor a is unemployed, then he is possible to be selected
as a worker by certain rm through the \hiring rule". If actor a is not unemployed,
7This is the general idea of the model, note that the original model does not allow the actor a to
make consumption within one iteration. Instead, the consumption right is passed down to a uniformly
selected actor b.
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Figure 3.3: Simulation structure of the SA model.
the computer will further check whether he is an employee or an employer: if he is an
employee, he works for the rm and earns revenue through the \revenue rule"; if he is
an employer, as the owner of rm, he also needs to pay wages to his workers, and decide
how many workers to re according to his current budget. Note that one shortcoming
of the original SA model is that, although the \expenditure rule" is positioned as the
third rule, it is a rule that a will never perform in the current iteration. Instead,
this rule will be executed by another actor called b (b 2 fA   fagg), therefore, it is
connected to the other rules using dotted line.
The above given rules are \executed N times (per month) to allow each of N actors
an opportunity" to realize all possible rules from 1 to 6. A year counter records every
12th applications of monthly calculation, so that once the intended simulation year is
given, the whole program will perform 12  years  N times iterations of the whole
process. There are three exogenous parameters: the total money holding by all agents
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M , the total number of actors, N , and the wage interval w. Unless specied, a standard
simulation with M=100,000, N=1,000 and w=[wa; wb]=[10, 90] is applied.
The result of the simulation is not sensitive to initial conditions. After the program
starts, it will rapidly self-organize into a stochastic equilibrium characterized by sta-
tionary distributions. The details of the original simulation results can be found in
Wright (2005). Since we investigate the possibilities to improve the SA model, some
distributions before (replication according to the original rules) and after modications
will be provided in the next section. In short, the general ndings according to Wright
(2005) are: (1) the class distribution of agents follows a normal distribution; (2) the
rm size distribution follows a power law; (3) the rm growth distribution follows a
Laplace distribution; (4) the rm demise distribution follows a Lognormal distribution;
(5) the log-GDP growth rate distribution follows a Laplace distribution; (6) the du-
ration of recessions follows an exponential law; (7) the wage share is normally higher
than the prot share in national income, and their ratios look normally distributed; (8)
the lower region of the income distribution is Lognormally distributed, while the higher
region is close to a power law; (9) the rate-of-prot distribution is highly right-skewed,
and might be dependent on rm size.
3.3 Some Considerations on the SA Model
The purpose of this section is to present our reconsideration and improvement sugges-
tions to the original SA model. We will show some possible modications or extensions
that can be added to the model. After each suggested modication, simulation results
after modication will be provided in comparison with the original results reported in
Wright (2005). It should be mentioned that the discussion of any modication does
not mean that the original simulation results from the SA model were \incorrect", and
it just tells that we are improving the model in a certain way and making it more
plausible. It is also probable that combining all these modications, simulation results
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will be \signicantly" changed, due to our models' high sensitivity on simulation rules.
The EPC model discussed in the next chapter will incorporate all these improvements
into consideration.
Before conducting the following experiments, we replicate the SA model in strict ac-
cordance with the original rules. Except for some stochastic dierences which come
from random selections, we generate most of the distributions very similar to those in
Wright (2005), and only few of them (as originally formulated) can not be obtained8.
All simulation results are neither sensitive to the number of participating actors, nor
to the length of the simulation. The convergence period for the model, which explains
most of the extreme outliers in some gures, is as short as 7-10 years. Because this
period is comparatively short to a 100 year simulation, to have a better overview of the
results, all following gures show a complete simulation with transient periods included.
Curve tting applied to some histograms oers a means of quantitative comparison of
modied simulation results with the original gures.
3.3.1 On Actor Selection Rule
The uniform distribution is the single distribution adopted many times in the SA
model. The idea is based on \Bernoulli's Principle of Insucient Reason", which says
that in the absence of better knowledge, all outcomes can be equally likely. This
applies in cases that the selection times are suciently large, then all outcomes within
the selection interval are equally likely. However, when applied in our simulation, we
nd that this theoretically correct method can lead to some computational problems:
due to too limited times of selection, it is dicult for uniformly selection to pick up
every number equally. This weakness becomes more severe when applied in the \actor
8In our replication, the gures are usually quite similar to those of Wright (2005), but we nd some
dierences in the curve tting part. For example, it seems that the original rm demise distribution
follows a normal distribution instead of a Lognormal, and the original distribution of log-GDP growth
rates looks normal instead of Laplace.
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selection rule" than the other rules, since it immediately turns out that some actors
will be selected many times, while some others will not be selected until the end of an
iteration.
The \actor selection rule" says randomly select an actor a from the set A according
to the uniform distribution. After the program starts, it will be repeated N times to
\allow each of the N actors an opportunity" to go through the rest of the simulation.
The left gure of Fig. 3.4 explains how the computer makes choice if we only repeat 100
times of selection in the hope that each of 100 actors can be selected once. Similarly,
the middle gure provides 1,000 times of selection out of 1,000 actors, which is exactly
the case of our standard simulation. Both gures show that when the number of
selection times is the same as the number of agents, no matter how many actors are
in the model, it is highly possible that some actors will be chosen more often than the
others. In fact, the rst two gures of Fig. 3.4 also show that some actors are even
selected more than 5 times, while others are simply neglected. When implemented in
our program, it means a single agent can be red, hired, or paid several times within
a month, and a few others may not be even considered. In contrast, if our selection
times can be suciently large, e.g. in the last gure of Fig. 3.4, where we have 100,000
times selection among 100 integers, the frequency of each number chosen looks more
equalized. Unfortunately, this will not happen in the original SA model, because it
regulates the number of selection times to be equal to the number of actors.
To overcome this signicant shortcoming and give each actor an equal opportunity to
be active, our suggestion is to use a simple \for-loop" with \a = 1 : N" instead of
the original \actor selection rule". This common \for-loop" guarantees that each actor
takes turns to be active one by one, which is exactly what the SA model should realize
according to the author's description of the actor selection rule (cf. Wright (2005),
p. 591{592). One may argue that given actors are selected based on natural order,
there might be causal relations among the order of the selected actors, namely an actor
who is chosen later might have fewer choices than those who are active before him.
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Figure 3.4: Selection errors from the uniform selection rule. Histograms of 100, 1,000 and 100,000
times of uniform selection (left to right). Left: frequencies of each integer number chosen within the
interval [1,100] with 100 times selections. Middle: frequencies of each integer number chosen within
the interval [1,1000] with 1,000 times selections. Frequencies of each integer number chosen within
the interval [1,100] with 100,000 times selections.
An ideal but easy way to provide fair selection is to rst shue (interleave) the order
of the actors before each round of iteration. Thus regardless of each actor's index, his
acting order each month is kept random and varied throughout the whole simulation.
To highlight how the \for-loop" applied in the \actor selection rule" will change the
model behavior, we oer two examples of simulation results with the original \actor
selection rule" and with the \for-loop". To make it more straight-forward, only the
simplest method (i.e., without shuing orders) is applied, and we temporarily call it
\simple for-loop"9 as comparison to the original \actor selection rule".
Fig. 3.5 plot histograms of the class distributions, with each series tted by a Gaussian
distribution (the smooth curve). The left column gures are simulation results with
the original \actor selection rule": they reveal that on average 12:4% of population are
employers, 70:4% are workers, and the remaining 17:2% are the unemployed. These
values (as well as standard deviations) are very similar to Wright (2005)'s when se-
lection randomness is taken into account. The right column gures show simulation
results with the \simple for-loop": we compute that around 14:9% of the population
9A temporary name for this rule. In fact, this may not be designed as a simulation rule, since
\for-loop" is just a normal iteration process in programming languages.
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Figure 3.5: Application of the \simple for-loop" in the class distribution of agents. Histograms of
number of actors in each economic class with a constant bin size of 1. The gures of the left column
are from replications of the original rules (compared with Wright (2005), Fig. 1), whereas the right
column gures are simulation using \simple for-loop", while remaining all the other rules unchanged.
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are employers, 75:7% are workers, and only around 9:4% are unemployed. Compared
with 17%, the 9% unemployment rate, coming from modied model, is perhaps closer
to empirical rate of unemployment10.
If we take a second look at Fig. 3.5, the variances of distributions before and after
changes are very dierent: the standard errors of the later are reduced by more than
half, so that we arrive at improved Gaussian ts with less noises (i.e., outliers). For
example, the bottom left gure of Fig. 3.5 shows that the original unemployment
population ranges from 10 (i.e., almost full employment) to 450 (i.e., half population
are unemployed). For comparison, the bottom right gure shows a much narrower
Gaussian t, with minimum unemployment of 55, and maximum around 180, which is
explicitly much more plausible. The highest unemployment rate most probably comes
from the rst several months of the iteration, since at initialization, all actors are in
the \unemployed" states.
Fig. 3.6 plot the rm size distribution under a shortened length of 15 years' simulation,
as well as a standard 100 years' simulation. The original rm size distribution plotted in
Wright (2005) (cf. Fig. 2, p.600) applies only 15 years' simulation. What has drawn our
attention is that, if we test the simulation for a longer period, the rm size distribution
under the original setting will have ever increasing mean and variance until it reaches
its higher bound where the largest rm nearly employs the whole workforce11 (cf. left
10It might be hard to compare our model predicted unemployment rate with real data. First of all,
the real economy also contains other sectors, such as the agriculture sector, which may have dierent
production processes from the industry sector. Secondly, the ocially announced \unemployment
rate" counts percentage of people in the labor force who do not have jobs and are actively seeking
jobs as the unemployed, therefore, it tends to underestimate the \true" unemployment rate which
is the sum of both the \unemployed" plus \discouraged workers", students, homemakers, and so
on. In our model, for simplicity, \unemployed" is equivalent to \non-employed". Those agents who
are neither employers nor employees are considered as the \unemployed", thus the model generated
\unemployment rate" should be higher than reality.
11This is similar to Gibrat (1931), where the rm sizes also have increasing mean and variance as
time goes by, and the model has no steady state.
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(d) Firm Size Distribution −−Simple for−loop (Year=1:100)
Figure 3.6: Application of the \simple for-loop" in rm size distribution. Histograms of aggregate
rm size distribution in log-log scale (Year=1:15 and Year=1:100). Sub-gures in the left column are
simulations using the \actor selection rule" with 15 and 100 years' simulation lengths, and the gures
in the right column are the corresponding gures with \simple for-loop". Note that all gures are
with transient periods (around 7-10 years) included, since we need enough data to generate a rm
size distribution of 15 years for the top gures. The rm size distributions with or without transient
periods for 100 years' simulation will look visibly little dierent. Finally, except for the \actor selection
rule", all the other rules remain unchanged.
column gures of Fig. 3.6). For comparison, the right column gures also have a more
obvious nonlinear curve shape, and the curvature seems to be less noisy in a prolonged
simulation.
A closer look shows that, although Wright (2005)'s 15-year rm size distribution is
said to follow Zipf's law, it applies only with data truncation, which excludes too large
(x  600) and too small rms (x  10), as shown in the left hand of Fig. 3.7. Since
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Figure 3.7: Application of the \simple for-loop" and curve tting to the rm size distribution. Left:
histogram of the rm sizes measured by the number of employees in log-log scale under the original
rules (Year=1:15, replication of Wright (2005) Fig. 2). The truncation excludes x  10; x  600; y 
10; y  10; 000; it is then tted into a power law distribution: P (x) / x (a+1) with slope  2:071, and
a  1 is known as Zipf's law. Right: rm size distribution with the \simple for-loop" in linear scale
(Year=1:100); the smooth curve is a Gaussian t, which indicates the original rm size distribution
closely follows a Lognormal.
a large majority of rms are small rms with no more than several employees, the
left-side truncation is somewhat cumbersome. Meanwhile, longer period simulation
(cf. gure (c) of Fig. 3.6) shows that there are a lot of large rms hiring more than
100 employees, in particular, the largest rm employs more than 700 workers out of a
total of 1; 000 agents, which contradicts Axtell (2001)'s empirical results for U.S. rms,
that the largest rms may not employ more than one-tenth of the total workforce.
However, no matter how long the simulation lasts, the largest rm generated under
\simple for-loop" has no more than 105 employees, which seems more reasonable than
the original cases of more than 700 employees.
In addition, the left gure in Fig. 3.7 is Wright (2005)'s curve tting experiment for
15 years' rm size distribution, whereas the right gure of Fig. 3.7 plots the logarithm
of the rm size simulated under \simple for-loop". The smooth line is a curve tting
which indicates that the rm size distribution under the \simple for-loop" follows
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Lognormality instead of a power law, in accordance with the ndings in Gibrat (1931),
Chesher (1979), Sutton (1997), Cabral and Mata (2003), Allanson (1992), and others.
When comparing the right gure of Fig. 3.7 with the right column gures in Fig. 3.6,
we see that the log-log scale plots only emphasize the upper tail, whereas the normal
scale provides a better t of the entire region of the rm size distribution, especially
the high frequency lower region. Note that the Lognormal distribution is skewed and
bell-shaped, the extreme case of a monotonically decreasing Lognormal distribution
happens when we have a small mean and variance as in this plot.
So far, we have shown two examples of how a slight modication in the \actor se-
lection rule" can improve the model. In the meantime, there are also minor changes
in the other distributions, such as the rm demise distribution, the uctuations in
wage and prot share, the GDP growth distribution, the prot-rate distribution, the
income distribution, and others. In order to save space, these distributions before
and after modications will not be provided here. Following this chapter, the EPC
model including all suggestions in this chapter will show a complete realization of the
above-mentioned distributions.
3.3.2 On Wage Payment Rule
The \wage payment rule" is the only rule which uses the exogenous wage interval
[wa; wb]. The wage interval is set to be [wa; wb] = [10; 90], to better reveal the \large"
wage dierential as designed by Wright (2005). Workers are getting their monthly
salaries according to uniform random draws from the wage interval [wa; wb], and this
is the only way for them to earn more \money". As a matter of fact, \money" is the
most important determinant for possible changes to the actor's current state in our
model, e.g., it decides whether an unemployed agent can be rich enough to become an
employer. While replicating the model, we are asking two questions: (1) does the wage
dierential really matter? (2) is the uniform wage payment \realistic"?
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Let's rst look into the rst question related to the wage dierential.
In order to \generate data in good overall agreement with the empirical data surveyed",
Wright (2005) takes a reasonable wage interval w=[10,90] to address the large wage
dierential found in many capitalistic economies. He also addresses that \the total
number of coins, M , and the total number of actors, N , on condition that M  N ,
appear to act as scaling parameters and do not aect the relative dynamics, unlike the
wage interval parameters. . . ", which explains that the varying of wage parameters
will \qualitatively" change aggregate dynamics of the model.
Our rst argument regarding the \wage payment rule" is that: the total wage bill
which an employer should pay to his employees will not be changed, regardless of which
wage dierential is arranged. This comes from the special character of the uniform
distribution: when the mean of variables is not changed, the sum of total remains
unchanged. In other words, if the mean of the wage dierential is the same, and the
number of workers to be paid is xed, the employer's wage bill will not be changed
either12. Particularly, in the\ring rule" (before the \wage payment rule"), the program
will check whether a rm owner has sucient money to pay his workers if each of
them requires only the average wage (i.e., the number of workers actor a can hire is
determined by ma= w), consequently, no matter how large the wage dierential is, it
has no inuence to the \ring rule". Since the employer's total wage bill is the only
thing that could change his state, we believe that the SA model's class distribution,
rm size, rm demise, wage and prot share will not be changed, even if the wage
interval is shifted.
We test this idea by using dierent wage interval, e.g. [40,60], [45,55] or assign 50 coins
wage for each worker, with all original game rules unchanged. The nal plots look
quite similar except for some random eects. It proves that the SA model is neither
12Mathematically, if the number of uniform selection times is xed, no matter how the boundary is
shrinking, the summation (
P
(wa + wb)=2 N) will result in no dierence, unless the mean value is
dierent.
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Figure 3.8: Income distribution under dierent wage payment conditions. Figure (a) (b): CCDF of
separate income by workers and employers and an aggregate plot, according to the original SA model
(compared with Wright (2005) Fig. 8 and Fig.9). Figure (c) (d): CCDF of separate income by workers
and employers and an aggregate plot, when every worker receives the same wage amount of 50 coins
(Year=1:100). The bottom gures are from simulations without any other modication to the model,
except removing the wage dierential.
quantitatively nor qualitatively sensitive to changes in the wage interval.
Apart from that, we would like to mention a slight dierence in the income13 distri-
13Note that \income" for an employer in the SA model is actually the revenue which he earns
through the \revenue rule", without deducting the wage bill paid to workers. This might not be so
convincing, and we will re-dene income as \revenue - cost (wage bill paid)" in Chap. 5.
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bution if we eliminate the wage dierential and pay 50 coins salary to each worker.
Fig. 3.8 shows the income distribution of workers and employers in complementary
CDF (CCDF) in log-log scale. Figure (a) and (b) in the rst row are replications
of the original model, and the gure (c) and (d) at bottom are simulations without
dierentiation of wages (i.e., each worker receives 50 coins as wage). The left column
gures (a) and (c) display the income by workers and employers separately, and the
right column gures (b) and (d) are aggregate plots of their income in CCDF. It seems
that the wage income for workers are more narrowly distributed (cf. the almost vertical
line in gure (a) and (c) of Fig. 3.8), whereas the revenue income for employers has
a long and stretching tail. Particularly, in gure (a), we observe a smoother curve,
showing that workers are receiving all possible wages below an approximate maximum
of 1080(= 90  12) coins. In contrast, in gure (c), the tail of the workers' wages be-
comes more scattered. This happens because without a \for-loop" preventing multiple
choices of the same actor, an actor can be paid x times a month with the wage amount
50x, but other wage amounts are not achievable. However, if we include the \simple
for-loop" for actor selection as discussed in the previous section, we will not see so many
scattered points: the possible wages for workers will be reduced to 50 1 ! 50 12,
depending on how long a worker stays in the rm14.
Moreover, when plotting the income distribution at the aggregate level (cf. gure (b)
and (d) of Fig. 3.8), we can easily observe a \knee shape" in the lower tail. Our rea-
soning is that, the \knee shape" will always exist because incomes from the two classes
are distinct: the wages as the only source of income for workers are naturally bounded
and cluster around a certain mean value, while the employers' incomes are much wider,
including selling products or other sources, and those incomes from employers consti-
tute the upper tail of the income distribution. According to Wright (2005)'s study,
14As mentioned, we only report the gures before and after one small modications. Therefore,
income gures under the \simple for-loop" as suggested in the last section, is not provided here. How
the overall modication will change the model behavior will be reported in the simulation results for
the EPC model in the next chapter.
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the lower tail of income distribution of the SA model is said to be Lognormal, and the
upper tail is close to a power law, but our study shows a dierent result in the lower
tail of income distribution.
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Figure 3.9: Histogram of yearly income distribution (Year=1:100). (Left: lower-income distribution
measured by the wages paid to the workers, which can be tted into a Gaussian (smooth curve, R-
sq= 98:9%, R-sq(adj)= 98:8%); The dotted line is a relatively poor t to the Lognormal distribution,
suggested in Wright (2005)). Right: higher-income distribution measured by property income from
rm owners (in log-log scale), the smooth line is a curve tting to the power law (Zipf's law, R-
sq= 100%, R-sq(adj)= 100% ). The gures are from simulations without any other modication to
the model, except our mentioned one.
Instead of plotting in CCDF, the left gure in Fig. 3.9 records the PDF of yearly
wages paid to workers. The dotted line is a Lognormal t to the wage distribution
suggested by Wright (2005), but the tting is relatively poor when compared with a
Gaussian (the smooth line with tting reported using R-sq values15). This is not sur-
prising considering the \Central Limit Theorem", which says that the sum of many
independent and identically (i.i.d.) distributed random variables will be approximately
normally distributed, if the random variables have a nite variance. To apply in the
15\R-sq" stands for \R-squared". It is a statistical measurement of how well a regression line
approximates real data points. The formula for R-squared is R(X;Y ) = Cov(X;Y )=XY , and a
R-squared of 1.0 (100%) indicates a perfect t.
70
\wage payment rule", it means that as long as the workers' wages are i.i.d., their yearly
wage distribution will always be Gaussian, no matter how the monthly wage payment
rule is changed (i.e., no matter whether the wage is uniformly selected or normally
selected, etc.). For comparison, the right gure of Fig. 3.9 plots the histogram of
monthly income by rm owners in a log-log scale, which can be tted by a Zipf's law,
in accordance with many empirical ndings (e.g., Axtell (2001), Fujiwara et al. (2004)).
Since the workers' wage distribution and the employers' income distribution are very
dierent, when they are plotted into the same gure in CCDF, there exists an over-
lapping transition area from the higher-wage workers to the lower-income employers.
We agree that in an aggregate plot, the lower income region might still look dierent
from a normal distribution. However, from the modeling perspective, it seems that the
lower part of income distribution will look more skewed to the left (since overlapping
might happen more frequently for the higher-income workers and the lower-income
employers), instead of skewed to the right, as a Lognormal distribution (cf. the blue
dotted line in the left gure of Fig. 3.9 is a Lognormal curve tting to the workers'
wage distribution).
Our second question to the SA model's \wage payment rule" is that: is uniform dis-
tributed wage payment \realistic"?
Fig. 3.10 depicts the histogram of wages that the employers pay to their workers in a
short 10 years' simulation (left gure) and a standard one of 100 years (right gure),
respectively. During the simulation, all wages that employers pay to their workers are
recorded. It shows that despite a sudden drop at the very low wage region ([0; 10]),
the remaining part inside the \reasonable" wage interval ([10; 90]) still looks unlikely
in reality: imagine if all wages are equally possible, then the number of workers who
receive the highest wages is the same as the number of workers receive the low or
middle level wages16. This contradicts reality that in industrialized economies, modern
16It is also odd that no matter whether 10 years or 100 years simulation is run, the histogram of
wage payment is somewhat downward sloping from the lower to the higher values. This phenomenon
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Figure 3.10: The distribution generated by the uniform wage selection rule of the SA model. The
left gure is the aggregate histogram of workers' wages selected using the \uniform wage selection
rule" at a simulation length of 10 years. The right gure is the corresponding gure generated under
100 years' simulation. Note that there is an obvious downward slope from the lower wage to the higher
wage region.
businesses distribute salary according to an employee's working experience, education,
age, as well as other qualications. Hence, it might be more reasonable to assume
a small number of workers receiving the highest wages or the lowest wages, and the
remaining majority receive the middle wages.
Besides, if we track a worker's wages during the time he stays at one rm, the amount
of wage he receives every month is completely random, ranging from 0 to 90. This
means within a particular month, he may get a payment as high as 90, but the next
month his wage may possibly drop to as low as less than 10 (or even 0). While in
reality the wage is usually xed at certain level for some periods according to an
employee's qualication, the big uctuations in a worker's wage payment generated by
the original SA model will continue throughout his whole employment, which looks not
very convincing.
possibly comes from the regulations in the \wage payment rule" that some employers may not aord
the rst wage selected, and resort to a second selection, which leads to an increase in the frequency
of the smaller wage amount.
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We suggest a slight modication to the original payment setting: choose the rst wage
randomly, then let the worker's wage remain at the same level as long as he stays at
one rm; if at a certain month, the employer fails to pay the worker his \guaranteed"
monthly wage, the rm owner will consider ring this too \expensive" labor or going
bankrupt himself. What's more, if working is the only way to earn money, nobody will
work for free, so paying 0 coins to workers for their work (as in the original setting) is
perhaps not too realistic. It may be more reasonable to impose a lowest wage payment
of 10 coins per month, similar as in many countries there is a minimum wage set by
law.
This modication of regulating a minimum wage threshold will not change workers'
monthly wage distribution signicantly when implemented alone. If the starting wages
of workers are uniformly selected, the resulting wage distribution will still look like
Fig. 3.10. To overcome this shortcoming, we propose a way of Gaussian-like selection
within a xed interval, which may be closer to reality. It highlights the fact that only
a minority of workers receive extreme wages, and a majority of them receive average
wages.
The PDF of Gaussian can be written as:
f(x) =
1

p
2
exp

  (x  )
2
2 2

;
Z +1
 1
f(x)dx = 1 (3.3)
In order to adopt a Gaussian distribution, we need to know not only its arithmetic
mean (), but also the standard deviation (). The mean can be easily calculated as
the average value of the highest and the lowest wage, so that  = 50 (wa = 10; wb =
90; w = (wa + wb)=2 = 50). One diculty that we encounter when using Gaussian
selection in a bounded area is how to nd a reliable and reasonable . Mathematically,
the PDF of Gaussian has no close boundary, and integral as Eq. 3.3 is not analytically
solvable. However, if we presume 95% of the selections should fall into the interval
between [10; 90], the area under the PDF should be near to 0.95 (instead of 1), then
73
 = 20:5 can be calculated from the numerical approximation.
if [wa; wb] = [10; 90] and  = 50;Z 90
10
1

p
2
exp

  (x  50)
2
22

dx  0:95 (3.4)
=)   20:5
The Gaussian distribution with  = 50;  = 20:5 is plotted in Fig. 3.11, which shows
95% of the selections are between [10,90]. In the computer programming, given  and
, we may construct a Gaussian-like selection by the following process:
(1) Select a random number according to a Gaussian distribution with given mean
and standard deviation. In our example, 95% of selections will be valid and fall
between the boundary [10; 90].
(2) The number being selected is taken into account only when it lies between 10 and
90. When the number selected is outside the boundaries (i.e., w < 10 or w > 90
with 5% possibility), we simply redraw numbers until the selected number is
indeed between the boundaries.
The newly generated Gaussian-like distribution (cf. histograms in bar plot as in the
left gure of Fig. 3.11) will lie slightly above the original one, but with the area within
the boundary [10; 90] still equal to 1. The right gure of Fig. 3.11 oers a better view
of the original Gaussian t and a new Gaussian t to the bounded data, where the
areas under the smooth line and dotted line should be equal.
When compared with the original wage payment rule, this Gaussian-like wage payment
method seems simpler and closer to reality, which means paying a worker less than the
minimum wage amount is no longer possible. If the rm owner fails to pay the lowest
wage (i.e., 10 coins), he himself goes bankrupt, and enters the unemployment class
with all his employees.
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Figure 3.11: Gaussian-like selection with comparison to the original Gaussian. In the left gure, the
histograms represent the original Gaussian distribution, and the smooth curve plots a Gaussian-like
histogram with boundaries [10; 90], and the area of newly generated bell-shape should be the same
as the original Gaussian. In the right gure, the smooth curve is the Gaussian t to the original
histogram, and the dotted line is the newly generated Gaussian t, corresponding to the smooth curve
histogram in the left side.
The variance represents the wage dierential: the larger the variance, the larger the
wage dierential, the atter the wage distribution. For example, it can be seen from
Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 2.5, that China, India and the U.S. have much larger wage (income)
dierentials than Japan in the late of 1990s, and there is a signicant increase in income
inequality for China in the past three decades. It is believed that if the boundary
value can be achieved with very low probability, the variance should not be too small.
However, when a relative large variance is applied, the computer will end up selecting
too many times invalid numbers (in such cases, redrawing numbers should be repeated),
and this might signicantly increase the calculation time and slower down the program.
In order to reduce the calculation time, a simpler substitute is the tent-shaped triangu-
lar distribution, which can be used as an approximation to bell-shaped distributions17.
In this case, the variance is no longer needed, and what we need to know is only the
17This method is recommended by Ian Wright, when he commented on the previous version of the
manuscript.
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boundary values and a mode, which are all directly available from the model's assump-
tion. We provide in Fig. 3.12 an example of a triangular wage selection within the
boundary [10; 90]. If we have 10,000 times selections, no matter which mode we have,
the height of triangle can be directly calculated by 100002=(b a) = 20000=(90 10) =
250 for the property of triangle. Another advantage is that the triangular distribu-
tion can be also asymmetric (while the Gaussian should be symmetric) | it can be
\skewed" to the left or to the right, depending on which mode (most frequent wage)
is set. In addition, this easy triangular wage selection rule does not have invalid cases,
and therefore, it runs very fast in a computer simulation.
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Figure 3.12: The triangular wage selection. The histograms are generated by 10,000 times selections
of wages in the interval [wa; wb] = [10; 90]. The left gure is the original histogram, and the right
gure plots a symmetric case of triangular distribution, where the mode equals the mean at the middle.
Note that under asymmetric case, which is very possible in the wage distribution, the height of the
distribution will still be h = 10; 000 2=(b  a), for the property of triangle.
In the end, perhaps it is still necessary to mention that since the wage selection is
always i.i.d., no matter which form of distribution it actually takes, the gures plotting
the aggregate monthly performance, such as class distribution, rm size distribution,
rate of prot distribution, etc., may not be changed signicantly when we switch from
one wage payment rule to the other. However, we insist that a good model should not
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only explain the observed statistical behavior (macro-output), but also be built upon
reasonable underlying rules that produce these statistics (micro-foundation). The mod-
ication in the \wage payment rule" directly inuences the majority of workers' money
holding. Another extension of the wage payment rule will be provided in Chap. 5.
3.3.3 On Expenditure Rule
Our third consideration is on the \expenditure rule", which says: \uniformly select a
consumer actor b from the set fA fagg and an expenditure amount m from b's money
holding [0;mb]. Hence, mb is reduced by m, and the market value V is increased by m".
This rule indicates that although actor a is selected to go through the simulation, he
does not have the right to make consumption, and whether he is able to consume in the
next periods depends on the possibility of being chosen the following months. In other
words, some of the agents will be prohibited to be active during the whole simulation,
while some other agents will perform the iteration more than the requirement (i.e.,
making consumptions several times a month). The signicant shortcoming of uniformly
selection has been discussed in Chap. 3.3.1. As suggested, an easy method to prevent
this trouble is to use \for-loop", which practically guarantees that each actor has a
chance to make consumption every month, so that extreme expenditure amount coming
from multiple consumptions by a single agent can be avoided.
Furthermore, the \expenditure rule" is originally designed to be the third rule (before
the \revenue rule" and much before the \wage payment rule") of the model. The reason
to put it in this position is because the \revenue rule" says a rm needs to earn prot
from the market, but the market value at initialization is 0. Therefore, it requires some-
one to spend money in the marketplace, especially for the rst month, when the rst
rm wants to trade in the market. On the other hand, when the \expenditure rule" is
positioned before the \wage payment rule", logically it means the actors' expenditures
are based on their money holdings at the beginning of month rather than at the end
of month after receiving salaries. This kind of calculation will lower the overall level
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of expenditure. Particularly in our test simulation, putting the \expenditure rule" in
the middle will cost 7 coins less of average consumption than putting it at the end of
program; meanwhile, since consumption is the only source for market value increment,
the rms' total revenues are comparatively lower as well.
We therefore suggest to put the \expenditure rule" behind the other simulation rules,
which means all active actors are subject to make consumption payable from their
money holdings at the end of month. Note that even if we post the \expenditure rule"
in the end, the overall distribution of monthly expenditure will not change too much in
the shape, but there is a minor change at its position (i.e., the mean of the distribution).
Moreover, to overcome the problem of zero initial market value, we assign V = 100
instead of V = 0, so that the rst-come rms may already prot from trading. These
small modications do not qualitatively change the model behaviors, but will make the
simulation rules more reasonable.
Finally, as previously discussed, the uniformly selected expenditure seems not optimal
too. In reality, most people are forward-looking. They tend to save some money while
spending, and the rich people might spend more than the poor, if they have more
money at hand. Therefore, it is suggested that a Gaussian-like selection or a triangular
selection method can be applied, meaning on average an actor will only spend half
of his money buying living articles or making investment while saving the other half.
A detailed presentation of how the model behaves including our suggestions will be
provided in the next chapter.
3.3.4 Growth in the SA Model
As mentioned in Chap. 2.6, taking the sum of rm revenue/income is one of the ways to
calculate GDP. Although in the SA model goods and their productions are not directly
visible, the capital gains from trading goods can still be observed from rms' monthly
incomes, thus GDP can be simplied as coming from the overall revenues of rms. The
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Figure 3.13: Log-GDP growth rate distribution of the SA model. The gure is from Wright (2005)
p.604. According to the original setting, the GDP growth rate is dened by Rt=Rt 1, where R is the
total revenues of the rms. Likewise, the log-GDP growth rate is measured by log(Rt=Rt 1). The
tick label in the x-axis perhaps stand for percentages of the GDP growth rates.
regulation for the GDP growth rate reads: \at the end of each year, calculate the total
revenue by all rms during the year, Rt, the (log) GDP growth rate is then Rt=Rt 1".
Wright (2005) (p. 604) plots a Laplace distributed log-GDP distribution as shown in
Fig. 3.13.
Unfortunately, we could not replicate the same form of the log-GDP growth rate dis-
tribution with the original formulation of the model. In our replication, following the
author's description, we arrive at gure (a) of Fig. 3.14. The log-GDP growth rate is
calculated as the division of yearly GDP, log(Rt=Rt 1), reported on the x-axis18. It
seems that our largest log growth rates are given by  0:2 and +0:2. At rst glance, we
guess the x-axis in Fig. 3.13 (according to Wright (2005)'s Fig. 5) records the numbers
in percentage (i.e., the real number should be divided by 100), but then the num-
18Approximately, the x-axis can be treated as net growth rate, because when the growth rate
Rt=Rt 1 is just a little over 1, we see log(1:01)  0:01, log(1:02)  0:02, log(1:05)  0:05, and so on.
However, this does not apply for large numbers, which are signicantly larger than 1.
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(a) Log−GDP Growth Rate (Year=1:500, replication)
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 (b) Gaussian Fit to the Log−GDP Growth Rate (Year=1:500)
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Figure 3.14: Figure (a): replication of the log-GDP growth rate with log-y scale, according to the
original SA settings. Figure (b): the Gaussian t to the log-GDP growth rate in gure (a) with linear-
y scale (R-sq=99:43%, R-sq(adj)=99:27%). Figure (c): the original GDP growth rate distribution
can be tted into a Gaussian distribution (R-sq=98:86%, R-sq(adj)=98:79%) (Year=1:500). The last
two gures reveal that the original GDP growth rate can be tted both by the Gaussian and the
Lognormal distribution. In fact, under a small variance and symmetric case, the Gaussian and the
Lognormal distribution look very similar to each other (except the dierences in the tick labels).
bers are still much higher than our replication outcomes in gure (b) of Fig. 3.14,
which converts the log-y scale into natural scale. Curve-tting shows that a Gaussian
distribution ts the log-GDP growth rate very well, which means the original GDP
growth rate distribution follows a Lognormal distribution. Meanwhile, because tak-
ing logarithm will not signicantly change the positions of extremely small numbers,
the original GDP growth rate should be tted by a normal distribution as well, as
illustrated in gure (c)19.
Our second point is whether the SA model can indeed characterize the empirical eco-
nomic growth. In reality, GDP is generally growing with more and more advanced
technology and industrialization, and the production capacity of today is surely much
higher than a century ago. From the gures of the GDP growth rate distribution, it
19As mentioned in the last footnote, since the GDP growth rates in our model are only small
percentages, and log(1 + x)  x, when x is very small, the original GDP growth rate distribution
should have the same shape as the log GDP growth rate distribution. Figure (c) of Fig. 3.14 provides
an example of 500 years' GDP growth rate distribution without taking logarithm (please note the
numbers on x-axis of the two gures).
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seems that GDP in the SA model has to grow, yet closer look shows that the model is
in fact \stationary": no matter how many years of simulation we are running, the total
money in circulation will retain at 100,000 coins. Meanwhile, the market value does
not really grow, and actually looks completely random. For example, at some months,
we record a market value as high as 300 coins, but it could sharply drop down in the
following months.
In order to make the model \non-stationary", we suggest to let the market value grow
with the GDP growth rate20: whenever there is a recession or a boom, the market
value will also decrease or increase at the end of corresponding years. Since the rst
year's GDP growth rate is not available, we assume that there is no growth in the rst
year, and the market value only starts to change from the end of the second year. This
slight modication lowers the probability of getting no market value as in the original
design, and the range of market value will be signicantly reduced and concentrated.
3.4 Summary
As the use of computer simulation skyrocketed, economists and sociologists start to
use computer to characterize social and economic activities. The agent-based model is
one of the most important computer-based methodologies. It starts with assumptions
about agents and their interactions, and then uses computer simulation to generate
\histories" that can reveal the dynamic consequences of these assumptions. Generally,
agent-based modeling is able to investigate how large-scale eects arise from micro-
processes of interactions among many agents. Here the \agents" can be not only
human actors (such as consumers, sellers, or workers), but also social groups (such as
families, rms or government agencies).
20The best way is perhaps adding a role for a central bank, but then we would need to decide how
much money the bank issues every year, how to distribute money to rms or actors, what is interest
rate, and so on, which will make our model much more complicated.
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The SA model, similar to the other agent-based models, provides both macro struc-
ture and micro interpretation. It might be the rst model which includes the whole
process of modern production into one simulation, instead of focusing on a stylized
simplication of an individual branch. The contribution of the SA model is that:
it generates many reasonable distributions, from rm dynamics to the whole econ-
omy, such as the power-law rm size distribution (e.g., Axtell (2001), Fujiwara et al.
(2004)), the Laplace rm and the GDP growth distribution (e.g., Stanley et al. (1996),
Lee et al. (1998), Bottazzi and Secchi (2005)), the Lognormal rm demises distribu-
tion (e.g., Cook and Ormerod (2003)), the exponential recession duration distribution
(e.g., Wright (2004b), Ausloos et al. (2004)), the Lognormal-Pareto income distribu-
tion (e.g., Levy and Solomon (1997), Silva and Yakovenko (2005)), etc., with most
of them quite close to empirical ndings. Normally, these distributions are studied
in an isolated manner, they are named \stylized facts", whereas this model connects
them within a single causal network. From this point of view, the SA model is an
innovation. During our replication, we nd that it is possible to make the model more
plausible through some modications in the game rules, which will lead to a qualitative
improvement of many simulation results.
To be specic, our changes include: (1) the \actor selection rule" has been replaced by
a \for-loop"; (2) in the \wage payment rule", the wage interval has been modied using
a Gaussian-like distribution or a triangular distribution; (3) the \expenditure rule" has
been re-ordered and further modied to ensure everyone's equal consumption chance;
(4) if the market value could change with GDP, the total money in circulation will be
changed accordingly, and the SA model becomes \non-stationary". Note that all the
gures provided after modication only consider one of these mentioned amendments,
while keeping all the other rules unchanged; all parameters and statistics shown in
this study are just to show the similarities between model-generated distributions and
the real ones (some of them are presented in Chap. 2), or indicate how close we move
to more realistic distributions. It should be emphasized that it is the similarities in
82
the distribution forms which are important, instead of parameter values or summary
statistics.
The SA model actually describes the simplest relations of production, in particular,
it simplies the advanced production procedure to \Employment, Production and
Consumption". In the next chapter, an agent-based model combining and summing
up all modications mentioned in this chapter will be introduced. To dierentiate it
from the original SA model, it will be called the \EPC" model instead.
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Chapter 4
Agent-based Model of Employment,
Production and Consumption
(EPC)
4.1 EPC Model and Improvement
The agent-based model of Employment, Production and Consumption (EPC) intro-
duced in this chapter is based on the \Social Architecture" (SA) model introduced in
Chap. 3. The SA model is robust in generating many empirical distributions within a
single causal framework. However, there are some serious shortcomings in the original
SA model. For example, if the simulation is prolonged for longer horizons, although we
could not nd a strong evidence of non-stationarity, it seems that some statistics uc-
tuate too much (e.g., one person becomes extremely rich). Another example is that,
although GDP growth is observed, money in circulation always remains unchanged,
which means the model is in fact a stationary economy. Given these unsatisfactory
ndings, is it possible to improve the SA model?
We have used Chap. 3 to explain one by one why some suggestions of modications are
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useful. In this chapter, all previously mentioned considerations will be considered into
the current model. In general, the main modications of the EPC model compared
with the SA model are:
1. The original 6 rules have been reduced to 5 rules: the \actor selection rule" has
been replaced with a normal \for-loop" iteration1, in order to make sure that
each actor is economically active once every period.
2. Since each actor at initialization has the same status, a random order generator
is used to shue the original natural order of active actors, so that the new order
of agents becomes completely random within every iteration.
3. In the SA model, not only wages and revenues, but also expenditures are uni-
formly selected, which means the possibility of selecting any amount is practically
equal, whereas in reality this would appear unrealistic. In the EPC model, a trian-
gular distribution is applied in all these places to highlight dierent probabilities
of choice. In other words, most agents make similar selections (e.g., spend half
of their money) according to the triangular distribution rules, and those who are
making extreme selections (e.g., spend all money or do not spend at all) are in
the minority.
4. According to Wright (2005), if the employer has an insucient budget, workers
may get very low or even no salary for their work resulting from the uniform
selection procedure. In the EPC model, a more reasonable rule is adopted, which
requires (e.g., in reality by law) the rm owner to pay the amount of wage ran-
domly selected from the minimum and maximum wages [10; 90] (according to the
triangular distribution); if the employer fails to pay the wage chosen, he should
pay the amount between the minimum wage and his pocket money (i.e., his
1The \for-loop" actually takes place everywhere in our program, thus it will not be counted as a
rule of the game. The original uniform selection rule might cause a multiple selection problem, as
discussed in Chap. 3.
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money holding); when he owns less than 10 coins, he pays all of his money to the
employee, then the rm goes bankrupt and this employer enters the unemployed
class with his employees.
5. In the SA model, consumption for a certain actor in his active period is actually
not allowed, whereas multiple consumptions for another actor may take place
quite often. In contrast, the EPC model ensures that each actor takes turns to
be active once per period, including spending money.
6. Compared with the SA model, the \expenditure rule" has been positioned at
the end of the iteration, instead of at the beginning, which means actors are
consuming after receiving revenues or wages every month. The original setting
of the SA model might prohibit the actors from consumption, since actors own
less money before gaining prot or being paid.
7. The total money in circulation in the SA model is an invariant quantity. However,
the EPC model enables market value to change hand-in-hand with the GDP
growth rate, so that the market always reects social production: a booming
market is mainly resulting from a high GDP growth period, and vice versa. As
the total money in circulation is the sum of money holdings from all actors and
market value, the overall money in the society is consequently also varying each
year, then our model is no longer stationary.
8. There is no market value at initialization in the SA model, which means no market
is existing at the beginning of simulation. This might result that the rst rm
cannot do any trade in market to earn prot. However, in the EPC model, the
market value at initialization is assumed to be 100 coins, so that the rst-come
rms can already prot from the market through making trade.
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4.2 Simulation Rules of the EPC Model
The EPC model is designed to have N economic actors, with i = 1 : : : N . At initializa-
tion (t=0), each actor holds an equal amount of money m, measured in \coins"; there
are still no rms or employment relations, everyone is in a state of \unemployed"; a
household is treated as a single actor, and a rm can be owned by only one actor;
meanwhile, a market is created with an initial value V , as a prerequisite for companies
to trade their goods; the total money in circulation in this economy is the sum of
money holdings by all actors and the market value (i.e., M + V =
PN
i=1mi(t) + V ).
The actor i in the economy can be either a rm owner (employer, denoted by E), an
employee (worker, denoted by W ) or a non-employed (unemployed2, denoted by U),
thus the total population set is A = E +W + U . The character of a certain actor can
be specied by a state variable Si(t) = fmi(t); ei(t)g, which gives i's money holding
mi(t) and employment state ei(t) at a certain time t. If ei(t) = 0, the actor is not
employed, otherwise if ei(t) = j, the employer j hires i as one of his employees. The
state evolution from S(t)! S(t+1) is determined by a set of 5 simulation rules, which
take place at each unit of time, measured in months.
There are 5 basic simulations rules, and each actor takes turns to go through all simula-
tion rules once per month. To avoid possible articial eects from the order of selection,
we shue (interleave) the N economic actors at the beginning of each month before
implementing the \for-loop". This is mathematically equivalent to a random selection
among N actors, then the following simulation rules are applied to the selective actor a
when applicable. The detailed program code in MATLAB is provided in Appendix B.
1. Hiring rule:
Randomly select an actor a, by rst shuing N numbers and then choose one by
2Although \unemployed" and \non-employed" is not the same in empirical research, we do not
dierentiate them in the EPC model: an actor who is neither employer nor employee, should be
unemployed.
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one. If the actor a is unemployed3, his potential employer can be either an existing
rm owner or an unemployed who will become an employer in the same period
(potential employer set P = E [ U). Choose an employer c for a according to
the probability function (4.1), that weights potential employers by their wealth:
P (c) =
mcP
x2H mx
(4.1)
The wage interval w = [wa; wb] is an exogenous parameter. It shows the minimum
and maximum possible wages, and the average wage is w = (wa + wb)=2. If c's
money holding exceeds the average wage mc > w, then c hires a.
2. Revenue rule:
The revenue rule enables rms to earn revenue from market by selling their
products. If the actor a is not unemployed, a can be either a rm owner or a
worker. In both cases, they work for the rm and gain prot m from the market.
The amount m is a number which is randomly selected from the current market
value [0; V ] according to a triangular distribution4. If actor a is an employee, then
transfer m coins to the employer. Alternatively, if actor a is an employer, the m
coins are given to himself. All transferred money is counted as rm revenue (the
total amount of yearly rm revenue will be later recorded as yearly GDP).
3. Firing rule:
If actor a is a rm owner, he determines the number of workers to re through
uniformly selecting u actors from the employee set Wa, according to Eq. 4.2, so
3All agents' starting stages are unemployed, so all of them go through the \hiring rule" during the
rst month. In the rst round, some of them become rm owners and the other remain unemployed.
Starting from the second month, the agent who is already employer or employee, does not need to
execute the \hiring rule".
4The triangular distribution is used here to prevent a certain rm from earning almost all the
money from the market at once, so that nothing is left for the other rms. This is very likely to
happen in the original SA model, where uniform selection is applied in this rule.
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that the rm's workforce is reduced to a size such that his wage bill is payable.
u = max

Wa  
hma
w
i
; 0

(4.2)
In this function, Wa shows the number of workers currently hired by employer
a. The number of employees that a can hire is determined by his total wage bill,
ma (i.e., possible wage bill he can aord), if an average wage (w) is paid to each
worker. Accordingly, the employer should re some employees if he runs out of
money. If his budget is sucient, no workers will be red, and new employment
is possible from the \hiring rule" (in the next iteration).
4. Payment rule:
For each worker in a's employee set, pay a certain wage amount w, where w
is randomly selected from an exogenous minimum and maximum wage interval
[wa; wb] according to the triangular distribution
5. If employer a has an insucient
budget to pay the selected wage w, then w is reselected between the minimum
wage and a's money holding [wa;ma]; if the employer's money holding is less than
the minimum wage level (i.e., ma < wa), he pays all the money that he owns to
the worker, and goes bankrupt with his employees.
5. Expenditure rule:
Actors make consumption in the market at the end of each month6. Randomly
select an expenditure amount m from a's money holding [0;ma] according to
triangular distribution. Hence, ma is reduced by m, and the market value V is
increased by m.
5The triangular distribution applied here implies that the employer will pay the majority of workers
the average wage w, and pay only few of them (e.g., managers or gate-keepers) extremely high or low
wages.
6In reality, people have multiple times of consumption every month depending on their budgets.
Here in the model, we assume that they sum up their spending at the end of a month, and this amount
may dependent on their total money holding after receiving wages (or gaining prot for rm owners).
90
Unemployed?
  a
Not unemployed?
Employee? Employer?
2. Revenue rule
  a
Selected Actor  a
  a
  a
1.  Hiring rule
2. Revenue rule
3. Firing rule
4. Payment rule 
5. Expenditure rule
V = 100
Figure 4.1: Simulation Structure of the EPC Model
Fig. 4.1 provides an overview of simulation rules that a selected actor a will go through.
The \expenditure rule", which was the third rule in the SA model has now been
positioned in the last place, the market has been assigned V = 100 coins as initial
value, which guarantees that trading occurs at the rst round of iteration. The selected
actor a is able to go through all ve rules including the \expenditure rule", while in
the original SA model this activity was not allowed. The whole iteration should be
executed N times per month so that each actor (after permutation) has a chance to be
active once. Before each iteration starts, the computer breaks the natural sequence of
agents and puts them into a new random order, then the iteration will be implemented
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to every actor one by one. When actor a is selected, the computer will rst judge
whether he is unemployed or not. If he is unemployed, he might be hired through the
\hiring rule". If he is not unemployed, the computer will further decide whether he is
an employee or an employer; as an employee, he works for the rm, and contributes to
the revenue of the rm; as an employer, he not only works for the rm, but also needs
to decide the wage payments for workers and how many workers to re or hire. Finally,
no matter whether actor a works or not, at the end of the corresponding iteration, his
monthly consumption is calculated.
Every 12 replications of all N actors will be recorded as one \year". The total amount
of yearly rm revenue is counted as GDP by the end of 12 iterations. The yearly GDP
growth rate is measured by GDPt=GDPt 1. Since there is no comparison for starting
GDP, the rst year's GDP growth rate is assumed to be 1. The change of GDP growth
rate will be applied to the last recorded market value V , so that the market value will
also grow or decline with yearly GDP. The four exogenous parameters are: the money
holding of all actors, M , the total number of actors, N , the wage interval, w, and the
market value, V . A standard simulation with M=100,000, N=1,000, w = [wa; wb]=[10,
90] and V = 100 will be used in the following simulations.
4.3 Simulation Results
4.3.1 Firms and the Unemployed
Class size measure: After each month, count the number of employers,
workers and the unemployed.
Fig. 4.2 plots histograms and time series of the number of employers, employees and
the unemployed. The top three gures (gure (a) (b) (c)) are histograms of each
class of actor numbers. Data are collected for a standard 100-year simulation at a
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(a) Histogram of the Number of Employers (Year=1:100)
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(b) Histogram of the Number of Employees (Year=1:100)
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(c) Histogram of the Number of the Unemployed (Year=1:100)
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Figure 4.2: Figure (a) (b) (c): histograms of the number of actors each month as either an employer,
an employee or an unemployed with a constant bin size of 1. Figure (d) (e) (f): time series of the
numbers of employers, employees and the unemployed throughout the simulation.
constant bin size of 1. All three gures display good agreement with a Gaussian
distribution, with variables clustering around the means. It shows that on average
18:05% of the population are rm owners, 80:65% are workers, and the remaining
1:31% are unemployed7. Although statistics about class percentage are hard to nd
in reality, the simulated unemployment rate seems quite close to empirical results, i.e.,
according to our previous discussion in Chap. 2.1, the common unemployment rate in
most of the development countries is around or under 5%.
The bottom three gures (d), (e) and (f) in Fig. 4.2 show the number of employers,
employees and the unemployed throughout the years. At the beginning of the simula-
7Note that unemployment rate in the SA model is around 17%, which is much higher than reality.
This rate is reduced to around 10% if the \for-loop" is used in the \actor selection rule" (cf. Fig. 3.5).
The further reduction in the unemployment rate of the EPC model comes from a better logical
formulation of the whole simulation rules. When multiple selections are prevented, less extreme cases
(e.g., ring or hiring) take place, so that more workers are able to nd jobs.
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tion, all actors are treated as unemployed, but since everyone is given an equal amount
of 100 coins, almost all agents are able to become either employed or an employer to
hire others, thus the unemployment rate was kept very low at the start of the simula-
tion. Later on, some employers may not aord the wage payments and either become
unemployed or workers themselves. A clear decrease in the number of employers with
an obvious increase in the workers and the unemployed numbers can be observed. The
convergence behavior will last until the proportions of these three classes reach a sta-
tionarity distribution after approximately 10 years (120 months), which means all data
collected after this transient period should be trusted for further analysis. Meanwhile,
this transient part of the simulation also explains the extreme values in gure (a) and
(b), which result in long at tails of these plots. In fact, if the rst 10 years of simula-
tion are truncated, the same gures will exhibit even better Gaussian t with a lower
variance (cf. gure (a) of Fig. 4.3). In order to represent the ergodic distribution of
our Markov process, all of the following simulations will exclude this transient period.
Moreover, since each rm is assumed to be owned by a single rm owner, the number
of rm owners is just equal to the number of rms calculated. Figure (d) of Fig. 4.2
provides a general view of the change in the rm numbers. At the start of the sim-
ulation, there are more than 300 rms, then the number of rms gradually drops to
175 within 10 years; for the rest of the simulation, there will be continuous entry and
exit of rms, causing uctuations in rm numbers around the mean (or mode), which
shows that the distributions of the number of rms in the EPC model is stationary,
which is in accordance with empirical facts given in Chap. 2.4.
4.3.2 Firm Size Distribution
Firm size measure: The rm size is calculated as the number of employees
in each rm. At the end of each month, count the number of employees of
all rms.
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(c) Firm Size Distribution in Log−Log Scale (Year=10:100)
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(d) Lognormal Fit to the Firm Size Distribution (Year=10:100)
Lognormal firm size
Lognormal fit
µ = − 0.695
σ = 1.2
Figure 4.3: Firm size distribution. Figure (a): histogram of the total number of employees at the
aggregate level; this histogram is a truncation of gure (b) in Fig. 4.2; the unstable data from the
rst 10 years of the simulation are omitted, thus this histogram records the last 90 years' simulation.
Figure (b): histogram of rm size distribution; rm sizes that are larger than 30 with comparably
very low frequency are omitted. Figure (c): rm sizes measured by the number of employees in the
log-log scale (Year=10:100). Figure (d): curve tting to gure (c), which shows that the rm size
distribution can be tted well by a Lognormal distribution.
Most of the older statistic models of rm dynamics assume that rms grow, decline or
exit with a probability that may be a function of rm size, and not all models evolve
to a steady state (e.g., the models of Gibrat (1931), Kalecki (1945), Simon (1955),
Steindl (1965), Levy and Solomon (1997) generally have no steady state). Some other
studies assume that rm sizes and their growth rates are independent, but that there
is a minimum size for a rm (e.g., Levy and Solomon (1997)). Apart from that, some
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models presume that the industry size and the number of rms are kept constant
throughout the simulation, i.e., by xing the number of rms, they assume that the
number of entry and exit rms are always equal during the simulation (e.g., Kalecki
(1945), Simon (1960)).
Compared with these models, the EPC model simulates rm dynamics from bottom
up. Instead of assuming that the growth rate and rm size are negatively connected,
it is assumed that the rms' behavior is determined by the money holding of the rm
owners, hence rich rms tend to hire more employees than poor rms. Meanwhile,
entering and exiting industry, in the EPC model, is governed by the employment
dynamics. Since the minimum rm size is set to 1, a rm comes into being if an actor
hires another, and a rm dies if a rm owner cannot aord the wage costs and res all
his employees.
Fig. 4.3 reveals some facts of rm size distribution in a 100 years' simulation. Figure (a)
of Fig. 4.3 depicts the number of workers (employees), which is the same gure as
Fig. 4.2 (b) after removing the rst 10 years' transient part. It shows that the total
number of employees (or \labor") per month does not uctuate much from a mean of
810, and can be well tted by a Gaussian distribution.
Instead of looking at the number of workers in gure (a) of Fig. 4.3, from a dierent
point of view, gure (b) displays a monthly histogram of employee numbers (i.e., rm
size). Generally, most rms are small, the mean rm size is 5 with median size of 4,
while the mode is just the minimum possible rm size | 1, which takes almost 27%
of the total frequency. Besides, only very rarely rms have more than 30 employees;
for a better observation of the clustering character of small rms, these large rms are
truncated in gure (b). Figure (c) shows a log-log plot of the rm size distribution,
where an obvious curve shape can be observed: it seems that the number of large rms
is much lower than small rms. As a matter of fact, in our study of rm size, the largest
rm size in record is 121 employees out of 830 (around 14% of total employee number).
According to Axtell (2001), the largest U.S. rm in 1997 had 106 employee out of a
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total workforce 107, meaning that the largest rm size should not exceed one-tenth
of the total workforce. Hence, the result from the EPC model looks closer to reality.
Figure (d) conducts curve tting to gure (c). It seems that the rm size distribution
can be tted well by a Lognormal distribution (R-sq = 99:9%, R-sq(adj) = 99:8%),
which is in harmony with the ndings of Gibrat (1931)8, and other researchers, such as
Chesher (1979), Sutton (1997), Cabral and Mata (2003) (cf. discussions in Chap. 2.2).
Although Gibrat (1931)'s model is very famous among studies of rm dynamics, it
has some pronounced shortcomings. For example, the rm size distribution tends to
slowly move to the right, with ever increasing mean and variance as time goes by. This
means the size of the biggest rm becomes larger and larger, consequently, the model
will have no statistical equilibrium distribution. In contrast, we have tested the EPC
model for both 500 and 1,000 years, and the results of the rm size distribution are
visibly stable: the largest rm size will not deviate much from 120, which perhaps
indicates only slight growth in large rms, in other words, the large rms tend to grow
much slower than small rms. This is also one of the stylized facts that have been
mentioned by many empirical researchers, as discussed in Chap. 2.3.
Finally, in our literature review of Chap. 2.2, some researchers found that the rm size
distribution (in log-log scale) satises a power law rather than a Lognormal distribution,
at least for the upper tail (e.g, in Axtell (2001), Silva and Yakovenko (2005)). If we
look at gure (c) of Fig. 4.3, the EPC model can also mimic a power law rm size
distribution when the lower tail is truncated. It shows again that the power law and
the Lognormal distribution can be very similar in the upper tail when a log-log scale
is applied. Note that we are more interested in the scaling behaviors generated by the
interactions among agents, instead of showing which one of the distributional forms can
8Gibrat (1931) proposes a simple model to study the rm size distribution, namely, using a log
annual growth rate r = ln(St+1St ) to measure the rm growths in aggregation, where S is the rm size.
His interesting nding is that, if we assume all companies are born at roughly the same time and of
similar initial sizes, in case they face the same i.i.d. growth rate r (independent of size), the resulting
rm size distribution is Lognormality.
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better represent the rm size distribution. It is possible that with further modications
to the current model, the rm size distribution may deviate from Lognormality, and
approach a power law more closely. This can be seen at the EPCE (EPC model with
endogenous wages) model introduced in the following chapter.
4.3.3 Firm Growth Distribution
Unlike many traditional models assuming that rm size and rm growth rate are in-
dependent (e.g., in Gibrat (1931), Kalecki (1945), Simon (1955), Steindl (1965)), most
of the empirical studies mentioned in Chap. 2.3 (e.g., Stanley et al. (1996), Bottazzi
et al. (2002)) suggest a company's current growth should be highly correlated with its
past performances, and might also inuence the near future. This nding is captured
in the EPC model as well, since the growth of a rm mainly results from the money
holding from its rm owner. The capacity to enlarge one rm either in size or in sales
will consequently depend on the rm's past revenue and the employer's wage budget.
Firm growth measure: After each month, calculate the current size, st, for
a rm that traded during this month. Size can be measured both in terms
of number of employees and total revenues within that month, the growth
rate is therefore st=st 19.
The EPC model generates log annual growth rates of rms consistent with the Laplace
distribution, no matter whether it is measured in terms of employee numbers (top
of Fig. 4.4) or total revenues (bottom of Fig. 4.4)10. A random variable obeys a
9The rm growth rates are recorded at an aggregate level in log-form. Only the rms who are
continuously trading in 2 successive months are counted.
10Note the dierences in the x-axis of Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 3.14 (from Chap. 3.3.4). The variation of
rm size can be very large, e.g., an increase of 100 times rm size will end up around 4.6 on the x-axis
(log(100) = 4:6), whereas the largest GDP increment may not be more than 25% (as in our replication
of the SA model).
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Figure 4.4: The Laplace t to the rm growth rate distribution. Figure (a) is the histogram of the
rm growth rate distribution measured by employee numbers and plotted in a log-y scale; Figure (b)
is the PDF of the rm growth rate distribution measured by employee numbers, and the smooth curve
represents a Laplace curve tting (OLS regression: R-sq=97:5%, R-sq(adj)=97:3%); Figure (c) plots
the histogram of the rm growth rate distribution measured by sales; Figure (d) is the PDF of rm
growth rate distribution measured by sales, and the smooth curve is a Laplace curve tting (OLS
regression: R-sq=96:8%, R-sq(adj)=96:5%).
Laplace(; b) distribution if its PDF is:
f(xj; b) = 1
2b
exp
   jx  j
b

(4.3)
The Laplace distribution is a special case of the Subbotin distribution introduced in
Chap. 2.3. Here,  is a location parameter and b > 0 is a scale parameter. If  = 0
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and b = 1, Eq. 4.3 is exactly an exponential distribution scaled by 1=2. Figure (d) of
Fig. 4.4 is close to this case.
From the shape of the rm growth distribution, it is easily observed that given small
rms dominating the simulation process, most of the probability mass in the tails of
Laplace distribution are contributed by small rms experiencing either rapid growth or
rapid decline. Namely, the variances of rm growth rates depend negatively on sizes.
Furthermore, when looking closer, especially in gure (a) and (c) of Fig. 4.4, there is
a slight asymmetry in the growth rate distribution. It seems that the rms' expan-
sions and contractions are less peaked and wider than a Gaussian, but asymmetrically,
while the negative rates appear more volatile than the positive rates. Interestingly,
this stylized fact is also reported by Perline et al. (2006) who study the U.S. rms
(cf. Chap. 2.3), and similar simulation results can be found in Wright (2005) as well.
4.3.4 Firm Demise Distribution
Firm demise measure: After each month, count the number of rm demises
that occurred during the month. A rm demise occurs when a rm res all
its employees.
The rm demise distributions shown in Fig. 4.5 illustrate that the rm demise is gen-
erally Gaussian distributed, both in a 100-year or 500-year simulations11. On average
around 2-3 rms die each month, an extreme case in a trial 100-year run is that in a
certain month, a maximum number of 7 rms die, whereas this record is increased to
10 rms if we run a prolonged simulation, e.g., for 500 years.
11The curve tting from Fig. 4.5 is conducted using the MATLAB \Curve Fitting Toolbox", which
supports more than 100 regression models. In our histogram curve tting, truncation of data is not
necessary. However, in some cases, one may need to include starting conditions to nd the global
optimum.
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Figure 4.5: The Gaussian t to the rm demise distribution. The smooth lines are OLS regres-
sions of the histograms of the rm demise distribution. Both distributions can be tted well into
Gaussian (Left: Year=10:100, R-sq=99:2%, R-sq(adj)=98:9%; Right: Year=10:500, R-sq=99:5%, R-
sq(adj)=99:3%).
If dividing the monthly number of demise rms by the number of existing rms, it
shows that roughly 2% of rms die per month, which is much lower than 16% predicted
by Wright (2005) in the SA model. The signicant drop in rm demise rates comes
from a dierent distribution of wage payments, so that the rm owners become less
endangered by bankruptcy after paying the wage bills.
According to a study of the U.S. economy during 1989{1997 by Cook and Ormerod
(2003), around 611,000 rms died each year out of a total 5.73 million, which gives
a yearly rm demise rate of approximately 10%. This percentage, at the rst glance,
looks much larger than our model-generated rm demise rate. However, note that in
the empirical calculation, the yearly rm demise rate should not be the summation
of 12 monthly rm demise rates12. From gure (a) and (d) in Fig. 4.2, it is known
that the number of rms is characterized by stationary uctuations after the transient
12Note that the number of yearly demises is the summation of the number of monthly demise rms.
However, the yearly rm demise rate should not be the summation of 12 monthly rm demise rates.
Theoretically, if the monthly entry and exit rates remain roughly constant, and if the total number of
rms is not varying too much, the yearly rm demise rate is close to monthly rm demise rate.
101
period (i.e., ca. 10 years). If we use the same calculation method as Cook and Ormerod
(2003), and count the actual rm exits per year, the average rm demise rate is close
to 10% as well. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that, since entry and exit of
rms happen at the same time, the number of total rms will stay roughly unchanged.
Our simulation is also in line with Midrigan (2007), who nds that in the U.S., most
rm demises are happening with small rms: rms with less than 20 employees together
account for 18% of the total employment, and dying rms are concentrated in rms
with less than 20 employees (cf. Chap. 2.4). These ndings are similar in the EPC
model, since we have seen in the growth rate distribution of Fig. 4.4 that large rms
are less volatile than small rms, and small rms may experience more entry and exit.
4.3.5 GDP Growth Rate Distribution
GDP growth rate measure: At the end of each year, calculate the total
revenues by all rms during the year, Xt, GDP growth rate is thenXt=Xt 1.
For simplicity, the rst year GDP growth rate is assumed to be 1.
In our simplied social model without government and international trade, GDP can be
approximated by the total yearly revenues of rms. From the \Central Limit Theorem",
we know that the sum of a large number of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables is close to a Gaussian distribution given a nite variance.
Consequently, if the simulation rule says all revenues are randomly picked from a
triangular distribution (or any other distribution), then the revenues should be i.i.d.
distributed, and the sum of them will naturally result in a Gaussian. This is also
conceded byWright (2005) (cf. p. 612 of the \rate-of-prot distribution"). Fig. 4.6 plots
the histogram of the GDP growth rate distribution based on a 500 years' simulation.
The resulting distribution seems to t a Gaussian distribution better than a Laplace
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Figure 4.6: Gaussian t to the GDP growth rate distribution (Year=10:500, R-sq=99:5%, R-
sq(adj)=99:3%). Note the dierence in the x-axis of this gure and Fig. 3.14: here we display the
natural rate of GDP growth, while Fig. 3.14 uses logarithms.
distribution (cf. Fig. 3.13), which we have mentioned in Chap. 3.3.413. Unfortunately,
due to the limitation of the i.i.d. revenue collecting rule, the EPC model is unable to
reproduce the empirical Subbotin or Laplace distribution of GDP, suggested by e.g.,
Lee et al. (1998), Castaldi and Dosi (2007), Canning et al. (1998) (cf. the discussion
in Chap. 2.6). We conjecture that if there were no wars, diseases or serious corruption
that stop economies from growing, GDP growth rates might be usually positive (thus
the whole distribution will look a little skewed to the left, with most of density at the
right side), unlike in the EPC model's prediction that negative growth happens with
almost the same frequency as positive growth.
13We have addressed the question of the Laplace GDP growth rate distribution simulated by Wright
(2005) in Chap. 3.3.4. From our replication of his model, it appears that the distribution seems not
tted very well by a Laplace distribution, but seems closer to a Gaussian distribution.
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4.3.6 Duration of Recession
Recession duration measure: A recession begins when GDP declines, i.e.,
Xt=Xt 1 < 1 and ends when GDP recovers, i.e., Xt+k=Xt+k 1 > 1, and the
duration of recession is k years.
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Figure 4.7: Exponential t to the duration of recession. The smooth line is an OLS regression
for the data, and both distributions can be tted well by an exponential function f(x)1 ebx where
b   0:8 for both simulation lengths. (Left: Year=10:100, R-sq=95:6%, R-sq(adj)=93:4%; Right:
Year=10:500, R-sq=99:1%, R-sq(adj)=98:4%).
Fig. 4.7 displays the distribution of recession durations simulated by the EPC model,
and the smooth curve is an exponential curve tting. Since a standard simulation
only provides 100 data for GDP, which are not enough for better curve tting, we
therefore prolong the simulation for 500 years and receive a better exponential t
(right of Fig. 4.7). A closer look shows that the mean duration is around 1.7 years,
and the mode is 1 year, which is quite close to empirical ndings by Everts (2006),
Burns and Mitchell (1946) and Sichel (1991), as mentioned in Chap. 2.6. In a 100 year
simulation, the duration of recession ranges from 1 to 4 years, only when the model is
run for 500 years, we will reach a maximum recession duration of 7 years. Although
there is still debate on whether a power law or an exponential law is more appropriate
104
to describe the distribution of recession durations, we see that the EPC model predicts
an exponential law for the duration of recession in line with Wright (2004b).
4.3.7 Income Shares and Prot Shares
Income shares measure: Given yearly GDP, X, which is equal to the total
rm revenue, calculate the total wage bill, W , paid to workers, thus wage
share is Xw =
W
X
, and prot share is Xp = 1 Xw.
Fig. 4.8 plots the yearly income share and prot share of GDP simulated by the EPC
model. The top two gures (a) (b) are results of 100 years' simulation, and the bottom
two gures (c) (d) are results of 500 years' simulation. Figures (a) and (c) in the
left column show that the income and prot share in GDP of the economy is visibly
stationary; the prot share is around 0.3, which is lower than the wage share of 0:7.
This goes hand in hand with some empirical ndings discussed in Chap. 2.7, such as
Kalecki (1954), or Foley and Michl (1999). A similar wage-prot plot is also provided
by Wright (2005) (p. 606, Fig. 7), but the original time series uctuate signicantly, and
the proportion of prot share against wage share is around 0:45 : 0:55. In comparison,
the results generated by the EPC model are more reasonable, with a more stationary
wage and prot share. Unfortunately, since the EPC model is stationary and over-
simplied from reality, it cannot reproduce the fact of a rising prot share which has
happened in the recent decades (cf. discussions in Chap. 2.7).
Concerning the ratios of wage/prot share distribution, we have addressed in Chap. 2.7
that, from a time series properties, if both time series are generally stationary, their
ratios should also be stationary, which might look like a bell-shaped distribution having
various variances in an aggregate manner. The simulation results by the EPC model
display that both the wage share and the prot share are uctuating very little about
their means, hence their ratios should be tted well by Gaussians with small variances,
as exhibited in gure (b) (d) of Fig. 4.8. Note that the Gaussian curve tting is better
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Figure 4.8: The income share and prot share of GDP. Figure (a) (b) is 100 years' simulation without
transient period, the smooth curve in gure (b) is a Gaussian t with R-sq=97:2%, R-sq(adj)=96:5%;
Figure (c) (d) is 500 years' simulation without transient period, the smooth curve in gure (d) is a
Gaussian t with R-sq=99:5%, R-sq(adj)=99:4%.
with a longer (i.e., 500 years') simulation, which gives the same mean but even smaller
variance.
106
4.3.8 Prot Rate Distribution
Prot rate measure: After each month, calculate the prot rate for each
rm throughout this month. The prot rate, pi, of rm i is dened as:
pi = 100
 ri
wi
  1

(4.4)
where ri is the total revenue received by rm owner i, and wi is his total
wage bill during the month.
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Figure 4.9: Firm prot rate distribution (Year=10:100). (Left: 100 years' simulation with mini-
mum = -51.2, maximum = 867.5, mode = 44.4; Right: truncation for values larger than 500, the
accumulated rm prot-rate distribution is apparently right-skewed.
Fig. 4.9 illustrates that the rm prot rate distribution is apparently right-skewed,
especially in the right gure where we have truncated those extreme monthly prot
rates of more than 500. This right-skewed prot rate distribution has also been dis-
covered in related researches, e.g., Wright (2004a) and Julian (2007), as mentioned in
Chap. 2.5. When compared with Wright (2005)'s prot-rate gures, where he uses both
rm-weighted and capital-weighted prot rate to reduce distributional noise, Fig. 4.9,
although without any such adjustment, is much less noisy and consistent. This might
be because the EPC model adopts a triangular distribution in many places instead of
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uniform draws. Consequently, the collection of revenues, the distribution of wages as
well as the expenditures (consumption + reinvestment14) from employers become more
moderate, so that the model results in less noisy prot rate distribution than the orig-
inal SA model. Meanwhile, Wright (2005) provides a six-parameter functional form to
t the model-generated prot rate distribution, with the mean and variance depending
on the power law distributed rm size. We have not applied this method, since our rm
size distribution looks more Lognormally distributed (instead of power law). However,
we agree with his opinion that a rm's prot rate may be closely correlated with its
size. According to our simulation rules, the prot rate is calculated from the division
of the total rm income by the wage bill, and either the income (total revenues earned
by both rm owners and his employees) or the wage bill (sum of all wage payments by
rm owners) should be correlated with rm size (i.e., employee numbers). The amount
of investment or prot may be higher for large companies than their small competitors.
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Figure 4.10: Gamma t to the rm prot rate distribution. The negative prot rates are truncated,
and only the prot rates recorded after transient period are plotted (i.e., year > 10).
14The rest of income after deducting a rm owner's wage bill and consumption goes to his money
holding, which directly decides whether he is able to hire more workers in the following month.
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We show that the prot rate distribution may be tted well by a Gamma distribution,
similar as the industry prot rate distribution proposed by Farjoun and Machover
(1983) (cf. our discussions on the Gamma distribution and industry prot rate in
Chap. 2.5). Since the Gamma distribution requires positive variables, the negative
prot rates in Fig. 4.9 must be truncated prior to estimation. The PDF of the Gamma
distribution is:
f(xj; ) =
 
x

 1
exp
   x


 ()
; ;  > 0 (4.5)
where  is a shape parameter. When  > 1, the Gamma distribution is unimodal
but has a skewed shape; the larger , the less the skewness.  is a scale parameter,
representing the range of the Gamma distribution; the larger , the more stretched is
the distribution.
The curve tting in Fig. 4.10 is done based on the maximum likelihood method. It
shows that the Gamma distribution ts both tails of the prot rate distribution quite
well, if negative values are neglected. Most of the prot rate density is concentrated
at the right long tail of the distribution, displaying a clear right-skewed feature.
4.3.9 Income Distribution
Income measure: After each year, calculate the total income received by
each actor during that year. Income for workers is just the wage amount,
and the employer's income15 is the total amount of revenues he received
within that year.
Fig. 4.11 displays the income distribution simulated by the EPC model. Figure (a)
shows yearly income for workers. Instead of Lognormality suggested by Wright (2005)
15Note that \income" for employer measured here is just his total amount of revenues collected
through the \revenue rule", following the denition of Wright (2005). In Chap. 5.4, we argue that
income for an employer should be in fact the amount obtained after subtracting the wage bill from
his total revenue. In the later case, an employer' income can also be negative.
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(b) Power Law Fit to Income by Firm Owners (Year=10:100)
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(c) Income by Workers and Firm Owners in CCDF Loglog Scale (Year=10:100)
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Figure 4.11: Histogram of yearly income distribution (Year=10:100). Figure (a): lower-income
distribution measured by wages paid to workers; the smooth curve is a Gaussian t (R-sq= 99:3%,
R-sq(adj)= 99:1%). Figure (b): higher-income distribution measured by the revenue incomes from
the rm owners; the smooth curve is a power law (Zipf distribution) t after truncation for income
6 3500 (R-sq= 98:7%, R-sq(adj)= 98:4%). Figure (c): income distribution from the workers and the
rm owners respectively, plotted as CCDF in log-log scale. Figure (d): a complete income distribution
as CCDF in log-log scale.
(cf. p. 608, Fig. 8), it seems that workers' income distribution is rather Gaussian follow-
ing the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), and their yearly wages are generally stationary
and clustering around a certain mean value. Figure (b) records yearly income for rm
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owners; if the noisy lower part can be neglected, the upper tail of the income distribu-
tion can be tted by Zipf's law. The agents who stay in this region are those who run
businesses, and normally they have other sources of incomes.
If we put workers' wage income and employers' revenue income into the same plot,
gure (c) of Fig. 4.11 displays the CCDF of the overall income distribution in log-
log scale. It seems that the workers' income is almost a vertical line (which shows
clustering of wages), but the rm owners' income has a long tail, indicating a much
wider income range, and some of them are even extremely rich. Finally, it might not
be surprising that when plotting gure (c) in an aggregate style as in gure (d), there
will be a \knee" shape characterizing the transition area of lower-income to higher-
income by an exponential (normal) law to a power law. This emerging power law
(or Zipf's law) in the upper tail of the income distribution is in accordance with the
ndings of researchers such as Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2000), Chatterjee et al.
(2005), Chakrabarti et al. (2006), and others (cf. discussions in Chap. 2.8).
4.4 Summary
We introduce in this chapter an agent-based model of Employment, Production and
Consumption (EPC), which simulates and explains a wide variety of phenomena emerg-
ing from the social relation of production, inspired by the work of Wright (2005). The
model consists of agents playing dierent roles in the economy, they can be either em-
ployers, employees or the unemployed. Firms are the main organizations to produce
goods, whereas a market, as a pool of dierent kinds of goods, is a place for the rms
to trade their products, and for the agents to consume. The monetary cycle goes hand-
in-hand with the production cycle: the owners of rms (employers) gain prot from the
market, they distribute salaries to employees, so that the employees can spend money
in the marketplace.
The model generates many statistical distributions, most of them are in accordance
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with empirical stylized facts. To sum up, the most important distributions generated
from the model are the following:
1 . The EPC model generates dierent classes of people in the society, among
them are a majority of workers, a comparatively small number of employers, and
a seemingly frictional unemployed class. Since each group's proportion remains
roughly unchanged, the distributions of their aggregate numbers look Gaussian,
(with much smaller variances when compared with the corresponding gures in
the SA model).
2 . The rm size distribution of the EPC model follows Lognormality instead of
a power law. This is perhaps the result from a more logical formulation in the
simulation rules. A closer look shows that, if uniform selection rule is applied,
the rm size distribution will follow a power law, such as in Wright (2005) and
Wright (2008). However, if we ensure random selection for each agent (i.e., each
agent should be selected only once depending on a random order), an apparent
curvature will be observed in the rm size distribution, such as in the slight
modication to the SA model (mentioned in Chap. 3.3.1), the EPC model, and
the EPC model with endogenous wages (which will be discussed in the next
chapter).
3 . The rm growth distribution follows a special kind of Subbotin distribution
called Laplace distribution. If we measure the growth by sales, the rms' expan-
sions and contractions occur asymmetrically, which is also observed in empirical
researches.
4 . The rm demise distribution follows a Gaussian distribution, instead of Lognor-
mality proposed by the original SA model. The underlying property under any
Gaussian distribution is that, the variables that come into our statistics always
uctuate regularly around the mean, showing \statistical equilibrium".
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5 . The annual GDP growth rate distribution follows a Gaussian according to
the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). However, the model generates the positive
growth rates symmetric to the negative growth rates, which might not be real-
istic. Unfortunately, related literature on the GDP growth rate distribution (for
a particular country16) is rather sparse, hence the real GDP growth rate distri-
bution is still under question. This is because most of the real world data for
specic countries is usually too short to capture the real growth rate distribution,
some of them is even truncated for the economic depression or the breakout of
war. As a result, although there are some studies based on the aggregate GDP
growth rates of certain years across all countries, a track of the GDP growth rate
for one country throughout the years is rarely done.
6 . The distribution of recession durations follows an exponential law instead of a
power law. Although there are still furious debates on which distribution is more
appropriate to portray the realistic recession duration, the EPC model predicts
a reasonable recession duration interval which is closer to empirical ndings.
7 . Our generated time series of wage-shares, prot-shares and their proportions,
have much less variations than the original SA model, and get closer to the
empirical statistics. As both prot and wage share are generally stationary time
series, their ratios should be also distributed around a long-term stable mean,
showing \statistical equilibrium" and a Gaussian bell-shape in aggregation.
8 . Concerning the prot rate distribution, the EPC model does not follow the 6-
parameter function designed by Wright (2005). Instead, our simulation outcomes
show that the prot rate distribution can be well tted by a right-skewed Gamma
distribution, similar as many empirical ndings.
16Note that we have addressed in Chap. 2.6 about the research by Lee et al. (1998) and Canning et al.
(1998). They collect GDP of 152 countries for the period 1950 to 1992, and show that the distributions
of annual GDP growth rates have \fatter" tails than Gaussian. However, similar research on GDP for
a particular country throughout the years has been relatively sparse.
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9 . Finally, income distribution explains in an easy manner why we often observe
a \knee" shape in the CDF of overall income in many developed countries. From
the modeling perspective, it is already clear that the workers' salaries and rm
owners' incomes are very dierently distributed, therefore, the overlapping area
of aggregate income may not look smooth17.
Interestingly but not so surprisingly, an important implication of this computational
social model is that, some of the features of our economic reality, such as income
inequality, unemployment problem as well as regular recessions, are inevitable conse-
quences of the social relations of production under driven of labor rather than so-called
\capitalistic exploitation". Hence, essential properties of capitalism might not be ac-
cidental or transitory as believed by Karl Marx and others.
17\Income distribution" mentioned here is not the same as the \wealth distribution", and the
dierence will be interpreted in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
EPC Model with Endogenous
Wages (EPCE)
5.1 Inclusion of Endogenous Wages
From the previously discussed SA model and the EPC model, we have already learned
how a better micro formulation of the simulation rules helps to improve the macro
quality of our output. In other words, if the model is well designed, it should be able
to reproduce many empirical distributions. As a matter of fact, both the SA model
and the EPC model are based on monetary exchange: the change of status of agents,
the employment relation, investments as well as consumptions, are all depending on
the money holdings of the agents. In this respect, the \payment rule" plays a key role
in the whole model, since it is the only element that determines money holdings of the
workers. Therefore, any change in this rule will directly aect the simulation at the
microscopic level.
The idea of including endogenous wages had been suggested by Ian Wright, when
he commented on the previous version of the EPC model. Later on, he introduced
a \closed social architecture model" in Wright (2008) where endogenous wages were
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adopted1, and the whole series of distributions mentioned in the SA model was revisited,
with all results in accordance with the original SA model. However, Wright (2008)'s
model still includes the shortcomings of the SA model discussed in Chap. 3 (e.g.,
the way of actor selection, investment and consumption is still based on the uniform
selection rule): it does not take into account economic growth, and is hence still static
and \closed" (as it is called \closed social architecture model"); in addition, if we follow
the individual behavior of either one rm or one agent, the uctuation of its activity is
usually too large. This means although there is stationarity of the aggregate quantities,
the individual behavior might not be as stationary as we would expect.
The model to be introduced in this chapter will be called EPCEmodel (EPCmodel with
endogenous wage) based on the framework of the EPC model. Apart from the money
holdings (mi) and the employment states (ei), the wage expectation (wi) becomes an
endogenous and important descriptive variable for an individual. If we make the wage
variable endogenous, it turns out to be a factor in the causal system whose value is
determined or inuenced by the other variables, such as the worker's previous wage
payments, the budget constraint of his employer, etc., which makes the model more
exible. What's more, unlike the SA or the EPC model2, where the wage payment
is completely random, agents in the EPCE model keep track of their recent history,
e.g., one may require generally the same wage level throughout his employment at one
rm; even if he gets red, his wage expectation for the next employment will not drop
immediately. This kind of \memory" does not exist in the previous models.
In the EPCE model, we are going to discuss some distributions or model-generated
1In the \closed social architecture model" by Wright (2008), the identier for one agent is S =
fmi; ei; wi; ig, representing money holding, employment state, wage level and wage expectation of
agent i. In the EPCE model, the identier has been reduced to S = fmi; ei; wig.
2Note that in the SA model (where workers' wages are uniformly distributed) or even EPC model
(where workers' wages are triangularly distributed), there are no correlations between a worker's
monthly wage payments, namely the same worker's wage may uctuate from very high to very low in
the next month.
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interesting facts, which have not been mentioned in the studies of Chap. 4 or in Wright
(2005, 2008). A signicant advantage of the EPCE model is that it allows for a close
look into how a single rm or agent develops throughout the simulation, while this is not
accessible in the previous models. By examining the rm behavior at the micro level,
some additional statistical properties can be interpreted. For instance, the stylized fact
of the \rm life expectancy distribution" will be analyzed; the relationship between
\economic growth and small rms" can be interpreted; the income and wealth dynamics
can be studied in great detail. Note that in the EPCE model, as the \payment rule"
changes, the wage boundary no longer exists, thus the \ring rule" will also be changed
correspondingly, so that it no longer depends on the average wage payment. The
distributions mentioned in the previous chapters can be easily recovered in this model
too. However, to save space, the same distributions will not be mentioned here again.
Before talking about the simulation results, let's rst discuss the setting of the model.
5.2 Simulation Rules of the EPCE Model
The EPCE Model is based on the EPC model adding endogenous wages, therefore, its
modeling platform is similar. It contains four exogenous parameters: (1) N = 1; 000
economic actors, with i = 1 : : : N ; (2) the total money held by an actor at initialization
is M =
PN
i=1mi(t) = 1000, thus each actor i at time t=0 holds an equal amount of
money m = 10, measured in \coins", and this money endowment is assumed to be
innitely divisible; (3) the initial wage expectations of all actors are also equal, so that
wi = 10; (4) A market with initial value V = 100 is created as starting value. The
simulation rules are designed on a monthly basis. At the starting time, there are still
no rms or employment relations, hence everyone is treated as unemployed, and each
actor takes turns to go through monthly simulation rules. A year counter records every
12 applications of monthly rules, and a standard simulation runs for 100 years.
Likewise, the actor i in the economy can be either a rm owner (E), a worker (W ), or
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an unemployed (U). Each actor should belong to one, but not more than one class,
E \W \ U = ;, and the total population set is A = E +W + U . The character of a
certain actor can be specied by a state variable Si(t) = fmi(t); ei(t); wi(t)g. mi(t) > 0
gives i's money holding at time t. ei(t) gives i's employment state: if ei(t) = 0, the
actor is not employed, otherwise if ei(t) = j, then the employer j hires i as one of
his employees. wi(t) > 0 is the wage expectation of a certain actor: if the actor is
employed, wi is also his negotiated wage, which needs to be settled at the beginning of
each new employment, and is expected to increase step by step as long as he stays at
the same rm and the employer has sucient wage budget to pay him3; if the actor is
not yet employed, wi is used to record his last wage payment, and he will lower down
the wage expectation in case he could not nd the next job very soon. Besides, as a
starting rule, for a rm owner himself who never experiences unemployment or for an
unemployed who never experiences employment, their wage expectation will stay at 10,
although they never get paid4. The state evolution from S(t)! S(t+1) is determined
by a set of simulation rules as follows, which take place at each unit of time, measured
in months:
1. Hiring rule:
Randomly select an actor a from the set A at the beginning of each month5.
(a) If actor a is unemployed, then his potential employer can be either an ex-
isting rm owner or an unemployed who becomes an employer in the same
period (potential employer set H = E [ U). Choose an employer h for a
3This regulation guarantees stable wage payments for workers, while in the SA or the EPC model,
wage payments are completely random.
4Since the employer is the leading person of a rm, we assume that he does not really pay a wage
to himself. Instead, after paying all his workers, he decides how to spend the leftover of his money,
either for reinvestment (i.e., his wealth in the following months directly decides whether he can hire
more workers) or his own expenditures.
5This is done by rst random permutation of all actors, and then choosing the actor according to
the shued ordering.
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according to the probability function 5.1, that weights potential employers
by their wealth:
P (h) =
mhP
x2H mx
(5.1)
(b) The worker's negotiated wage \w" should be settled the moment he gets
employed by a certain rm. The employer h selects the negotiated wage,
w, from the possible employee a's wage expectation interval [wa; 1:5wa]
6
according to uniform distribution. To avoid too small a wage expectation,
here we dene the workers' minimum wage expectation should be wa > 1 (for
wa < 1, adjust negotiated wage to wa = 1). If the employer can aord the
negotiated wage (mh > w, which is higher than the minimum wage w > wa),
h hires a: set a's employee index to ea = h, a's new wage expectation has
increased to the current negotiated wage level w
0
a = w, and the number of
employees for employer h has been increased by 1.
(c) If the negotiated wage is higher than the employer can aord, mh < w, actor
a remains unemployed, ea = 0. However, after this unsuccessful experience,
actor a starts to think that he might have set the wage expectation too
high, therefore, he sets a new wage expectation, which can be 50% lower
than the original wage expectation: select a new wage expectation for the
next job search w
0
a 2 [0:5wa; wa] according to a random draw from a uniform
distribution. The new wage expectation should be at least the minimum
wage (w
0
a > 1).
2. Revenue rule:
6Each actor a may set individual wage expectation, but he also has an acceptable minimum wage
expectation wa, as well as a higher wage expectation 1:5wa, which is 50% more than his lowest
acceptable wage. If the negotiated wage has been accepted at the date of employment, the employee's
wage will start at this level and increase by 10% from year to year as long as he stays at the same
rm.
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(a) If actor a is not unemployed, a can be either an employer or an employee,
and in both cases, he gains revenues m from the market. The amount m
is selected from the current market value [0; V ] according to a triangular
distribution.
(b) If actor a is an employee, then transfer m coins to the employer. Alter-
natively, if actor a is an employer, then transfer m coins to himself. All
transferred money is counted as rm revenue, and is nally added to the
employer's money holding.
3. Payment and ring rule:
(a) If the selected actor a is an employer, he needs to pay wages to his employees,
according to their negotiated wage wi when a certain employee i is hired
(through the \hiring rule"). If the employee stays at the same rm, his
wage (together with his wage expectation) should increase by 10% on a
yearly basis. To avoid unrealistic wage increments, we pose as an upper
boundary that the maximum wage expectation should not be more than 5
times the negotiated wage when this employee was hired (1 6 wi 6 5wi).
(b) The wage payment wi should be the amount that employer a can aord.
Therefore, if ma > wi, add wi to i's money holding mi, and the amount of
employer's cash reserve ma is reduced by wi.
(c) If the employer a has insucient budget to pay the employee i, ma < wi,
the employer pays half of this money to this employee, but needs to re him.
Add 0:5ma to i's money holding mi, so that the employer's cash reserve is
reduced to 0:5ma, the number of a's employees is reduced by 1. The red
employee goes to the unemployed class with his wage expectation being
equal to the last wage payment, thus ei = 0 and wi = 0:5ma. When the
last employee has been red, the rm goes bankrupt, and the employer a
himself enters the unemployed class too (ea = 0), while his wage expectation
remains at the initial amount the moment he became an employer.
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4. Expenditure rule:
At each iteration, the actor a is able to buy consumption goods in the mar-
ketplace. We assume that no matter how many times he consumes, his total
expenditure is calculated at once at the end of each iteration (i.e., month). Ran-
domly select an expenditure amount m from a's money holding, m 2 [0;ma],
according to a triangular distribution. Add m coins to the available market value
V , hence, ma is reduced by m, and the market value V is increased by m.
At the end of each year, count the total amount of rm revenues as GDP of that year.
The growth rate of GDP is dened by gt =
GDPt
GDPt 1
(the rst year GDP growth rate is
set to be 1, which stands for no growth). The market value V is varying hand-in-hand
with GDP, and at the beginning of the next year it becomes Vt+1 = Vt gt, which allows
for non-stationary behavior of the monetary circle of our economy (i.e., the sum of the
money holdings of all actors and the market value V is continuously changing).
5.3 Firm Dynamics
Except for quantitative dierences, most simulation outcomes from the EPCE model,
such as the social class distribution, the uctuations of wage and prot share in GDP,
etc., are generally similar as in the EPC model. However, since the EPCE model is
more detailed in regulating both the rm's and individual's behavior, it allows us to
study some properties of rms, which have not been accessible in the previous models.
What is the major property of our model generated rm dynamics? Fig. 5.1 answers
the questions by plotting a typical rm generated by the model which lasts for 60
years. Fig. 5.1 (a) shows the change of rm size (employee numbers) and Fig. 5.1 (b)
shows the rm's growth rate (in terms of rm size (or employee number) at the end
of each year) throughout its life. It is clear that although this rm is indeed \long-
lasting", it is not always a \large" one and its growth rate is uctuating. Within the
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model framework, the growth rate of any rm, no matter whether it is big or small,
long-lasting or short-lived, has no obvious trend7. Moreover, in reality, large rms
usually last longer. In our model, however, it is not possible to dierentiate a \large"
or a \small" rm by its length of surviving years, we call a rm \large" only when it
maintains a \large" number of employees.
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Figure 5.1: Firm size and growth of a typical long-lasting rm. Figure (a): a rm which lasts for 60
years and its employee numbers during the whole life expectancy; Figure (b): the rm growth rates
calculated by division of yearly employee numbers shown in gure (a).
Fig. 5.1 displays a representative long-lasting rm. This kind of rms are in the minor-
ity and most rms are short-lived. Meanwhile, it does not necessarily mean that rm
size has no correlation with rm growth. Later we will show our interesting ndings
that, rm size or growth rate is not completely random, and large rms tend to grow
more slowly than small rms. In a \prosperous" year it is more possible for a rm to
7This is in line with the literature research in Chap. 2.4 that the rm survival rates do not uctuate
too much, and that the entry and exit of rms remain roughly steady across years
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hire more employees and become \larger".
5.3.1 Firm Life Expectancy
Firm life expectancy measure: At the end of each month/year, check the
number of employees in each rm which remains in business for the entire
period, if the employee number is more than (or equal to) 1, the rm life
is prolonged for another month/year. The rms' life expectancy starts
when the rm hires its rst employee, and ends when the rm res the last
employee.
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(a) Power Law Distribution of Firm Life Expectancy (Year=10:100)
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(b) Distribution of Firm Life Expectancy in Months (Month=120:1200)
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Figure 5.2: Life expectancy of the rms. Figure (a): histogram of the yearly life expectancy
of the rms plotted on a log-log scale, the smooth curve is a power law t (R-sq= 99:99%, R-
sq(adj) = 99:99%) (Year=10:100, the transient period is omitted); Figure (b): histogram of the
rm life expectancy calculated in months, the smooth curve is a power law curve t after truncat-
ing for the rms which survive for less than three months (R-sq= 99:57%, R-sq(adj) = 99:47%)
(Month=120:1200, transient period is omitted).
Mathematically, a quantity x obeys a power law if it is drawn from a probability
distribution f(x)1x , where  is a constant parameter known as the exponent or
scaling parameter. A special case when  = 2 is known as Zipf's law. Fig. 5.2 records
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simulation outcomes of rms' life expectancy (or rm age) distribution. The distribu-
tion seems well represented by a power law. This pattern is commonly called \80/20
rule"8, and has long been familiar with those studying distributions in income (Pareto
(1897), few rich control most of social wealth), word frequencies in text (Zipf (1932),
some words such as \the", \that" are much more frequently used than the others), city
sizes (Zipf (1949), a few large cities have far more population than the average), page
numbers and links of websites on the internet (Huberman and Adamic (1999), a small
percentage of websites are much frequently viewed or linked), and so on.
It seems that the curve tting of rm life expectancy based on yearly calculation, as
shown in gure (a) of Fig. 5.2, displays a satisfactory Zipf's law. However, in practice,
only very few empirical phenomena obey a power law for the entire region, it is more
often that the power law applies only for values larger than a certain minimum (i.e.,
x > xmin), which means only the upper part of distribution follows a power law. For
example, gure (b) of Fig. 5.2 calculates rm life expectancy in months, however, the
complete range does not t entirely into a power law distribution. The rst three or
four values are obviously outliers for the power law tting (i.e., the dotted cycle area
shows a curved shape). After truncating for the rms which last less than (or equal
to) three months, the power law tting is immediately improved9.
So far, we have not found any empirical research targeting the study of rm life ex-
pectancy. However, there are a lot of studies focusing on demise or exit of rms,
since more related datasets are available10. By looking into the high exit rate of rms
8Also named \Pareto principle" discovered by the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, who observed
that 80% of income in Italy was received by 20% of the Italian population. The conjecture is that
most of results in many situations are determined by a small number of causes. Pareto demonstrated
in his research that this \rule" holds roughly true to an 80=20 ratio, but in many cases the ratio can
be a lot higher.
9The power law tting to gure (b) of Fig. 5.2 without truncating very short-lived (lasts less than
3 months) rms is roughly R-sq= 85%, the curve tting after truncation improves to R-sq= 99%.
10For example, the U.S. Small Business Administration provides data accumulated by Census Bu-
reau and Internal Revenue Service, reporting the number of rms and establishments each year, along
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(cf. Chap. 4.3.4), it is obvious that the \80/20" rule holds, and only a minority of
rms have long life expectancies, whereas most of the rest enter and exit within a short
time. A recent study by Morris (2009) emphasizes that small rms are more likely to
die than the large rms. Typically, from the year 2003 to 2004, 15% of the small rms
(with fewer than 5 employees) exit, but only 3:1% of the large rms (with 100{499
employees) die, this number is further reduced to 1:78% for mega rms (with over
500 employees). A related analysis of the rm demise rate distribution (which follows
Gaussian) will be discussed in Chap. 5.3.4.
5.3.2 Firm Size Distribution
Fig. 5.3 displays the rm size distribution with respect to employee numbers. Although
in the EPC model the rm size distribution can be tted by a Lognormal distribution,
it seems that in the current model, the Lognormal distribution can not t both the
lower tail and upper tail well (such as in gure (a) (b) of Fig. 5.3), and a power law
can not fulll this task for the entire distribution region as well (due to signicant
curvature of the upper tail in Fig. 5.3 (b).
However, Fig. 5.3 (b) actually looks quite close to many empirical plots of the rm
size distributions, which in fact, look partly Lognormal, and partly power law before
truncation, and cannot be entirely described by either of them. This interesting fact has
been mentioned by Stanley et al. (1995) for American rms and Ishikawa (2008, 2009)
for Japanese rms. Usually, on a log-log plot, the Lognormal distribution is seemingly
curved, and a power law looks like a straight line. A closer look into Fig. 5.3 (b)
also shows a modest curvature, especially in the middle region. We also demonstrate
in gure (c) and gure (d) that a power law rm size supported by Axtell (2001)
only applies after a signicant truncation for large (> 20) and small rms (< 3). We
agree with Sutton (1997) that probably there is no general density function that could
with the number of rms exiting the industry. The data is available since 1988.
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(c) Firm Size Distribution after Truncation (Year=10:100)
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(d) Histogram of Firm Size Distribution (Year=10:100)
Power Law
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Figure 5.3: Figure (a): PDF of the rm size distribution after truncating the transient period of
rst 10 years, and the smooth curve is a corresponding Lognormal t using the sample mean and
variance; Figure (b): the same plot in log-log scale as gure (a); Figure (c): rm size distribution for
rms with employee numbers larger than 3 and less than 15 plotted in log-log scale; Figure (d): rm
size distribution after truncating very large (> 20) and small rms (< 3), the smooth curve is a power
law t (R-sq= 99:83%, R-sq(adj)= 99:81%). (Year=10:100).
successfully describe the empirical densities of the rm size distribution.
Disregarding the discussion of whether a Lognormal distribution or a power law ts
the rm size data better, the simulated distribution of rm size by the EPCE model is
quite dierent from previous models. The maximum monthly rm size is 34, and the
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minimum rm size is 1 which is the minimum requirement for setting up a rm. As
comparison, in the original SA model, the largest rm size has exceeded 600 employees
even in a 15 years' short simulation; whereas in the EPC model, a test simulation
indicates that the largest rm has become much smaller having 121 employees. It
happens that if one rm holds a large number of employees, then the other rms are
\forced" to be small since the total population in the model is xed.
Our conclusion is in accordance with Simon and Bonini (1958)'s nding that: the
overall distribution of rm size is highly skewed, with a small number of large rms
coexisting with a large number of small rms in the economy; the exact form of such
skewed distribution seems to lie somewhat between a Lognormal and Pareto law.
5.3.3 Firm Size and Growth Rate
While Gibrat (1931) assumes that the rm growth rates are independent of rm size,
more recent empirical research nds that the growth rates fall with rm size (e.g., in
Prais (1976), Evans (1987), Lotti et al. (2003)). The present model assumes that the
rm size is dependent on the rm owner's budget and growth is dependent on the rm's
revenues.
Figure (a) of Fig. 5.4 displays the histogram of the log growth rate, measured by
employee numbers, which is similar to the results from the EPC model (cf. Fig. 4.4)
and looks Laplace distributed (i.e., a two-sided exponential distribution). Apparently,
most of the growth rates are relatively small, and large increases or decreases rarely
take place. Figure (b) of Fig. 5.4 plots the relationship between rm sizes and growth
rates, which exhibits a cluster at the lower region. It seems that fast-growing rms are
all small rms (with less than 5 employees), and the larger the rm, the slower the
growth rate. In other words, it is more probable for a small rm of 5 employees to hire
5 new workers, as it is for a size 30 rm to hire another 30 new workers.
Most of the literature studying rm dynamics in the area of \Industrial Organization" is
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Figure 5.4: Relationship between rm sizes and growth rates. Figure (a): histogram of the
rm growth rate distribution; Figure (b): relationship between rm sizes and rm growth rates
(Year=10:100).
based on the assumption that rm growth rates are independently normally distributed
(cf. random growth hypothesis by e.g., Caves (1998), Lipczynski et al. (2005)). As both
the EPC and the EPCE model suggest a Laplace distribution, which distribution is
in fact closer to the empirical rm growth rate distribution, and what is the major
dierence between the Laplace and the normal distribution?
We randomly pick up 500 realizations from Fig. 5.4 (a), and plot Fig. 5.5 (b), which
shows the time series for the Laplace-shaped log employee growth rate. Then we use
the same mean and variance of the Laplace distribution to generate a corresponding
Gaussian time series shown in Fig. 5.5 (c). When comparing these two gures, although
they have the same rst and second moment, in gure (b) large deviation away from
[ 1:5; 1:5] can be observed, with the majority of values clustering around the mean. On
the contrary, the probability of extreme values in gure (c) is very rare, with almost all
data uctuating within the boundary [ 1:5; 1:5], and a comparably much less centered
distribution than gure (b). Figure (a) plots the histogram of both time series into
the same gure, the tent-shaped Laplace distribution possesses more extreme data
than the bell-shaped Gaussian, especially in the center and in the tail. To apply it
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Figure 5.5: Figure (a): comparison of the Laplace and the Gaussian distribution for the log employee
growth rates; the left (grey) columns are (500 realizations of) the original log employee growth rates
generated from model, the right (red) columns are generated corresponding Gaussian distributed
growth rates with the same mean and variance as the Laplace distribution; Figure (b): time series of
the Laplace distributed data (i.e., 500 realizations of the log growth rates); Figure (c): time series of
the Gaussian distributed data with the same mean and variance.
in empirical study of employee growth rates, it seems that the Laplace distribution is
more capable of explaining why a large number of rms either experience very strong
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n PrNormal(r > n) PrLaplace(r > n) PrLaplace=PrNormal
2 2:3 10 2 6:7 10 2 2:97
3 1:3 10 3 2:5 10 2 18:4
4 3:2 10 5 6:7 10 3 289
5 2:9 10 7 3:4 10 3 1:18 104
6 9:9 10 10 1:2 10 3 1:25 106
7 1:3 10 12 4:6 10 4 3:56 108
8 6:2 10 16 1:7 10 4 2:7 1011
Table 5.1: Tail probabilities of Laplace and normal Distribution
growth uctuations or no growth at all, and in particular, why the fast-growing rms
are actually mostly small rms whereas large rms usually enjoy slow or modest growth
rates.
To further compare the Laplace distribution and the Gaussian (at the same mean and
variance), we quote part of Teitelbaum and Axtell (2005)'s interesting table studying
the tail behavior of both distributions in Table 5.1. It illustrates that compared with
Laplace, the normal distribution has much less frequent tail events, e.g., the chances
of extreme events (i.e., events happen at the distance of more than 4 from the mean)
in the Laplace distribution is hundreds of times larger than the corresponding normal
distribution.
Our simulation of a Laplace distributed rm growth rate distribution is consistent with
Stanley et al. (1996), Bottazzi and Secchi (2003a), who study the whole database of the
U.S. rms. It has been shown that the Laplace distribution also holds within industry
sectors. For example, Demirel and Mazzucato (2008) look into 323 pharmaceutical
rms quoted in S&P 500 index during the year 1950 and 2003, and nd out \the rm
growth distribution is not a normal distribution but a more peaked distribution with
thicker tails than the normal distribution". It is suggested by Teitelbaum and Axtell
(2005) that in some special industries, the growth rate distribution is even more heavily
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tailed than the Laplace distribution, rather than tending towards normality; besides,
since small rms are quite vulnerable and experience severe growth uctuations, \gov-
ernment policies whose goal is to shield rms from uctuations may be ineective,
however, policies designed to help rms ride out dicult times may go a long way in
prompting rm survivals".
5.3.4 Small Firms and the Economy
As we have mentioned, extremely large rms such as Microsoft, Walmart, GE are very
exceptional cases across industries. They have monopoly power in their respective
areas, and their growth histories are not easily replicable. Therefore, these extremely
successful rms are not the representatives of the whole business sector, and are often
discarded by researchers when studying the rm dynamics. As a matter of fact, the
majority of rms are normally young and small, and more small businesses can be
observed in the economic boom years than in the depression. Many researchers (such
as Acs (1999), Acs et al. (1999), Teitelbaum and Axtell (2005), Lotti et al. (2003),
among others) believe that the number of small rms is an indicator for the current
economic situation.
In order to see how the number of small rms and big rms vary with the economic
situation, Fig. 5.6 presents bivariate scatter plots11 of the relationship between rm
numbers and GDP. Since extremely large rms do not exist in our model, our denition
of the \large" rm is limited to the relatively big rms. Particularly, a rm with less
than 15 workers is dened as a \small" rm, and a rm with more than 15 employees
11Bivariate scatter plot graphs the degree and pattern of relationship between two variables under
measurement. In these scatter plots, the straight line shows the correlation coecient estimated by
a simple linear regression, but the points do not follow this straight line perfectly, and the distance
between the points and the regression line is called \scatter". A large amount of scatters indicate
weak relationship, whereas fewer scatters represent strong relationship. If all points fall directly onto
the straight line, we have a perfect linear relationship between these two variables.
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(b) Relationship of Yearly GDP and Large Firms (Year=10:100)
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Figure 5.6: Figure (a): bivariate scatter plot of yearly GDP and small (with employee numbers
between [1; 15]) rm numbers; the smooth curve shows a linear regression, and there is a positive
relationship between these two variables ( = 0:62). Figure (b): bivariate scatter plot of yearly GDP
and large (with employee numbers larger than 15) rm numbers; the smooth curve shows a linear
regression, there is a negative relationship between these two variables ( =  0:45). (Year=10:100).
belongs to a \large" rm. Figure (a) of Fig. 5.6 plots relationship between the numbers
of small rms and corresponding yearly GDP. The straight line is a simple linear
regression, and the correlation coecient estimated is around 0.62, showing a strong
positive relation between them. This indicates that small rms play an important role
in the economy, and when the economy is prosperous (i.e., with high GDP), there
are more small rms existing in the market too. As comparison, Figure (b) plots the
relationship between the numbers of large rms and GDP. The straight line shows even
a negative relationship with correlation coecient  =  0:45, which suggests that even
in good years, the number of large rms does not necessarily increase.
Our simulation results are more-or-less in line with reality, as business cycle inuences
the growth of small rms more than the large rms (cf. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994),
Quiros and Timmermann (2000), Pindado et al. (2006), and others). This is because
small rms tend to be more risk-seeking and more productive, and growth of the
economy will easily encourage more small rms to start businesses and share prots.
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Nevertheless, small rms are comparably more fragile. Once a depression comes, they
are usually the rst to be kicked out of the industry. A good example is the U.S.
industry: in the 1990s, the U.S. economy had been growing hand-in-hand with an
exploding number of small startup rms, yet starting from the end of 2008, the (world)
economy declined with a large number of small rms closing down at the rst stage
of the crisis. Meanwhile, the fact of frequent entrance and exit of small rms in the
business cycles also coincides with the highly peaked and heavily tailed Laplace rm
growth rate distribution, which can be explained by small rms experiencing much
stronger uctuations than they would encounter if their growth rates were Gaussian.
It seems that one way to avoid too many uctuations is to let the smaller rms enter
the group of large rms. Therefore, it is perhaps more eective if our government could
support the small rms to grow, rather than encouraging more start-ups, especially in
recession times.
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Figure 5.7: Figure (a): histogram of monthly rm demise distribution and Gaussian curve tting
(R-sq= 98:05%, R-sq(adj) = 97:9%); Figure (b): proportion of rm demise distribution and Gaussian
curve tting (R-sq= 99:35%, R-sq(adj) = 99:17%) (Year=10:100).
Finally, we provide the rm demise distribution in Fig. 5.7, which is in accordance with
the study by Cook and Ormerod (2003). It shows that the number of rm demises has
very little variation throughout the whole simulation. Figure (a) records the number of
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demises on a monthly bases, and Figure (b) calculates the proportion of rm demise in
the overall existing rms. It tells that on average there is 13 rms exiting the industry
per month, which is around 6% of the total number of rms12. As uctuations happen
more frequently with small rms, they tend to contribute most to the frequency of rm
demise.
5.4 Income and Wealth Dynamics
The improvement in the micro formulation of the EPCE model also enables one to have
a deeper look into the distribution of income and wealth. Strictly speaking, income is
only part of wealth. For workers, wages are their only source of income, whereas the
employers have broader sources of income. In our simulation, the leftover of revenues
after paying wage bills, are all calculated as income for employers, which can include
revenue income, material wealth, capital assets, and so on.
Much of the literature (e.g., since Pareto (1897), Zipf (1949), followed by Dragulescu
and Yakovenko (2000), among others) argue that the upper tail of the income distri-
bution is power law after truncating the lower part. Others (e.g., Montroll and Badger
(1974), West and Deering (1995), among others) nd that the income distribution may
be better tted by a Lognormal type, but this tting is perhaps unsatisfactory in the
upper tail (cf. discussions in Chap. 2.8). However, perhaps neither of them is able to
explain the whole story well. In this section, after splitting the income distribution into
two parts, i.e., the income for workers and employers respectively, we propose that the
whole region of income distribution might be described by a multimodal distribution
aggregating several normal distributions, which represent income of dierent groups.
12Note that this result should be in line with the EPC model, and actually the original SA model as
well. Wright (2005) suggests that the rm demise distribution may follow a Lognormal distribution,
but our replication shows that the rm demise distribution following either the original or the modied
rules is tted better by a normal distribution.
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This feature is overlooked by many economists. The popular way of studying income
is to convert the normal scale into the log-scale, so that the upper tail is many times
enlarged against the lower end. We will see that the mixed normal distribution ex-
plains the entire region of income distribution quite well. Although sometimes multiple
modes are not directly visible, this is just because the means of separate distributions
are not far away from each other to display an additional mode, yet their overlapping
tails can still be well described by multiple normal distributions. The simplest case of a
multimodal distribution is presented in Schilling et al. (2002), showing that a mixture
of two equally weighted normal distributions with standard deviation  is bimodal if
and only if the dierence between the means of the two distributions is greater than
2. As a matter of fact, multimodal distributions exist everywhere in our daily lives,
and some of the typical multimodal-distributed stylized facts have been discussed in
Chap. 2.8.
5.4.1 Wages for Workers
Wage is a compensation, usually in terms of salary, received by workers in exchange
for their labor. Empirically, it is the most easily achievable data among wage, income
and wealth, because it is carefully recorded in every rm's accounting book. As a
result, most of the income data publicly available are in fact the wage data reported
by the government's tax oce. What's more, since wage is just the compensation for
(hourly or daily) labor input, it should not be much dierent across rms, consequently,
using only wage data to model income (or wealth) may largely underestimate the gap
between the rich and the poor.
In the previously discussed EPC model, the yearly wage for workers is found to be
Gaussian distributed: as all the wages are selected within a certain boundary, accord-
ing to the CLT, the sum of many i:i:d: random variables will be normally distributed
(cf. Fig. 4.11 (a) in Chap. 4.3.9). However, in the EPCE model, the wage limit is
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released, the worker's wage expectation increases when he remains employed, and de-
creases when he could not nd the next job. For example, if a worker stays in the
same company for more than 10 years, his wage expectation will increase to as high as
3 times his starting wage expectation13.
Fig. 5.8 shows the aggregate wage distribution throughout the years. Figure (a) displays
a clear long and at right tail, obviously the wage distribution is not Gaussian due to
the asymmetry in the distributional form. If the same gure is plotted in log-log scale,
as in gure (b), we will see a straight line in the upper level of the wage distribution,
indicating a power law14. However, this power law only applies for a yearly wage larger
than 100, and gure (a) indicates that the majority of the yearly income is in fact
around 50 with very few workers having wages larger than 100, therefore, the power
law in gure (b) actually only explains one-third of the whole wage distribution.
On the other hand, Fig. 5.8 (a) at the rst glance, may look Lognormal, thus we plot in
gure (c) the log of the wage distribution. If the wage distribution follows Lognormal-
ity, the log of wages will follow the normal distribution. Unfortunately, the log of wages
in gure (c) still look asymmetric with a at left tail, and the dashed line (Gaussian t)
reveals that the original wage distribution can not be Lognormal as well. In the end,
we try to use a multimodal normal distribution to explain the skewness and fat tail
found in the data. In gure (d), the dashed red line displays a single Gaussian tting
(f(x)  N(59:1; 37:52)) to the worker's yearly wage distribution, and obviously both
the lower and upper tails are not well tted. In contrast, the blue smooth line, which
13As most of rms do not last very long, it rarely happens in our model that an actor will stay in
one rm for more than 10 years. Meanwhile, in the \payment rule", we have set an upper boundary,
that the worker's wage expectation should not be more than 5 times his initial wage expectation when
he was hired. In addition, the rm owner will re this person the moment he can not aord to pay
his wage expectation.
14Note that in this gure, the wage amount smaller than 20 is truncated, so that the upper tail
behavior can be emphasized, this is exactly how most of the income plots are dealing with data, and
the nal plots will be usually in a log-log scale.
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(c) Non−lognormal Yearly Wage per Worker (Year=10:100)
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(d) Yearly Wages Received by Different Workers (Year=10:100) 
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f(x) ∼ N(59.1, 37.52)
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Figure 5.8: Figure (a): histogram of the yearly wage incomes from workers; Figure (b): the same
gure as in (a), but on a log-log scale, wage amount smaller than 20 is truncated for a better view of
the upper tail; Figure (c): the dashed line is Gaussian t to the log of the yearly wages (R-sq= 91:55%,
R-sq(adj) = 90:89%); Figure (d): bimodal Gaussian t to the yearly wage distribution (R-sq= 99:34%,
R-sq(adj) = 99:29%). (Year=10:100).
represents a mixture of Gaussians (f(x)  N(50:2; 28:42)+N(77:3; 39:72)) has provided
a satisfactory t for the entire region of the wage distribution including both tails. As
can be seen, the dierence in the means of these two dierent-weighted Gaussian dis-
tributions is too small compared with their standard deviations to produce bimodality,
137
so that the distribution itself, in appearance, is still unimodal15. A clear bimodality
can be observed in the income distribution for employers, as will be demonstrated in
the next section.
5.4.2 Income for Employers
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(b) Cumulative Probability of Yearly Income by Employers (Year=10:100)
Power law tail
Figure 5.9: Figure (a): histogram of yearly income for employers; Figure (b): cumulative probability
of yearly income for the employers, the smooth straight curve is a power law t (Year=10:100).
Income16, by denition, refers to consumption opportunity gain by an entity within
a specied time frame, which is generally expressed in monetary terms (cf. Case and
Fair (2007), p. 54). Unlike wage, which is always positive as a compensation for labor,
negative income can be as common as negative growth for rms. In other words, if
15Note that the weight of each separate Gaussian distribution is dierent, i.e., a1 6= a2, (for this
histogram plot, a1 = 7; 495, and a2 = 5; 919). For simplicity, we write the expression f(x) =
a1N(50:2; 28:4
2) + a2N(77:3; 39:7
2) in the reduced form: f(x)  N(50:2; 28:42) +N(77:3; 39:72).
16In the SA model and the EPC model (as a modied version of the SA model), income for employers
is calculated as the total amount of rm revenues. This denition may not be completely satisfactory,
since in the model, the monetary gains of the employer should exclude the cost of labor. Therefore,
letting income for employers to be the gains after subtracting the wage bill may be more accurate and
plausible.
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the rm is enlarging (i.e., employing more workers), its income is usually positive,
however, if the rm is shrinking (i.e., ring the workers), it is a sign that its income
might become negative. Note that a rm having continuous negative incomes does not
necessarily mean that it will soon close down. If the rm owner is rich enough, he
should be able to aord the negative prot for some time, re some workers and try to
recover. In some cases, if the reserved money holding of this employer is large enough
to pay for his workers, the employer does not need to re any worker at all even though
his monthly income gets negative.
As we have mentioned, the most popular way of studying income distribution is limited
to the upper tail of income, usually plotted in log-log scale to demonstrate a straight
line (cf. Clementi and Gallegati (2004), Silva and Yakovenko (2005), Chatterjee et al.
(2005), among others). This method not only truncates the major part of the income
distribution, which is the high frequency part including the middle and lower income
classes, but also automatically drops all negative values when the logarithmic transfor-
mation is applied. Figure (a) of Fig. 5.9 illustrates the full range of possible income in
our simulations, and we observe that there are many observations around zero with the
percentage of negative values around 10% of all incomes in record. Nevertheless, most
of the incomes are positive, in order for the majority of rms to survive. Fig. 5.9 (b)
converts Fig. 5.9 (a) into a log-log plot, where a typical power law is observed at the
upper tail after a \knee" shape around the middle part. It is clear that the power law
explains the income distribution for extremely rich employers, yet it only constitutes
10% of the entire employers' income distribution, and the lower part (as well as the
not displayed negative income part) which account for 90% of the income can not be
described by the same power law. In addition, Fig. 5.9 (a) also shows that the result-
ing income distribution actually displays an additional mode around 150, making the
histogram look like a bimodal distribution. This fact can not be seen in Fig. 5.9 (b),
which looks quite close to some empirical income plots for Germany, Italy, U.K., the
U.S., discussed in Clementi and Gallegati (2004), Yakovenko and Silva (2005), among
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others.
Knowing that the upper tail of income may be more-or-less close to a power law, is
there a distribution capable of explaining the entire range of the income distribution?
Figure 5.10 exhibits our model generated employers' income distribution without any
truncation of the original data (the same as Fig. 5.9 (a)), and the shaded scattered
squares are the histogram data. We have tried an unimodal Gaussian, bi-Gaussian
and tri-Gaussian distribution to t the data. a1, a2 and a3 in Fig. 5.10 provide the
estimated weights for each individual Gaussian distribution. The property of each
curve tting is listed in the bottom table17.
The unimodal Gaussian generally does not t the data well and shows extremely high
RMSE (Root Mean Square Error). The mode of this single Gaussian is equal to the
mean of all income data, which seems far away from the true mode (the highest and
second highest frequency of the histogram). More importantly, the original plot itself
looks asymmetric while the Gaussian distribution displays a symmetric bell shape. A
mixture of two Gaussian distributions has done a much better tting job in all stages
except for the central area. A signicant improvement is that it delivers exactly the
same shape as the original histogram with two dierent modes. If we check the curve
tting property of the bi-Gaussian, both R-squared and adjust R-squared announce
98% t, and the RMSE has dropped considerably. It is interesting to extend the
bi-Gaussian to a tri-Gaussian. We nd that the tri-Gaussian distribution provides an
excellent 99:99% t. This means adding additional weighted Gaussians is not necessary
any more. The blue smooth line (representing the tri-Gaussian t) in Fig. 5.10 locates
itself exactly at all points of the histogram, from center to both tails with RMSE
17This exercise is carried out using MATLAB's \Curve Fitting Toolbox". It estimates not only the
Gaussian statistics, but also the parameters assigned to each single Gaussian distribution, which can
be understood as weights for each individual distribution. For example, here in the bi-Gaussian case,
we have a1 = 3; 758, a2 = 1; 868, and in the tri-Gaussian case, we have a1 = 2; 128, a2 = 2; 187,
a3 = 1; 775. Note that this is a histogram plot, and if we draw the same gure in PDF format, the
weights become very small.
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The Curve Fitting to Histogram of Income by Employers (Year=10:100)
Employer Income
f(x) = a1*N1
f(x) = a1*N1 + a2*N2
f(x) = a1*N1 + a2*N2 + a3*N3
Fitting Function R-square Adj.R-sq. RMSE
Uni-Gaussian f(x)  N(62:8; 133:92) 0.732 0.726 278.72
Bi-Gaussian f(x)  N(9:2; 30:12)+N(125; 138:42) 0.987 0.985 64.10
Tri-Gaussian f(x)  N(7:9; 27:72) +N(54:9; 18:12) 0.999 0.998 6.15
+N(131:1; 137:52)
Figure 5.10: Curve tting to the multimodal income distribution of employers, with single Gaussian,
bi-Gaussian, and tri-Gaussian distributions. (Year=10:100). We use a1, a2, a3 to indicate dierent
weights assigned to dierent Gaussian distributions, N1, N2, N3 refer to the dierent Gaussian
distributions in the mixture model, and the weights are omitted in the table.
dropping down to a very low level. The tting function from the last line of table
shows a summation of three weighted Gaussians. It is obvious that the means of these
three Gaussians are diering enough, so that we could observe more than one mode.
Nevertheless, since the variance of the second Gaussian is not large enough compared
with the rst and the last Gaussian, we can only observe a slight convexity in between
the two modes, instead of three modes.
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5.4.3 Aggregate Income Distribution
Fig. 5.11 depicts the overall income distribution when both the employees' and the
employers' incomes are taken into account. The aggregate income again looks unimodal
as shown in Fig. 5.11 (a), and when plotted in log-log scale, it has a power law upper
tail. Obviously, the log-log plot hides many facts of the true distribution, especially the
lower tail and negative part of the values. In particular, it hides the fact that, behind
the \knee" shape, a certain part of the distribution, when plotting in histogram or
probability density function, may look multimodal.
The overall income distribution does not show more than one mode, just because the
dierences in the means of all subgroups are not large enough (compared with their
standard deviations) to display bimodality. This is also a common phenomenon in
reality. Devore and Peck (1997) study the heights of college students, and nd that
both male and female height distribution is unimodal; however, the histogram of heights
of all students will display one peak at a typical male height of 70 inches, and another
peak at a typical female height of about 65 inches. Another study by Schilling et al.
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Power Law Tail
Figure 5.11: Figure (a): histogram of the yearly income for all agents; Figure (b): cumulative
probability of the yearly income (after truncating the negative values), and the smooth line is a power
law curve tting. (Year=10:100).
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(2002) uses the government data from National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANE) (conducted in 1988{1994 by the United States National Center for
Health Statistics) to construct the approximate theoretical density function for heights
of population in the 20-29 age bracket. They show that both height data for male
and female population follow normality separately, with fmale  N(69:3; 2:922) and
ffemale  N(64:1; 2:752), and the mixture distribution of the heights will look very
similar to gure (a) of Fig. 5.11: it has only one mode, is slightly asymmetric, and
is neither normal nor Lognormal18. From these examples, we learn that there might
be actually more stories hidden behind an existing distribution, hence it is worthwhile
to know how the separate subgroups behave to generate the aggregate outcome. A
general curve tting using some popular distributional forms to any empirical plot or
an odd distribution can easily run into trouble and is not always satisfactory.
Fig. 5.12 provides the curve tting results for the aggregate income distribution of
all agents, as well as the tted functions listed in the attached table. Although the
emerging distribution looks unimodal, it is not a symmetric Gaussian: a single Gaussian
function does not t very well the right tail of the distribution, and it has relatively
large RMSE. In contrast, the bi-Gaussian function does a better job at tting both
tails with much lower RMSE and improves R-squared value to 99:88%. Because the
means of two Gaussian distributions are not too distinct from each other (compared
with their standard deviations), the nal distribution does not exhibit bimodality.
18Schilling et al. (2002) show that: \if f1 and f2 be normal densities with respective means 1 and
2, and common variance 
2, and let f be the mixture density 12f1 +
1
2f2, then f is unimodal if and
only if j2  1j 6 2". For a mixture of Gaussians which have dierent weights, dierent means and
variances, the case can be more complicated, and it usually requires that the dierence between two
means is much larger than both standard deviations in order to generate a bimodal distribution.
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Curve Fitting to Historgram of Yearly Income for All (Year=10:100)
Yearly Income by All
f(x) = a1*N1
f(x) = a1*N1 + a2*N2
Fitting Function R-square Adj.R-sq RMSE
Uni-Gaussian f(x)  N(57:4; 44:42) 0.977 0.969 429.87
Bi-Gaussian f(x)  N(55:9; 37:62) +N(96:8; 124:12) 0.998 0.997 26.8
Figure 5.12: Curve tting to the multimodal income distribution of all agents, with a single Gaussian
and a bi-Gaussian. (Year=10:100). We use a1, a2 to indicate dierent weights assigned by dierent
Gaussian distributions, and N1, N2 to record dierent Gaussian distributions in short. Here, a1 =
11; 190, a2 = 1; 585 for the bimodal case.
5.4.4 Wealth Distribution
Wealth is dened as \assets - liabilities" that an individual holds, while income is an
\inow" of items of economic value. If the expense of an individual can be known as an
"outow" of items of economic value, the relation among wealth, income and expense
can be written as: change of wealth = income { expense.
Although income is considered to be part of wealth, the distribution of income is
substantially dierent from the distribution of wealth. As a matter of fact, empirical
wealth data is not easy to obtained and hardly reliable. For example, it is more dicult
to measure real estate, permanent assets and other capital assets, although they are
signicant parts of people's wealth (especially for the rich). We address that in our
study, income and wealth is not equivalent either: income can be negative but wealth
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(c) Cumulative Probability of Monthly Wealth (Year=10:100)
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Figure 5.13: Monthly and yearly wealth distribution in the EPCE model. Figure (a): histogram
of the monthly wealth distribution; Figure (b): histogram of the monthly wealth distribution in log-
log scale; Figure (c): CCDF of the monthly wealth distribution; Figure (d): histogram of the yearly
wealth distribution; Figure (e): histogram of the yearly wealth distribution in log-log scale; Figure (f):
CCDF of the yearly wealth distribution (Year=10:100).
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can not be; income is considered as the monetary gain of a actor within a certain period,
and wealth is the overall money holding (including savings) of the actor at a particular
time.
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(a) Bi−Gaussian Fit to the Monthly Wealth Distribution
Monthly Wealth
Uni−Gaussian
Bi−Gaussian
f(x) ∼ N(6.8,10.22)
f(x) ∼ N(5.6,5.72)+N(8.9,13.82)
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    (b) Bi−Gaussian Fit to the Yearly Wealth Distribution (Year=10:100)
Yearly Wealth
f(x) = Uni−Gaussian
f(x) = Bi−Gaussian
f(x) ~ N(7.5,9.22)
f(x) ~ N(7.7,2.12) + N(7.5,13.92)
Figure 5.14: Figure (a): uni-Gaussian and bi-Gaussian t to the monthly wealth distribution;
Figure (b): uni-Gaussian and bi-Gaussian for the yearly wealth distribution. (Year=10:100).
Monthly Wealth Distribution
Fitting Function R-square Adj.R-sq. RMSE
f(x)  N(6:8; 10:22) 0.967 0.962 920.3
f(x)  N(5:6; 5:72) +N(8:9; 13:82) 0.999 0.998 70.1
Yearly Wealth Distribution
f(x)  N(7:5; 9:22) 0.962 0.961 835.6
f(x)  N(7:7; 2:12) +N(7:5; 13:92) 0.998 0.997 97.8
Table 5.2: Fit properties of single and bi-Gaussian to the monthly and yearly wealth distributions.
The weights are omitted in the table. RMSE represents \Root Mean Square Error". The weights for
the rst bi-Gaussian is a1 = 190; 200 and a2 = 156; 800; for the second bi-Gaussian is a1 = 39; 820
and a2 = 15; 940
Fig. 5.13 displays the (cumulative) wealth distribution of all actors, in the sense of
their money balances (i.e., money holdings). No matter whether it is counted monthly
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or yearly, when plotting the histogram with a log-log scale, as in gure (b) and (e)
(i.e., the second row of Fig. 5.13), the upper tail of the wealth distribution is a straight
line very close to a power law, after truncating the agents with wealth less than 10
coins. The same straight line power law behavior can be observed in gure (c) and (f)
(i.e., the last row of Fig. 5.13), when we plot the wealth distribution in a cumulative
probability form.
Similar to the income distribution plots, the wealth distribution for either separate
groups or the aggregate wealth distribution can be tted well by a multiple-Gaussian
distribution. For example, Fig. 5.14 and Table 5.2 give the bi-Gaussian t to the
monthly and yearly wealth distributions, corresponding to gure (a) and (d) of Fig. 5.13.
Both the monthly and yearly plots reveal that a bi-Gaussian distribution measures the
data more appropriately than a single Gaussian function. In order to have a better im-
age of the majority in the lower part of the wealth distribution, the horizontal axis has
been shortened, but the curve tting is applied without any truncation of the original
datasets. From both cases, we observe only one mode of the distribution, simply be-
cause the dierence between the means of sub-Gaussian function is too small compared
to their standard deviations. In spite of that, the bi-Gaussian curve tting still does
a good job in explaining not only the peak, but also the tail behavior of the overall
wealth distribution.
5.4.5 Income and Wealth Inequality
Inequality is a hot topic today. According to one report by the Canadian Center for
Policy Alternatives (cf. Morel (2006)), even in the economic expansion period (1998{
2004), 65% of Canadians felt they were not beneting from the economic growth, which
tells that perhaps a great share of benets from the economic growth is going to the
most richest people. Similar studies related to the expansion of inequality among or
within nations can be found in Davies and Shorrocks (2000), Babeau and Sbano (2003),
Dell et al. (2005), and others.
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Most of inequality studies are concentrated on income dierences, because income data
is easier accessible. As a matter of fact, the wealth inequality is much more severe across
the world. Davies et al. (2007) carefully collect wealth data for many developed and
developing countries, such as Sweden, the U.S., OECD, China, India, for the year 2000,
they nd out that \the world distribution of wealth is much more unequal than that of
income", especially when focusing on the bottom 60% of households. Another study
by Wol (2007) on the U.S. wealth data from the \Survey of Consumer Finances"
suggests that, wealth inequality, like income inequality, has been increasing in the past
years; most of the wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small number of families.
In particular, the top 10% of the population own nearly 70% of the total wealth, and
the bottom 40% of the population own perhaps less than 1% of the nation's wealth.
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% of Total Wealth and % of Total Income, US Household, 2004
Wealth
Income
Top 5% Top 20% 3rd 20% 2nd 20% Bottom 40%
Wealth 58:9 84:7 11:3 3:8 0:2
Income 21:8 50:1 23:2 14:7 12:1
Table 5.3: Comparison of the Income and Wealth Inequality of the U.S. Households in 2004.
Table 5.3 replicates the wealth and income distribution of the U.S. households in the
year 2004. The source of data is the Survey of Consumer Finances sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Board, and this replication follows Hodgson (2008)'s methodology. In
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each percentage population group, the left column represents wealth, and the right
column represents income. It is obvious that the distribution of wealth is much more
unequal than the distribution of income, especially when focusing on the bottom 60% of
households. It is reported that in the U.S., the bottom 60% of households possess only
4% of the nation's wealth while they earn 26:8% of all income, according to Table 5.3.
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Wealth
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Top 1% Top 5% Top 20% 3rd 20% 2nd 10% Bottom 20%
Wealth 5:34 17:80 46:98 16:15 9:45 2:88
Income 2:71 10:56 33:00 19:39 14:9 9:16
Table 5.4: Comparison of income and wealth inequality in the EPCE model
We also test whether the EPCE model is able to replicate the fact of wealth and income
inequality in Table 5.3. Although Table 5.4 has less concentration of wealth/income
than the empirical survey of Table 5.3, it coincides with the empirical ndings that a
minority of the population controls most of the social wealth, making the bottom 60%
of the population much poorer. If we compare the height of columns of wealth and
income, we immediately see larger dierences among columns of wealth than that of
income, which indicates that the distribution of wealth is much more unequal than the
distribution of income.
As both income and wealth dierences can be used to study the striking gap between
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the rich and the poor, which one of them should be emphasized? Considering the
accessability of dataset, many researchers may still prefer income. However, it seems
that Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank prefers wealth, be-
cause \ultimately, we are interested in the question of relative standards of living and
economic well-being. Thus, we need also to examine trends in the distribution of wealth,
which, more fundamentally than earnings or income, represents a measure of the ability
of households to consume . . . " (cf. Greenspan (1998)).
5.5 Summary and Discussion
5.5.1 Summary
The basis of any economic activity in modern societies is the interactions among indi-
viduals, which result in redistribution of their assets (measured in terms of monetary
values). In our multi-agent system, an individual is either viewed as a single person, or
a self-contained economic entity, such as a rm. Allocation of \assets" is represented
by exchange of \coins", which can be analogous to cash or physical products in real life.
The producers produce goods and sell them in the market, and the workers are paid
for their labor by wages which are used for consumption. The simple hypothesis under
this exchange system is that: every payment must be counterbalanced by another, which
is observed as redistribution of \money" in the simulation. The EPCE model has its
strength in the micro design. In particular, it contains an elaborate \wage payment
and ring rule", taking into account the agent's memory of the past and expectation
for the future.
For the \rm dynamics", a short summary of our ndings is:
(1) The life expectancy of the rms follows a power law. It shows that the majority of
rms are short-lived, whereas only a minority of rms will maintain the business
for a long period.
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(2) The exact form of rm size distribution may lie between Lognormal and power
law. This highly skewed distribution provides the fact that small rms are in
the majority and large rms are relatively rare. The number of rms drops
exponentially as the rm size increases. Since rms usually start with a small
size, we may derive that many start-up companies close down within their starting
years, but once the rm passes through the most \dicult" time and grows bigger,
there will be less rms competing with them in the same size category.
(3) From the relationship between rm sizes and growth rates, we observe that small
rms are not only fast growing, but also fast declining. Usually large rms have
smaller uctuations in growth rates.
(4) Although small rms are relatively weak, they are in the majority and their overall
performance is like a thermometer of the economy. We observe more small rms
in the booming years than in the depression, which tells us that small rms may
have an important contribution to the economic growth, whereas there are no
apparent correlation detected between the economy and large rms' performance.
For the \income and wealth dynamics", we point out that the usual \money plot" in
a cumulative probability or a log-log form, may be misleading to some extent, because
too much truncation needs to be adopted to reach a power law in the upper tail. If
we realize the fact that most of the population receives lower income (or wealth), a
heavy truncation will lead us to neglect the majority of the distribution, and just focus
on perhaps less than 20% of the \true" income (wealth) distribution, which provides
just a limited image (i.e., within a small region) of the real distribution. In order to
have a comprehensive view of the true income distribution, the income of workers and
employers is studied rst in an isolated manner, and then in an aggregate format. We
use a mixture of Gaussian distributions to recover the income distribution for workers
and employers, and obtain quite good ts without any truncation of data. Although
this tting may include more parameters19, it uses a simple way to describe seemingly
19In fact, the number of parameters is 2 for single Gaussian ( and ) and 4 for bi-Gaussian (if
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very complicated income distributions and perhaps some other distributions too. It
also explains the hidden mystery behind the \knee" shape of income distribution, which
may just be the overlapping area among two or more normally distributed subgroups.
5.5.2 Discussion
Agent-based modeling came into being as an alternative to traditional methodology in
the past 20 years. Quite in contrast with the classical method, most of the agent-based
models are almost equation-free, with many \realistic" built-in assumptions, so that
the nal simulation is able to replicate or explain some real world phenomena. When
discussing this thesis with the colleagues working on the mainstream economic elds,
we are often asked to explain \how do the descriptive rules work?", \why does the
inequality emerge out of an equality initialization?", \without using a `representative
agent', how many people can be built into your model?" . . . Some of their questions
are dicult to answer shortly, but there is one thing that is sure, among all college
students who are trained in economics, very few of them have ever learned simulation
methodology as a third way of doing research in standard economic courses, or as a
complementary tool to the traditional analytic methods. Even if some students have
learned about using programs to build up simple models, their experiences of creating
a large system based on descriptive rules evolving from complex network are quite
limited. As a consequence, most of the agent-based social simulations have been done
by physicists, engineers, and other scholars, who have been trained to use this technique
to do laboratory experiments in natural sciences, such as thermodynamics. It should
be admitted that, although agent-based social simulation is becoming popular, it has
not been accepted by most of the \mainstream" economists yet. We would like to
contribute to the\non-mainstream" economic study by advertising our social models
in this thesis.
weights are not counted). In our experience, a bi-Gaussian distribution already allows for a good t
in most cases.
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The fact that a single model can be useful in understanding the dynamics of interac-
tions among adaptive agents, is not due to the accuracy of the model in representing
the details of all situations. Instead, it is due to its generalization capacity that an
extremely simple model captures the fundamental features of many interactions, and
is able to generate many macroscopic regularities from microscopic behavior, involving
intricate interactions among simple micro-economic entities. The application of agent-
based models is highly dependent on the improvement in computer capacity and the
eciency of programming languages. The purpose of this dissertation is to present
a discussion that a certain kind of agent-based model can generate a range of social
phenomena, and many of them may be quite close to reality. Instead of focusing on a
single solution resulting from \utility maximization", we emphasize more the aspect of
\statistical equilibrium".
Below are some interesting ndings from our study:
- The 80/20 rule is ubiquitous in nature, instead of being a \transient" or \tempo-
rary" phenomena. It happens not only for rms, but also for individuals in the
social production process. This rule can be also observed in our simulation, for
example: there is always a minority of large rms coexisting with a majority of
small rms; a large number of poor and middle class agents together with very
few rich agents determine the shape of the income distribution; the general life
expectancies of rms are short with only very few exceptions; the majority of
small rms inuence the economy . . .Moreover, if we keep improving the micro-
scopic design of the model, we will be able to nd some other facts that are in
accordance with 80/20 rule, such as: many markets have historically been domi-
nated by a small number of best-selling products; 80% of value creation for one
rm comes from 20% of products; most rms seek to grow but will only risk 20%
of revenue for further investment; most of the individuals do not spend all their
money but save around 20%, and so on.
- The power law with varying exponents is very common in reality. It is usually
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observed as a straight line or a \long tail" in log-log scale, which proves again
the pervasive 80/20 rule, and the logarithm scale has helped to emphasize the
extreme behavior happening in the upper 20% part. Since the 80/20 rule is so
common, it is possible that the upper tail behavior of many \size" distributions
will also follow a power law (when truncation of data is applied), such as the rm
size distribution, the rm prot rate distribution, wealth and income distribution,
etc. Furthermore, we nd that the higher the exponent   (i.e., the smaller the
absolute value), the atter the tails, and the higher the inequality among the
entities.
- Concerning the business cycle phenomenon, classical economic text books propose
that there is a xed equilibrium state for an economy, which is time independent
and can be easily described as a crossing point where supply equals demand in
a competitive market. In our agent-based simulation, we nd that the economy
actually never stays at a xed equilibrium stage and it will be continuously uc-
tuating around a certain \mean" equilibrium. In other words, we argue that the
business cycle is neither \transient" nor \temporary", it is a natural outcome
showing that the system is in a \statistical equilibrium". As a matter of fact,
business cycles can start from \imperfect information" of both rms and con-
sumers located in the \local" networks; since their information is never \perfect"
and their network is never \global", consequently, the supply is not always equal
to the demand, the business cycle occurs as an outcome of continuous adjustment.
The resulting uctuations might always be around a stable mean, displaying the
character of a \statistical equilibrium".
- The Gaussian distribution is considered to be the most common distribution
in life. Therefore, our reasonable conjecture is that certain kinds of mixture-
Gaussian distributions may also be widespread. It is demonstrated in Chap. 5
that some seemingly complicated distributions, such as the income and wealth
distribution, can be well described by a mixture of Gaussians with dierent means
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and variances. This possibility is neglected by most researchers, since many
believe that mixtures of Gaussians only generate multimodal distribution, while
this is not always the case if the means of these sub-Gaussians stay close enough
(compared with their standard deviations) to each other. Similarly, (although
we don't have space to explain in this study), the \leptokurtosis" of nancial
time series in aggregation can be represented by a mixture of two Gaussians with
the same mean but dierent variances. Some other distributions, e.g., the prot
rate distribution, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution of energy might be also
reproduced as a mixture of Gaussians with dierent means and variances. We
agree that this way we are facing more parameters to be estimated, however, if
one faces a realistic distribution which is dicult to explain, why not splitting
the whole distribution into two or more subgroups and study them in isolation?
Remember that our nature contains a lot of mathematical \beauty". Many things
that we nd in reality are in \statistical equilibrium", which should often look
Gaussian in aggregation, just with various means and variances.
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Part II
Agent-Based Modeling of
Sentiment Dynamics

Chapter 6
Business and Consumer Sentiment
and Industrial Output
| A VAR Analysis
6.1 Introduction
There is nothing more interesting than what is happening in human brains. Dierent
kinds of opinions come into our minds as a result of emotion or interpretation of facts
from time to time. It has been a long time that people recognize that the accumulation
of a variety of attitudes or sentiments may aect economic activities. For example, in
a bullish stock market, most investors expect upward price movement, and on the
contrary, if the market sentiment is bearish, most investors expect downward price
movement.
Consumer or producer sentiment are the most well-known among all market sentiment
topics, and they are usually monitored by various surveys using statistical methods.
There are a large number of papers studying the predictive power of consumer or
producer sentiment. Taylor and McNabb (2007) nd evidence of causality between the
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indicators of business condence and GDP, and show that the condence indicators
would appear to have good predictive power in identifying turning points in European
business cycles. Gelper et al. (2007) investigate the U.S. consumer sentiment index and
report a signicant causality from the consumer sentiment to the future consumption
both for the short term and longer horizons. Similar survey-based sentiment research
are in Zullow (1991), Vuchelen (1995), Lemmens et al. (2005), among others.
Does sentiment always have a signicant impact on economic activities? Brown and
Cli (2004) study that the U.S. stock market data since 1965, and nd that the stock
returns do Granger-cause sentiment, while sentiment is not a signicant predictor of
returns. Kling and Gao (2008) investigate the Shanghai stock market and reports cau-
sation from returns on sentiment but not vice versa. However, their studies are ques-
tioned by some other researchers. Verma and Verma (2007) nd signicant predictive
power from sentiment on near-term returns. Apart from that, Schmeling (2007) per-
forms sentiment-based trading experiments and nds signicant predictability in long
horizons. More recently, using sentiment data and returns for the German stock mar-
ket, Lux (2009b, 2010) report a signicant causal inuence from sentiment on returns.
In this chapter, we follow the companion studies Lux (2009b, 2010) to study the interac-
tions between sentiment dynamics and industrial output with the vector autoregressive
(VAR) approach, focusing on the possible inuences of sentiments on nal output. Sev-
eral econometric tools are applied and addressed, including forecast oriented estimation
of the number of dynamic factors and tests for the factor restriction imposed on the
VAR. Later on in Chap. 7, we will contrast the VAR results to those of an agent-based
model of opinion dynamics, following the companion research work by Lux (2009a).
6.2 Data Overview
Our empirical analysis takes two German opinion indices and the industrial production
index into consideration. These datasets are presented in Fig. 6.1. The gure contrasts
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Figure 6.1: Consumer Condence Indicator (CCI), Industrial Condence Indicator (ICI) and In-
dustrial Production (IP) indices. The time horizon records monthly (seasonally adjusted) data from
January 1973 to April 2009.
three monthly time series for the German economy throughout the past four decades,
namely the Consumer Condence Indicator (CCI), Industry Condence Indicator (ICI)
and Industrial Production (IP). All datasets start from January 1973 until April 2009,
with 436 seasonally adjusted observations each. The rst two historical series (CCI
and ICI) are collected and released by the European Commission Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Aairs1 in the form of a diusion index. Obviously, the
positive (negative) values reveal whether optimistic (pessimistic) opinions are in the
1The expanded name for CCI is \Consumer Condence Indicator { Germany" with memonic code
\BDEUSCCIQ", and the expanded name for ICI is \Industrial Condence Indicator { Germany" with
code \BDEUSICIQ". The value of these indices come from business surveys. At rst, the answers
obtained from the survey are aggregated in the form of \balances", then the indices are constructed
as the dierences between the percentages of respondents giving positive and negative replies.
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majority among respondents to the questionnaires (on their attitudes towards industrial
output). The farther the index is away from zero, the more pronounced the positive
(negative) opinion for the German industry. The monthly IP data is compiled by
Thomson Financial and National Source2 on a \year-on-year" base. In the following
study, we will test whether there is any relationship among the sentiment of rms,
consumers and the industrial outputs.
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full sample (436 observations)
Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis 1 ADF
CCI -0.079 0.098 -0.344 2.433 0.971 -3.207*
ICI -0.116 0.121 -0.439 2.856 0.986 -4.932**
IP 0.014 0.047 -1.450 7.816 0.860 -3.501**
Panel B: In-sample (300 observations)
CCI -0.081 0.101 -0.335 2.324 0.976 -2.928*
ICI -0.128 0.124 -0.361 2.616 0.987 -4.206**
IP 0.013 0.044 -0.486 3.243 0.819 -3.795**
Notes: Table 6.1 provides summary statistics for CCI, ICI and IP. 1 is the autocorrelation coecient
at lag 1 (with non-zero mean). The ADF test statistics have been computed with 4 lags and included a
constant term, the one-sided 5% and 1% critical values are  2:871 ( 2:870) and  3:458 ( 3:440), for
the full-sample (in-sample) data respectively. It turns out that all time series are generally stationary.
 and  denote signicant parameters at the 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
Table 6.1 provides the summary statistics for our data. Panel A presents the full
sample with 436 data, and in Panel B, we have truncated the original full sample and
taken out their rst 300 values to represent the in-sample data for further analysis.
2The expanded name for IP is \Industrial Production Including Construction" with memonic
code \BDIPTOT%G", and the monthly data are collected on the \year-on-year" percentage changes
(YOY%).
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First of all, the mean values for CCI and ICI are clearly negative, while for IP it is
slightly positive, therefore we will include a non-zero mean in constructing the later
tests. Second, the statistics of higher moments and standard deviations conrm our
impression that uctuations in CCI and ICI are more volatile than IP, for both full
sample and reduced in-sample. Third, it seems that all three time series have strong
autocorrelation with their past values, showing long-term memory regardless of their
lengths. Finally, the ADF test statistics have been computed with 4 lags3, the H0
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 5% critical value for all full sample and
in-sample datasets, which proves that our time series are generally stationary.
6.3 Specication and Testing of a VAR Model
The VAR approach is widely used for analyzing the dynamic impact of random distur-
bances on a system of variables. It models every endogenous variable as a function of
the lagged values of all variables in the system. To explore the dynamic relationships
among time series of CCI, ICI and IP, a tri-variate VAR model will be constructed4,
with vector yt = (y1t; y2t; y3t)
0 denoting the triple observations on CCI, ICI and IP at
time t. The reduced form of the tri-variate VAR model can be written as:
yt =  +A1yt 1 +   +Apyt p + ut; t 2 Z (6.1)
where
 yt is a 3 1 random vector
3An important practical issue for the implementation of ADF test is the specication of lag length
p. If p is too small, the remaining serial correlations in errors will bias the test; if p is too large,
then the power of the test will suer. Monte Carlo experiments (e.g., in Kilian (2001)) suggest it is
better to err on the side of including more lags, therefore, a lag of 4 instead of 1 is selected for high
autocorrelation in our time series (one could also select the lag length via information criteria).
4Detailed description of the methodology can be found in Lutkepohl (2005), and a similar approach
is also applied in e.g., Brown and Cli (2004), Kling and Gao (2008).
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 Ai are 3 3 xed coecient matrices
  is a 3 1 xed vector of intercept terms
 ut is a 3 1 white noise process with
{ Eut = 0
{ Eutu
0
t = u (nonsingular)
{ Eutu
0
s = 0, if s 6= t
Determining the lag length of a VAR(p) process of yt, is to nd an exact lag order p such
that Ai = 0 for all i > p in the model. In other words, we need to nd the index of the
most lagged value of yt that contributes to the current value. The common practice
is to choose a lag-length arbitrarily allowing just enough lags, and make sure that
the residuals are white noise when maintaining the precision of estimates. There are
some well-known procedures used to determine an appropriate lag length such as the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, Akaike (1974)), the Hannan-Quinn Information
Criterion (HQ, Hannan and Quinn (1979)), and the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC, also known as Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC, Schwarz (1978))). In short,
information criteria (IC) compare the gains of having a more generous lag structure
in the regression, with the cost represented by the loss of degrees of freedom. The
test statistics can be generally expressed as: IC =   (log-likelihood of parameters) +
(penalty term for number of parameters)5. Among these three information criteria,
BIC and HQ tend to select the correct order for suciently large sample size, while
AIC may suer from inconsistency, and it tends to asymptotically overestimate the true
lag order with positive probability6. Therefore, in the literature, corrected forms of AIC
5Lutkepohl (1991) (Chap. 4) presents a number of results regarding consistent lag order selection
in the VAR models.
6The AIC methodology attempts to nd the model that best explains the data with a minimum of
free parameters, and the model with smaller AIC is preferred. For simplicity, AIC can be written as:
AIC =  2 ln(Ln(k))=n+2k, where Ln(k) is the likelihood function and k is the degrees of freedom in
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have been introduced, e.g., Hurvich and Tsai (1989)'s AICC method includes additional
penalty term. Based on their methodology, Huang (2008) uses a simple example to
prove that for small sample size, AIC is able to select the correct order, but not for
large samples. However, the original version of AIC is still the most popular method
used by researchers, Liew (2004) claims that AIC is superior than other information
criteria for limited sample sizes.
Table 6.2: Lag Selection of Tri-variate VAR Model
Information criteria
Lags AIC HQ BIC
0 11.256 11.267 11.284
1 4.559 4.604 4.671
2 4.181 4.259 4.378
3 4.046 4.157 4.328
4 4.010 4.155 4.378
5 4.038 4.217 4.491
6 4.045 4.258 4.584
7 4.043 4.290 4.668
8 4.062 4.343 4.773
9 4.092 4.407 4.890
10 4.132 4.482 5.017
Table 6.2 provides the lag selection preferred by various information criteria. It seems
that both AIC and HQ opt for a minimum of 4 lags to be included, while BIC alone
the model. Clearly, AIC does not depend on the sample size. Meanwhile, it is usually claimed that
AIC is too liberal and comes with the danger of overtting (resulting in a choice of too many lags).
BIC and SIC take the sample size into account, and the later methods have a higher penalty for k,
especially when the sample size is large. This overcomes the overtting tendency of AIC (cf. Chatterjee
and Hadi (2006)).
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favors a more parsimonious model of 3 lags. By reading this table, it is very dicult
to decide immediately which lag length should be adopted. Although AIC might have
the problem of inconsistency, the consistency problem might not be so important for
a preparatory selection of the model, particularly for a moderate sample size like ours.
Since dierent information criteria emphasize dierent aspects of the data generation
process and may all provide useful information for further analysis, we test our model
based on all favored lags instead of relying on a single procedure, then dierent sta-
tistical tools will be used to aid the choice of appropriate lag-length. In the following
steps, we will check the model adequacy for both VAR(3) and VAR(4) systems.
Parameter Estimation for VAR(3) Model
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Parameter Estimation for VAR(4) Model
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Eq. 6.2 and Eq. 6.3 display parameter estimation results for both VAR(3) and VAR(4)
models, using maximum likelihood method.  and  denote the signicant coecients
at 95% and 99% condence interval judged by the t-statistics, respectively. It shows
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Table 6.3: Covariance Matrix of VAR Models
Covariance Matrix of VAR(3) Covariance Matrix of VAR(4)
dep. var CCI ICI IP dep. var CCI ICI IP
CCI 0:021 - - CCI 0:020 - -
ICI 0:002 0:016 - ICI 0:002 0:015 -
IP 0.001 0:004 0:021 ICI 0.001 0:003 0:021
Table 6.4: Diagnostic Checking of Estimated Unrestricted VAR Models
Var(3)
Portmanteau test for autocorrelation: 157.256 (0.000)
Test for Nonnormality:
Skewness Statistics: 4.060 (0.255)
Kurtosis Statistics: 391.882 (0.000)
Skewness + Kurtosis Statistics: 395.942 (0.000)
Var(4)
Portmanteau test for autocorrelation: 146.595 (0.000)
Test for Nonnormality:
Skewness Statistics: 2.947 (0.399)
Kurtosis Statistics: 350.626 (0.000)
Skewness + Kurtosis Statistics: 353.573 (0.000)
Notes: Portmanteau test for residual autocorrelation with 12 lags are computed (probability in paren-
thesis).
that all three variables in our model have strong dependence on their past values. We
observe a strong causal inuence of ICI on both CCI and IP and this inuence lasts for
more than 1 lag. On the other hand, CCI seems to be caused uni-directionally by ICI,
but uncorrelated with IP. Besides, ICI and IP seem to have causal relations to each
other, particularly, ICI appears to be marginally aected by IP in the short run (lag 1)
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for the VAR(3) model, but in the long run (lag 4) for the VAR(4) model. Meanwhile,
the inuence of ICI on IP lasts at least for 3 lags. When comparing the estimation
results of both the VAR(3) and VAR(4) models, the estimation results for CCI and
IP dynamics are quite similar. The only dierence is that in the VAR(4) model, the
inuence from IP on ICI vanishes in the rst entry, but moves to the fourth entry.
Apart from that, in the second entry, ICI looks marginally aected by CCI, which does
not exist in the VAR(3) model. Quite surprisingly, both of our models identify CCI as
an exogenous variable whose dynamics have no explicit cause on IP (for both models)
and ICI (for the VAR(3) model). In other words, ICI alone should be exploitable to
help predicting future industrial output movements.
After parameter estimation, Table 6.3 illustrates the estimated covariance matrices for
both VAR(3) and VAR(4) models. The values indicated in the left corner of matrices
show signicant correlations in the innovations of ICI and IP, as well as signicant
correlation between both sentiment CCI and ICI. In contrast, CCI and IP appear not
to be instantaneously correlated.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that both the VAR(3) or VAR(4) processes estimated
above are stable, satisfying the stability condition in Lutkepohl (1991) (p. 11), that
the moduli of eigenvalue for the reverse characteristic polynomial \det(IK   A1z  
     ApZp)" should be outside the complex unit circle. In particular, for the VAR(3)
model, the moduli of the eigenvalues of the reverse characteristic polynomial are:
jzj = f2:1269; 2:1269; 2:1315; 4:5890; 3:1409; 1:0666; 1:1243; 1:1243; 1:3064g, and for the
VAR(4) model, we have jzj = f1:8477; 1:8477; 2:0515; 2:0515; 3:8683; 3:8683; 2:7899;
1:1211; 1:1211; 1:0569; 17:0259; 1:1129g. Obviously, all moduli are greater than 1 (i.e.,
outside the unit circle) in absolute values, which prove that both processes are stable.
Knowing that a VAR(p) process can be rewritten in a moving average representation,
the procedure of deciding the order of VAR system may also be interpreted as methods
for determining a lter that transforms the given data into white noise series. Correctly
specied VAR(p) model should have residuals that are nearly random. However, if
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forecasting is the objective of our analysis, it may not be of prime importance whether
the residuals are really white noise as long as the model forecasts well (Lutkepohl
(1991), Chap. 4). To capture the model's property at large, Table 6.4 reports the
diagnostic checking results of the selected VAR(3) and VAR(4) models.
The Portmanteau test7 jointly tests the signicance of all error autocorrelations up to
a set order h (h=12 in our tests). It is displayed in Table 6.4 that there is temporal de-
pendence in the white noise term ut for both VAR models. Also displayed in Table 6.4
are results of the non-normality test. Lutkepohl (1991) suggests using a multivariate
generalization of the Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and Bera (1987)) to test for multivariate
normality of ut. The idea underlying this non-normality test
8 is to transform the resid-
ual vector such that its components are independent and then check the compatibility
of the third and fourth moments with those of a normal distribution. Our tests for
nonnormality are based on skewness and kurtosis of standardized residuals, and statis-
tics indicate that both residuals of these unrestricted models suer from signicant
kurtosis, but do not display excess skewness.
Fig. 6.2 displays the residual autocorrelation and cross-correlation of our multivariate
VAR(3) and VAR(4) systems, respectively. Twice their asymptotic standard errors
(approximately 95% condence bounds) around zero9 are depicted in transparent for-
mat. For both VAR(3) and VAR(4) models, we observe strong autocorrelations of ICI
and IP residuals to their own past, especially for IP in the long term. Moreover, the
residual cross-correlations between CCI and IP are not signicant, which is in harmony
with our previous nding on the covariance matrices shown in Table 6.3. Comparing
7Dene Ri as autocorrelation matrix for lag i among errors, the Portmanteau test evaluates: H0 :
Rh = (R1; : : : ; Rh) = 0 vs. H1 : Rh 6= 0.
8The underlying H0 hypothesis of the non-normality test is that the error term ut follows a normal
distribution, namely, if the ut are indeed white noise, there will be no signicant deviation from the
skewness or kurtosis of the normal distribution.
9For a rough check of 5% level signicance of autocorrelations at higher lags, we use 2pT -bounds
which are convenient from computational purpose.
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Figure 6.2: Residual Autocorrelations of VAR(3) and VAR(4) Models
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both models, VAR(3) nds residual cross-correlations in CCI and ICI at low lags, which
is not exhibited in the VAR(4). Last but not least, both VAR(3) and VAR(4) report
cross-correlations in ICI and IP at low lags.
Since our major task of estimating the tri-variate system is to identify the relationships
among industrial output and sentiment indices (from either consumers or industry),
in order to test for their causal relations, we report in Table 6.5 the Wald test for
Granger (1969) causality as well as instantaneous causality among the innovations
of the variables. First of all, we observe from Panel A that the joint sentiments do
Granger-cause IP, but not vise versa, and their innovations are closely related. Then
in Panel B, it is shown that there is no Granger causation between CCI and IP in
either direction, as well as no correlation among their innovations. Finally, in Panel C,
we nd that ICI has a strong causal inuence on IP, but not the other way round.
In addition, there is also strong correlation among their innovations, which explains
the joint sentiments' behaviors in Panel A. To sum up this table, the only signicant
causality pair that we could observe from the system is ICI Granger-causes IP. In other
words, ICI can help improving the prediction for IP, while the consumer sentiment CCI
seems to be exogenous. Its values do not aect the other variables signicantly. These
ndings are all in accordance with our parameter estimation in Eq. 6.2 and Eq. 6.3,
and the covariance matrices in Table 6.3.
6.4 Forecast Performance
6.4.1 Forecast for Tri-variate System
In general, time series are sets of ordered observations on certain quantitative charac-
teristics of phenomena at equally spaced time points, and one of the main targets of
time series analysis is to forecast future values of the series. Forecasting is the act of
predicting the future, it is the estimation of the expected value of a dependent variable
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Table 6.5: Causality Tests of the Unrestricted VAR Models
Panel A CCI/ICI ! IP IP ! CCI/ICI Inst.
Var(3)
Wald 11.308 1.174 10.204
p-value 0.000 0.320 0.006
Var(4)
Wald 8.453 1.307 7.953
p-value 0.000 0.239 0.019
Panel B CCI ! IP IP ! CCI Inst.
Var(3)
Wald 1.706 0.370 0.568
p-value 0.166 0.775 0.451
Var(4)
Wald 1.354 0.521 0.367
p-value 0.250 0.721 0.545
Panel C ICI ! IP IP ! ICI Inst.
Var(3)
Wald 18.359 2.072 9.636
p-value 0.000 0.104 0.002
Var(4)
Wald 13.811 1.985 7.587
p-value 0.000 0.097 0.005
Note: Two types of causality tests, i.e., tests for Granger causality and tests for instantaneous causality,
are implemented. The variables to the left of the arrows are the causal variables, while to the right
of the arrows are the aected variables (or dependent variables). The null hypothesis (H0) is tested
against the alternative (H1) that the causal variable(s) do aect the aected variable(s). A small
p-value (computed from the underlying 2-square distribution under H0) reveals the fact that all
coecients of the rst variables(s) at all lags are jointly insignicant in the equation(s) of the second
variable(s). The test for instantaneous causality tests the hypothesis of no correlation among the
innovations of output and sentiment variable(s).172
for observations that are not part of the sample dataset. Since it is not clear which
system among VAR(3) and VAR(4) is better to help forecasting IP, we start out with
inspecting the impulse response functions for both systems.
The impulse response analysis quanties the reaction of every single variable in the
model on an exogenous shock from the other variable (or itself). If one variable is
related to the other variable, the shock from the former will have a positive or negative
eect on the later, but this impulse dies away in nite time due to the stability of
the system. Hence, impulse response analysis is a tool for inspecting inter-relations
among model variables. Fig. 6.3 depicts dynamic responses of the system variables to
a positive unit shock (forecast error) from one of the other variables. The diagonal
gures show the responses of each of the three variables to a unit shock from itself,
and the clear convergent trends prove that all three time series are stationary. The left
corner picture of the o-diagonal might be most interesting for us. It seems that the
external shock from CCI has less signicant impact on ICI and IP than the shock from
ICI to IP. On the contrary, the eect from ICI on IP looks immediate and strong, which
reveals their close relationship; the peak eects are between 2 to 4 months, and then
taper o slowly. Note that the convergence period of impulse response takes longer, and
shows more variation for VAR(4) model. It seems that a more parsimonious VAR(3)
model is robust enough to characterize our system.
In the next step, we move to forecast error decomposition analysis. The process de-
termines how much of the forecast error variances of each variable can be explained
by exogenous shocks from other variables. The forecast error variance decomposition
of IP from the unrestricted VAR(3) model10 is provided in Table 6.6. It is shown in
Panel A that the major part of the forecast error variances of industrial production are
accounted for by either innovations of IP itself, or from the innovations of ICI. Since
there are strong correlations in the innovations of IP and ICI discovered before, we
10Variance decomposition for VAR(4) model is omitted, since there are only marginal dierences
from the VAR(3) model.
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Figure 6.3: Forecast Error Impulse Responses of VAR(3) and VAR(4) Models
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Table 6.6: Error Variance Decompositions of Industrial Production
Panel A: VAR(3) model, unrestricted
periods CCI innovation ICI innovation IP innovations
1 0.00 0.02 0.98
2 0.01 0.08 0.91
3 0.03 0.23 0.74
4 0.04 0.31 0.65
5 0.04 0.38 0.57
6 0.05 0.43 0.52
7 0.05 0.47 0.48
8 0.06 0.49 0.45
Panel B: VAR(3) model, unrestricted, dierent order
periods IP innovations CCI innovations ICI innovations
1 1.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.95 0.00 0.04
3 0.81 0.02 0.17
4 0.74 0.02 0.23
5 0.68 0.03 0.30
6 0.63 0.03 0.34
7 0.59 0.04 0.37
8 0.57 0.04 0.40
Panel C: VAR(3) model, restricted
periods CCI innovations ICI innovations IP innovations
1 0.00 0.02 0.98
2 0.01 0.10 0.89
3 0.01 0.24 0.75
4 0.01 0.32 0.67
5 0.01 0.39 0.60
6 0.01 0.44 0.55
7 0.01 0.47 0.51
8 0.01 0.50 0.49
Note: The order of the variables in the respective VARs corresponds to the ordering of the forecast
error components. 175
Table 6.7: Diagnostic Checking of Estimated Restricted VAR Models
Restricted Var(3)
Portmanteau test for autocorrelation: 150.844 (0.000)
Test for Nonnormality:
Skewness Statistics: 5.946 (0.114)
Kurtosis Statistics: 376.118 (0.000)
Skewness + Kurtosis Statistics: 382.063 (0.000)
Restricted Var(4)
Portmanteau test for autocorrelation: 146.835 (0.001)
Test for Nonnormality:
Skewness Statistics: 5.294 (0.152)
Kurtosis Statistics: 363.591 (0.000)
Skewness + Kurtosis Statistics: 368.885 (0.000)
Notes: Portmanteau test for residual autocorrelation with 12 lags are computed (probability in paren-
thesis).
change the order of the VAR(3) system in Panel B, where CCI enters just behind IP,
and we observe that CCI's contribution to error variances is very tiny, in comparison
with a more sizable inuence from ICI. As a matter of fact, for long term forecasts in
our unrestricted VAR(3) model, IP together with ICI accounts for nearly 95% of the
forecast error variances. To reduce estimation noise, we have also conducted innovation
accounting for restricted models in Panel C, where the original insignicant parameters
are replaced by zero constraints. The exercise gives a comparable proportion of error
variances to both ICI and IP, while leaving CCI only a 1% contribution for even longer
horizons. This nding is in agreement with our previous causality analysis of Table 6.5,
that ICI Granger-causes IP, whereas CCI is almost independent of IP.
Following general-to-specic philosophy, because Eq. 6.2 has too many insignicant
parameters which could add extra noise to our VAR system (especially when forecasting
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is the aim). In the later forecast experiments, we will focus on the restricted model.
Table 6.7 reports the diagnostic checking for the restricted version of the VAR(3) and
VAR(4) models. It shows that both unrestricted and restricted models have almost
exactly the same pattern of qualitative results. In addition, we have also compared
the covariance matrices and Granger causality test of the restricted model with the
unrestricted version, which all result in tiny dierences as well. Consequently, we may
safely use the restricted version of the model, instead of using the original unrestricted
version with more variables for further forecasting exercises.
To see in how far sentiment helps to predict industrial production, in the following we
conduct an explicit out-of-sample forecasting exercise. Forecast accuracy will be eval-
uated via the mean squared error (MSE), which is a frequently-used way to quantify
the dierence between an estimator and the true value actually observed. It treats
positive and negative forecast errors symmetrically, and the common principle is to
nd an estimator with minimum MSE. Here we apply the tests for equal forecast accu-
racy of Diebold and Mariano (1995). If the model has substantial predictive power, we
would expect the MSE to be lower than that of an alternative model. This test is ap-
plied to both restricted VAR(3) and VAR(4) models, estimated both by the maximum
likelihood (ML) method and least square (LS) method.
Table 6.8 shows the results of our forecasting exercise for industrial production (single
output as well as cumulative outputs) using time horizons of up to 8 periods ahead. All
mean-squared errors in the table are standardized by dividing by the MSE of a random
walk with drift as a benchmark and the adjusted Diebold-Mariano (DM-) Test11 is
11Diebold and Mariano were interested in a situation where a \cheap" benchmark forecast is com-
pared to a sophisticated forecast. A forecaster may prefer the cheap forecast up to a point where
the sophisticated forecast shows its relative merits \signicantly". They assume that the precision
of forecast is basically measured by Eg(xt   x^t 1) and Eg(xt   ~xt 1) for two dierent forecasts x^
and ~x, and a loss function g(). Under the hypothesis that the dierence is zero, it can be shown
that the test statistic S1 = d=
q
m 12f^t 1 converges to a standard normal distribution as m ! 1.
Here, d denotes the sample average of dt = g(xt   x^t 1)  g(xt   ~xt 1). The element f^d(0) is a scale
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reported. It turns out that forecasts based on either the ML method or LS method
display almost the same pattern of quantitative outcomes. Nevertheless, in general,
the forecast performance of constrained estimation via the LS method (cf. Panel B of
Table 6.8) does a slightly better job than estimation via the ML method (cf. Panel A
of Table 6.8), especially for the short and medium term forecasts. From both panels,
the DM-test statistics prefer the VAR(3) model, which seems to better capture the
systematic eects than a richer VAR(4), for both single output and cumulative outputs.
Meanwhile, although the LS estimates do a better job for cumulative forecasts, the ML
method results in better forecasts for single period forecasts in a long term. Taking
our previous ndings in Fig. 6.3 and Table 6.6 into consideration, we nd that the
VAR(3) model can reproduce our system dynamics more consistently, and it is able to
cover not only medium-term but also long-term feedback eects among sentiments and
industrial output.
6.4.2 Forecast for Bivariate System
The main motivation of estimating the tri-variate system in our study is to nd whether
the sentiment from consumer or industry could help to explain the quantitative dy-
namics of output IP. Another way to better observe their inuences on IP is to create
separately two bivariate VAR systems. Eq. 6.4 shows the LS estimation results for
restricted VAR(3) model, CCI & IP and ICI & IP respectively, favored by (dier-
factor dened as the spectral density estimate of dt at frequency 0. For the case of nested models, the
standard DM test is very likely to be undersized, and the correct limiting distribution is not normal
any more. Clark and West (2006, 2007) show that most bias can be corrected by a simple adjustment
in the statistic, and the adjusted test with Gaussian critical values has a size close to, but a little
less than the normal one (cf. Busetti et al. (2009)). In our study, the adjusted Diebold-Mariano test
statistics with Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent estimator of the standard
deviation with automatic lag selection by Andrew's method are computed (cf. Clark and McCracken
(2001), Clark and West (2007)).
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Table 6.8: MSE of Out-of-Sample Forecasts for Tri-variate Models
A: Forecasts of Model Based on constrained ML
Forecasts of single output
horizon VAR(3) DMadj VAR(4) DMadj
1 0.124 1.812* 0.121 1.805*
2 0.180 1.879* 0.171 1.861*
3 0.294 1.966* 0.274 1.940*
4 0.424 2.138* 0.401 2.101*
5 0.557 2.385** 0.529 2.306*
6 0.686 2.636** 0.657 2.550**
7 0.790 2.720** 0.765 2.716**
8 0.857 2.642** 0.835 2.750**
Forecasts of cumulative outputs
1 0.124 1.812* 0.121 1.805*
2 0.134 1.944* 0.128 1.930*
3 0.178 2.158* 0.168 2.136*
4 0.239 2.519** 0.226 2.488**
5 0.308 3.132** 0.293 3.073**
6 0.388 3.747** 0.370 3.680**
7 0.446 3.485** 0.429 3.552**
8 0.482 3.296** 0.469 3.410**
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B: Forecasts of Model Based on constrained LS
Forecasts of single output
horizon VAR(3) DMadj VAR(4) DMadj
1 0.124 1.825* 0.181 1.863*
2 0.187 1.905* 0.302 2.065*
3 0.299 2.013* 0.450 2.407**
4 0.426 2.212* 0.599 2.840**
5 0.553 2.519** 0.722 3.156**
6 0.683 2.846** 0.827 2.733**
7 0.779 2.959** 0.910 1.842*
8 0.839 2.935** 0.973 1.234
Forecasts of cumulative outputs
1 0.124 1.825* 0.181 1.863*
2 0.137 1.968* 0.228 2.095*
3 0.182 2.195* 0.308 2.526**
4 0.240 2.568** 0.400 3.213**
5 0.305 3.203** 0.474 3.767**
6 0.383 3.814** 0.536 3.280**
7 0.435 3.478** 0.582 2.768**
8 0.466 3.244** 0.617 2.964**
Note: The estimation results of in-sample restricted models have been applied in this forecast exper-
iment. The rst entry gives the relative MSE of the forecasts from either VAR(3) or VAR(4) (i.e.,
original MSE divided by MSE of random walk model with drift). DMadj is the adjusted Diebold-
Mariano test statistic for equal predictive accuracy of nested models. * and ** identify cases of
signicantly better predictive accuracy of the pertinent VAR forecasts compared to those of a random
walk with drift using one-sided 5% and 1% tests respectively.
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ent) information criteria12. Both systems (at various lags) are stable according to the
eigenvalues of their characteristic equations (cf. Lutkepohl (1991)13.
24 CCI
IP
35 =
24 1:09 0
0 0:49
3524 CCI 1
IP 1
35+
24 0 0
0 0:25
3524 CCI 2
IP 2
35+
24  0:12 0
0:02 0:11
3524 CCI 3
IP 3
35   
24 ICI
IP
35 =
24 1:27 0:07
0:33 0:34
3524 ICI 1
IP 1
35+
24 0 0
0 0:20
3524 ICI 2
IP 2
35+
24  0:31 0
 0:28 0:17
3524 ICI 3
IP 3
35   
(6.4)
The rst equation of Eq. 6.4 shows the bivariate restricted VAR(3) model for CCI & IP.
The o-diagonal estimates of all 3 lags are either zeros or insignicantly small values,
which show that CCI has no correlation with IP, and this nding is in accordance with
our tri-variate VAR study. In contrast, the interactions between ICI and IP are very
strong in lag 1, and the eect of ICI on IP lasts for 3 lags. If we compare the signicant
estimates of these equations with Eq. 6.2, they look very similar. Considering that CCI
is relatively independent in the system, it seems that the tri-variate model can be safely
reduced to a bivariate ICI & IP model.
Table 6.9 lists the DM-test results for forecasting both bivariate systems. Since CCI has
already been shown to be independent, Panel A can be equally treated as the forecast
12Dierent criteria are in favor of dierent lag orders. For example, for the bivariate CCI & IP
model, AIC would favor a lag selection of 3, whereas BIC and HQ favor a lag selection of 2; for the
bivariate ICI & IP model, AIC favors 7 lags, while BIC favors lag 3 and HQ favors lag 4 selection. To
save space, here we choose only VAR(3) for both models.
13According to Lutkepohl (1991), the VAR process satises stability condition if the mod-
uli of all eigenvalues of the reverse characteristic polynomial are outside the complex unit cir-
cle. Here, for bivariate CCI & IP VAR(2) model, the moduli for the corresponding eigenvalues
are: jzj = f1:02; 5:92; 1:09; 2:71g, for VAR(3), jzj = f1:02; 2:42; 3:44; 2:67; 2:67; 1:07g; for bivariate
ICI & IP VAR(3) model, the moduli are jzj = f2:15; 2:15; 1:09; 1:09; 2:37; 1:40g, and for VAR(4),
jzj = f1:89; 1:89; 1:85; 1:85; 1:11; 1:11; 1:09g.
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results for IP VAR(2) and VAR(3) (univariate) models. It seems that a VAR(2) model
for IP is good enough if forecasting is our main objective. To allow autocorrelation in its
error terms, we will also estimate an ARMAmodel for IP in the next section. Panel B of
Table 6.9 shows the DM-test for the forecast experiments of selected restricted VAR(3)
and VAR(4) specications for bivariate models of ICI & IP. We can easily compare it
with panel B of Table 6.8, it is certain that both forecast results are very close to each
other. Although the tri-variate model looks slightly better, the parsimonious bivariate
ICI & IP models also do a good job in forecasting.
In addition, the forecast gures depicted in Fig. 6.4 provide another possibility to
show the equivalence of the tri-variate system and the bivariate ICI & IP system. We
illustrate gures of forecasting performances for restricted bivariate models CCI & IP
and ICI & IP, as well as the restricted tri-variate model. All selected models are based
on VAR(3) estimation, since dierent lags only result in tiny visible dierences. In these
gures, the dashed lines depict the out-of-sample data, which we show as benchmarks
for comparison. The smooth lines capture the predicted industrial outputs based on a
particular multivariate VAR model. The following facts are interesting:
(1) The restricted CCI & IP model is close to an IP VAR(3) model, since CCI has
no signicant causal relationship to IP.
(2) When comparing the CCI & IP model with the bivariate restricted model ICI
& IP, the later is more successful in reproducing the real data, especially in the
longer term.
(3) The industrial output boom shortly before the crisis and the downward trend in
the economic crisis, are more-or-less followed with a lag by both bivariate ICI &
IP and tri-variate models.
(4) There is little dierence in forecast performance between the tri-variate system
and the bivariate ICI & IP system, although the former might be slightly better
for the near term, the later looks more ecient for the long term. These two
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systems' predictability measured by the DM-test statistics is provided in Panel B
of Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, respectively.
Table 6.9: MSE of Out-of-Sample Forecasts for Restricted Bivariate Models
A: Forecasts via constrained LS, for (CCI +)IP
Forecasts of single output
horizon VAR(2) DMadj VAR(3) DMadj
1 0.167 1.757* 0.175 1.791*
2 0.284 1.892* 0.296 1.949*
3 0.454 2.230* 0.450 2.269*
4 0.619 2.692** 0.620 2.762**
5 0.746 3.124** 0.745 3.144**
6 0.833 3.014** 0.837 2.893**
7 0.901 2.266* 0.910 2.091*
8 0.957 1.322 0.973 1.204
Forecasts of cumulative outputs
1 0.167 1.757* 0.175 1.791*
2 0.212 1.939* 0.224 1.994*
3 0.299 2.338** 0.308 2.409**
4 0.405 3.068** 0.412 3.154**
5 0.486 3.792** 0.491 3.819**
6 0.543 3.751** 0.549 3.589**
7 0.587 3.083** 0.594 2.958**
8 0.623 2.742** 0.633 2.759**
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B: Forecasts via constrained LS, for ICI + IP
Forecasts of single output
horizon VAR(3) DMadj VAR(4) DMadj
1 0.125 1.881* 0.181 1.926*
2 0.187 1.965* 0.302 2.148*
3 0.299 2.079* 0.450 2.521**
4 0.425 2.287* 0.598 2.968**
5 0.552 2.607** 0.720 3.217**
6 0.681 2.936** 0.825 2.630**
7 0.776 3.002** 0.906 1.785*
8 0.834 2.978** 0.968 1.238
Forecasts of cumulative outputs
1 0.125 1.881* 0.181 1.926*
2 0.137 2.033* 0.228 2.178*
3 0.182 2.274* 0.308 2.642**
4 0.239 2.666** 0.400 3.342**
5 0.304 3.320** 0.474 3.773**
6 0.382 3.839** 0.535 3.105**
7 0.434 3.362** 0.580 2.741**
8 0.465 3.135** 0.615 2.879**
Note: DMadj denotes adjusted Diebold-Mariano test statistics for equal predictive accuracy of nested
models. * and ** indicate signicance at 5% and 1% of the DM-test for hypothesis of no signicant
dierence in MSE with respect to the benchmark. Since it is indicated by Eq. 6.4 that CCI and IP is
not correlated, Panel A can be understood as VAR forecasts for IP alone.
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Figure 6.4: Forecast Performance of Bivariate and Tri-variate Models
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6.4.3 Forecast for ARMA IP Model
From the last two sections, we have already learned that our tri-variate system can be
reduced to a bivariate system of ICI & IP. Nevertheless, we are still curious how the IP
time series alone predicts the future, so that we can better understand to which extent
the sentiment index ICI could help to explain the future behavior of IP dynamics.
It is known that a forecast is of greater practical value if measurement of uncertainty
can also be included. Poddig and Huber (1999) nd that autoregressive moving average
(ARMA) model provides a more accurate forecasting tool for predicting turning points
(if there is structural change) than a VARmodel. After observing some autocorrelations
in IP from Fig. 6.2, we pick up the ARMA model for a deeper analysis of IP, assuming
autocorrelations in its error terms.
The ARMA model can be considered as an extension to our standard nite order VAR
model dened in Eq. 6.1:
yt =  +A1yt 1 +   +Apyt p + ut; t 2 Z
By allowing the error terms ut to be autocorrelated rather than white noise, we will
arrive at a nite order moving average (MA) representation for ut:
ut = "t +B1"t 1 +   +Bq"t q; (6.5)
as in the standard VAR model, "t is zero mean white noise with nonsingular covariance
matrix ".
Following the same procedure as in the VAR analysis, we rst conduct a general ARMA
order selection using dierent information criteria. Both ARMA models with and
without constant term are tested. For an ARMA model with constant, AIC favors
AMRA(1,3), BIC favors ARMA(2,0), and HQ favors ARMA(1,2), but none of their
constant terms are signicant. As an alternative, for an ARMA model without con-
stant, AIC favors ARMA(4,1), whereas both BIC and HQ opt for ARMA(1,1). Given
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that AIC is sometimes inconsistent and tends to overestimate the actual order (as dis-
cussed in Chap. 6.3), we focus on the ARMA(1,1) model, which is favored by the other
two information criteria. Eq. 6.6 shows the estimation result for the ARMA(1,1) model
for IP using LS estimation, the t-ratios reported in brackets are all signicant.
IPt = 0:939 IPt 1 + 0:361 "t 1 + "t (6.6)
t-ratio (42:2) (5:85)
In order to check stationarity of the system, we can write the ARMA(1,1) in the form
of lag operator:
(1  1L) IPt = (1 + 1L) "t (6.7)
This simple dierence equation is stable provided that the root of \1   1z = 0"
lies outside the unit cycle. As the estimated 1 is less than 1, this means the only
unit root should be outside the unit cycle too, and our ARMA(1,1) process is station-
ary. As a double check, Fig. 6.5 illustrates the residual autocorrelation and partial-
autocorrelation, it seems that except for the third lag, there is little autocorrelation in
the short horizon, which proves adequacy of the model.
In order to compare the forecast performance of ARMA model with previous models,
Table 6.10 provides DM-tests results measuring the MSE of out-of-sample forecasts
for ARMA(1,1). It shows that the ARMA-IP model does a good job in forecasting,
and it even outperforms the (restricted) VAR(2) or VAR(3) IP model (cf. Panel A of
Table 6.9) in the medium and long run, especially for the cumulative output forecasts.
However, when comparing the ARMA system with the bivariate ICI & IP system, the
later one still provides a signicant improvement, for both single output and cumulative
output. The last two columns of Table 6.10 show the DM-test statistics of predictive
accuracy of the bivariate ICI & IP VAR(3) and VAR(4) models (cf. Panel B of Table 6.9)
against the ARMA(1,1) model, which show that although the VAR(4) model predicts
relatively worse when compared with the ARMA(1,1) forecasts, the VAR(3) model is
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Figure 6.5: Residual Autocorrelations and Partial Autocorrelations of IP ARMA(1,1) Model
still signicantly better at predicting both in the short run and in relative long run,
as all statistics are signicant at all lag lengths. In other words, ICI does help us to
better predict the future behavior of IP.
To sum up, it is usually believed that sentiment can inuence economic activity. When
the word \sentiment" is mentioned, perhaps we are more likely to refer to \consumer
sentiment", since their purchasing willingness will directly inuence the \market", and
hence production. This chapter studies two major sentiment indices, which may have
close connection to industrial output, namely the consumer sentiment (CCI) and indus-
trial sentiment (ICI). Quite surprisingly, after investigating the tri-variate system, and
further the bivariate restricted system, we arrive at the conclusion that consumer sen-
timent does not really help in explaining the dynamics of IP at all, which is in striking
contrast to the common conjecture. Meanwhile, the successful recovery of predictabil-
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Table 6.10: MSE of Out-of-Sample Forecasts for IP ARMA(1,1) Model
Model forecasts estimated via LS method
Forecasts of single output
horizon ARMA(1,1) DMadj DM(3) DM(4)
1 0.142 1.704* 4.984** 0.020
2 0.242 1.831* 3.688** -0.227
3 0.369 2.121* 2.985** -0.467
4 0.538 2.565** 3.880** -0.256
5 0.699 3.056** 4.348** 0.394
6 0.825 3.193** 4.022** 1.131
7 0.935 2.800** 4.243** 2.136*
8 1.055 1.619 4.599** 3.200**
Forecasts of cumulative outputs
1 0.142 1.704* 4.984** 0.020
2 0.175 1.855* 4.850** -0.106
3 0.237 2.200* 4.134** -0.347
4 0.339 2.894** 4.195** -0.284
5 0.438 3.713** 4.294** 0.149
6 0.520 3.982** 5.269** 0.709
7 0.591 3.673** 4.999** 1.845*
8 0.670 2.896** 4.635** 2.793**
Note: * and ** indicate signicance at 5% and 1% of Diebold-Mariano test for the null hypothesis of
no signicant dierence in MSE with respect to the benchmark. DMadj identify cases of signicantly
better predictive accuracy of ARMA(1,1) forecasts compared with random walk with drift; DM(3)
and DM(4) identify cases of signicantly better predictive accuracy of VAR(3) and VAR(4) forecasts
(cf. Panel B of Table 6.9) compared with the ARMA(1,1) model.
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ity by the bivariate ICI & IP VAR system, proves a very close correlation between
industry sentiment and production, namely, part of IP dynamics can be explained by
the development of ICI.
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Chapter 7
Modeling the Joint Dynamics of
Sentiment and Output
7.1 A Stochastic Model for Opinion Formation
There are numerous examples of equilibrium and non-equilibrium systems that exhibit
transitions between phases and characteristic spatial-temporal patterns. For instance,
transitions between solid, liquid and gaseous states of matter; transitions between fer-
romagnetic and paramagnetic phases of magnetic materials at the Curie point (cf.
Heusler et al. (1903)), and others. In human societies, there are also transitions be-
tween fashion trends every now and then. Humans, animals and even insects change
gaits at critical values of locomotion speeds. An interesting example can be found in
Kirman (1993)'s ants' model. It oers an explanation of ants' behavior which puzzled
entomologists for a long time, that when facing two identical food sources, the ants
are observed to concentrate more on one of them, but after a period they will abruptly
turn attention to the other food source. The same \herding" behavior can be also
observed in humans when they choose between two similar but close-by restaurants,
etc. Current interests in the problem of how two competing opinions evolve and how
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consensus emerges over time include not only the ants' model, but also the active walker
model (Helbing et al. (1997)), the compromise model (Weisbuch et al. (2001), Naim
et al. (2003)), the neighborhood model (Galam (2002), Tessone et al. (2004)), the voter
model (Liggett (1999), Lambiotte and Redner (2008)), and many others.
A common phenomenon underlying a system which exhibits phase transition is that
they are all many-body systems, which represent an ensemble of many subsystems. Our
lives and natural surroundings, such as neural networks or societies are full of many-
body systems. Due to self-organization, many-body systems can exhibit properties
that do not exist on the level of their subsystems, so the whole system will display
a collective or cooperative behavior. Consequently, a complete description of this
huge system requires taking the interactions among all subsystems into account. The
non-linear Fokker-Planck equation oers a possibility to quantify equilibrium and non-
equilibrium phase transitions in terms of subsystem probability dependency (cf. Frank
(2005)).
On top of classical time series analysis of our sentiment indices and industrial output,
in this chapter, we move to a stochastic model for opinion formation, which might
better capture the inter-relation, or phase transition properties of the whole system
through digging into the interaction of its subsystems.
7.1.1 Model Framework
Our baseline model can be traced back to Weidlich and Haag (1983), and similar mod-
els of opinion formation in nancial market have been later studied by Lux (1995, 1997,
1998, 2009b), Alfarano et al. (2008), Ghonghadze and Lux (2009), among others. The
model describes a binary choice problem and captures the transition process of opin-
ion formation between two groups of agents. For simplicity, we begin with assuming
that the agents are all homogeneous, having the same individual probabilities of reac-
tions and interactions in the opinion formation process. They hold either a \positive
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(optimistic)" or \negative (pessimistic)" opinion denoted by \+" and \ ". The socio-
conguration fn+t ; n t g1 at given time t consists of the numbers n+ and n  of people
having opinion \+" and \ ", respectively; the total number of agents is xed to 2N ;
here, N is multiplied by 2 to make sure that the total number of agents participating
is an even number, for calculation simplicity. The socio-conguration is determined
by another variable nt based on the dierence of the numbers of agents with opposite
opinions. Therefore, we dene:
n :=
1
2
(n+   n ) (7.1)
since n+ + n  = 2N ,
n+ = N + n and n  = N   n (7.2)
where  N 6 n 6 N and 0 6 n+; n  6 2N . Meanwhile, we dene another variable
called \opinion index" x (or xt) to characterize the aggregate or average opinion as,
x :=
n
N
=
n+   n 
2N
; with   1 6 x 6 1 (7.3)
Since all agents are homogeneous, having the same weights in the population, x = 0
can be interpreted as a situation with a balanced distribution of opinions, while x > 0
(or x < 0) represent the cases that the optimistic (or pessimistic) agents are in the
majority. In the next step, dene
p(n; t) := p[n+; n ; t] (7.4)
which denotes the probability that one society has the socio-conguration fn+; n g at
time t, then the condition
NX
n= N
p(n; t) = 1 (7.5)
1In most of the later expressions, we omit the notation t for simplicity, which only tells that the
calculation of these expressions happen at the same time. This applies to other expressions as well.
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holds for all t. In a continuous time setting, only the following changes of the socio-
conguration happen at an innitesimal interval of time:
fn+; n g ! fn+ + 1; n    1g; or
fn+; n g ! fn+   1; n  + 1g (7.6)
To save space, these expressions will be reduced to n! (n+1) and n! (n 1) respec-
tively, meaning that one more agent in the optimistic (pessimistic) group comes from
the pessimistic (optimistic) group, who has just changed his opinion. Furthermore,
it should be noted that as the agent's opinion may be easily inuenced by others, he
might change opinion suddenly. Therefore, we assume that the changes of belief hap-
pen in continuous time, with a Poisson process describing the opinion switches from
the optimistic group to the pessimistic group, or vice versa. The pertinent transition
rates can be written as:
w"(n) := w(n! n+ 1); or
w#(n) := w(n! n  1) (7.7)
Particularly, w(n! n0) = 0 for n0 6= n 1, which means there should be no more than
one agent change his opinion per unit time. Weidlich and Haag (1983) have dened the
so-called \general Master equation" to describe the exact transitions of probabilities
between dierent states i and j (for i; j 2 [ N;N ]):
dp(n; t)
dt
=
X
j
h
w(i! j) p(j; t)  w(j ! i) p(i; t)
i
(7.8)
Under the denition from Eq. 7.7, the equation of motion for p(n; t) in our model can
be transformed into the following function:
dp(n; t)
dt
= w"(n  1) p(n  1; t)  w"(n) p(n; t)
+w#(n+ 1) p(n+ 1; t)  w#(n) p(n; t) (7.9)
If the exact description of the socio-conguration in terms of discrete integer number n,
can be approximately described in terms of continuous variables, and if p(n; t), w"(n),
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w#(n) can be treated as continuous functions of n, using a Taylor series expansion, the
Master equation of Eq. 7.9 can be approximated by a Fokker-Planck equation2, which
is a special form of partial dierence equation (PDE):
@p(n; t)
@t
=   @
@n
n
[w"(n)  w#(n)] p(n; t)
o
+
1
2
@2
@n2
n
[w"(n) + w#(n)] p(n; t)
o
(7.10)
Given the denition of the opinion index x = n=N , the probability distribution function
(PDF) for this opinion index can be written as:
P (x; t) = N  p(n; t) = N  p(Nx; t) (7.11)
which is normalized byZ +1
 1
P (x; t)dx 
+1X
x= 1
P (x; t)x =
+NX
n= N
p(n; t) = 1 (7.12)
Applying Eq. 7.11 to Eq. 7.9, we arrive at an equivalent Master equation for the opinion
index:
dp(x; t)
dt
= w"(x  1
N
) p(x  1
N
; t)  w"(x) p(x; t)
+w#(x+
1
N
) p(x+
1
N
; t)  w#(x) p(x; t) (7.13)
2The Fokker-Planck equation (FPE) was originally designed to describe the time evolution of the
probability density function of the position of a particle in a uid. Later on, it has been widely
used in physics, chemistry and other elds in the natural sciences, as a parabolic partial dierential
equation for the transition density. It is named after Adriaan Fokker (1914) and Max Planck (1917).
The former investigated Brownian motion in a radiation eld and the latter attempted to build up a
complete theory of uctuations based on it. The Soviet Russian mathematician Andrey Nikolaevich
Kolmogorov contributed in developing its rigorous basis mathematically in his work Kolmogorov
(1931), and therefore it is also known as the Kolmogorov's equation. The same methodology of using
Fokker-Planck equation for estimation of opinion formation has also been adopted in Weidlich and
Haag (1983), Lux (1997, 2009b), Ghonghadze and Lux (2009). A detailed explanation of the Fokker-
Planck equation can be found in Risken (1989), Carmichael (1999), Gardiner (2004), Frank (2005),
and so on.
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Following the same procedure as in Eq. 7.10, the standard form of Fokker-Planck
equation for opinion index is obtained:
@P (x; t)
@t
=   @
@x
n
A(x)P (x; t)
o
+
1
2
@2
@x2
n
B(x)P (x; t)
o
(7.14)
with drift A(x) and diusion B(x), where
A(x) =
1
N
[w"(x)  w#(x)]; and
B(x) =
1
N2
[w"(x) + w#(x)] (7.15)
In addition, note that Eq. 7.14 can be rewritten in the following form:
@P
@t
=   @
@x

1
2
B(x)
@P
@x
+
h
  A(x) + 1
2
@B(x)
@x
i
P

| {z }
F (x)
(7.16)
The term denoted by F (x) in the big brackets is often named \ux", which is dened
as the rate at which the density is passing the point x at respective time point t. Thus,
the original Fokker-Planck parabolic PDE in Eq. 7.14 can be expressed as a hyperbolic
ux conservation equation:
@P (x; t)
@t
=  @F (x; t)
@x
(7.17)
Suppose, furthermore, that the state space of our problem is bounded within [a; b], and
the process starts at x = Xh at time th. If measurement error is negligible, the initial
condition turns out to be:
P (x; th) = (x Xh) (7.18)
where  is the Dirac delta function, and the boundary conditions required to conserve
the unit density within the interval [a; b] are given by:
lim
x!a+

1
2
@

B(x)P

@x
  A(x)P

= 0; and
lim
x!b 

1
2
@

B(x)P

@x
  A(x)P

= 0 (7.19)
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The boundary conditions state that the probability density calculated by the Fokker-
Planck equation is a conserved quantity as the process evolves. Unfortunately, a closed-
form solution for Eq. 7.16 is not analytically tractable, we therefore resort to numerical
estimation using a nite dierence method. We will apply the Crank-Nicolson Scheme
for the one-dimensional problem, and an Alternative Direction Implicit Scheme will be
used for the two-dimensional problem.
7.1.2 Explicit Form of the Model
There are various forms for the transition probabilities w" and w#. In order to obtain
explicit results for the model, an explicit denition for w" and w# should be chosen.
Here we use a theoretical representation, that is considered to be exible enough to
describe manifold possibilities. This specication has been used in Weidlich and Haag
(1983), Lux (1995, 1997, 2009a,b), Ghonghadze and Lux (2009), among others. To be
in line with our previous VAR analysis, we further denote wC" (or w
C
# ) and w
I
" (or w
I
#)
as the transition rates for consumer condence index (CCI) and industry condence
index (ICI), respectively. The transition rates for CCI are assumed to be of exponential
form:
wC" = C expfUCg; or
wC# = C expf UCg (7.20)
Similarly, the transition rates for ICI are:
wI" = I expfUIg; or
wI# = I expf UIg (7.21)
where  is often called the \exibility parameter" that determines the time scale in
which opinion changes occur. The expression U covers those variables which may
directly inuence the transition rates, and can be labeled as a \forcing function" for
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transition, for example, here we follow the denition of Lux (2009a), and dene:
UC = 0 + 1xC + 2xI + 3y; and
UI = 0 + 1xI + 2xC + 3y (7.22)
In Eq. 7.22, the function of U allows for cross dependencies among consumer sentiment
xC , industry sentiment xI , as well as dependency on industry output \y". 0 and
0 are preference parameters, positive (negative) 0 (or 0) increases the probability
that an individual changes to \+" (\ ") opinion; 1 and 1 are often called herding
parameters, positive 1 (or 1) increases the transition probability in favor of the
majority opinion and reduces the transition probability in the direction of the minority
opinion. According to previous experiments in Alfarano et al. (2008), Lux (2009b),
Ghonghadze and Lux (2009), for a single opinion process, the aggregate outcome of the
process depends crucially on 1 (or 1). It can be also labeled as the intensity of herding
or interaction: when 1 (or 1) is below 1, the stationary distribution has a unique
maximum, while it becomes bi-modal under stronger interaction (1 > 1, or 1 > 1).
The later case allows for build-up and breakdown of a strong optimistic or pessimistic
majority. Besides, 2 and 2, 3 and 3 indicate the adjusted parameters for cross
dependency on sentiment, and possible causal eects of industrial output, respectively.
If we denote the parameter vector, C = (vC ; 0; 1; 2)
0 and I = (vI ; 0; 1; 2)0, as
the parameter set to be estimated, then the drift and diusion coecients dened by
Eq. 7.15 turn out to be:
A(xt; i) = vi(1  xit) exp(Ui)  vi(1 + xit) exp( Ui); and
B(xt; i) = [vi(1  xit) exp(Ui) + vi(1 + xit) exp( Ui)]=N (7.23)
with i = C; I, corresponding to either CCI or ICI indices . (1 x) and (1+x) denote the
fractions of currently optimistic and pessimistic agents who would potentially change
their opinions (note that if these two groups of people are in balance, x is equal to 0).
Our aim is to estimate the parameter set , given a sample of n + 1 observations (n
\space" dimensions plus time) x0; : : : ; xn at the respective time t0; : : : ; tn. We adopt
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the maximum likelihood (ML) method to estimate the unknown parameter set , by
nding the value of  that maximizes L() (cf. John (1997)):
^ = argmax

L() (7.24)
The ML estimate of  can be also understood as generated by minimizing the negative
log-likelihood function of the observed sample, with respect to :
  logL() =   logP0(X0j) 
n 1X
h=0
logP (Xh+1jXh; ) (7.25)
where P0(X0j) is the probability density for the initial state, the conditional prob-
ability P (Xh+1jXh; ) can be calculated by numerical iteration of the Fokker-Planck
equation over a unit time interval given Xh as a previous observation, using nite dif-
ference methods. The likelihood of initial condition x0, should be in principle computed
on the basis of the limiting distribution of P0. Since its inuence over the whole esti-
mation is negligible, we will simply discard this observation in practice. The remaining
entries are conditional probabilities evaluated numerically with the above approach.
7.2 Model Estimation in One Dimension
7.2.1 Crank-Nicolson Finite Dierence Scheme
In mathematics, nite dierence schemes (FDS) are numerical methods for approxi-
mating the solutions to dierential equations by replacing derivative expressions with
approximately equivalent dierence quotients3 using nite dierence equations (FDE).
There are three types of FDE,
forward dierence : p(x+ h)  p(x)
backward dierence : p(x)  p(x  h)
central dierence : p(x+
1
2
h)  p(x  1
2
h)
3If the nite dierence is dened in the form p(x+ b)  p(x+ a), and is divided by b  a, then one
gets the dierence quotients.
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Common FDS for PDE include the so-called Crank-Nicolson, Du Fort-Frankel, Laaso-
nen methods, among others. Following Lux (2009a,b), as the Crank-Nicolson method is
considered to be numerically robust and stable (Strikwerda (1989)), our Fokker-Planck
equation will be solved numerically by the Crank-Nicolson nite dierence method,
which was developed by John Crank and Phyllis Nicolson in the mid-20th century
(Crank and Nicolson (1947)4). This approach to estimation is proven to be consistent,
asymptotically normal and asymptotically equivalent to full ML estimates (cf. Poulsen
(1999) for univariate diusion processes). The nite dierence procedure is based on
discretization5. First of all, uniform partition is applied to the space domain using
grid points xn = x0 + nh; n = 0; 1; : : : Nx and similarly in the time domain: tm = mk;
m = 0; 1; : : : Nt. Then, P
m
n represents the discrete evaluation of the transient density
at space and time coordinates (xn; tm), P
m
n := p(xn; tm).
As pointed out by Wilmott et al. (1995), a fully central dierence is seldom used
in practice because it easily ends up with bad numerical results. More often, a half
central dierence is used instead to approximate the partial derivative. The basic idea
of Crank-Nicolson's method is to evaluate the value of the midpoint as the average of
values at the grid points one half step before and one half step after in time. Before we
describe the algorithm, it would be necessary to dene the following half-step values:
xn+1=2 =
xn + xn+1
2
(7.26)
xn+1=2 = xn+1   xn (7.27)
xn = xn+1=2   xn 1=2 = xn + xn+1
2
  xn + xn 1
2
=
xn+1   xn 1
2
(7.28)
4They use an implicit nite dierence method (later called \Crank-Nicolson nite dierence
scheme") to approximate the solution of a non-linear dierential system which arises in the prob-
lems of heat ow.
5Discretization is a procedure that replaces the continuous problem in certain domain by grids of
discrete location. Since the nite dierence procedure is to compute approximate PDE solutions only
at nite points, grids of space and time interval should be dened beforehand to solve the problem
(cf. Wang (2007)).
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similarly, in the time domain,
tm+1=2 =
tm + tm+1
2
(7.29)
tm+1=2 = tm+1   tm (7.30)
tm = tm+1=2   tm 1=2 = tm + tm+1
2
  tm + tm 1
2
=
tm+1   tm 1
2
: (7.31)
Since the drift, diusion term, as well as the transient density depend explicitly on x,
we have:
An+1=2 =
An + An+1
2
(7.32)
Bn+1=2 =
Bn +Bn+1
2
(7.33)
Pmn+1=2 =
Pmn + P
m
n+1
2
(7.34)
Pm+1=2n =
Pmn + P
m+1
n
2
(7.35)
The relation between the ux term F (x; t) and P (x; t) is linear, therefore, the half-step
value of the ux F
m+1=2
n is given by:
Fm+1=2n =
Fmn + F
m+1
n
2
(7.36)
It should be mentioned again that, in the case of uniform grids, all spacial and time
intervals are of identical length of h and k respectively:
x = xn+1   xn = xn+1=2   xn 1=2 = h (7.37)
t = tm+1   tm = tm+1=2   tm 1=2 = k (7.38)
The Crank-Nicolson method is essentially an arithmetic average of an explicit method
(or forward dierence method) and an implicit method (or backward dierence method).
For our PDE Eq. 7.17, by approximating the ux at intermediate points (m + 1=2)k,
we have the following nite dierence approximation:
Pm+1n   Pmn
k
=  
F
m+1=2
n+1=2   Fm+1=2n 1=2
h
(7.39)
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Since tm1=2 are points that are not on the grid, we may overcome this diculty by
the half-step values dened before, then the right side of Eq. 7.39 can be rewritten as:
F
m+1=2
n+1=2   Fm+1=2n 1=2
h
=
1
h

Fmn+1=2 + F
m+1
n+1=2
2
 
Fmn 1=2 + F
m+1
n 1=2
2

=
1
h

Fmn+1=2   Fmn 1=2
2
+
Fm+1n+1=2   Fm+1n 1=2
2

(7.40)
So far, the half-step values for the ux term Fmn1=2 and F
m+1
n1=2 are still unknown.
However, recall Eq. 7.16 that the ux is dened as:
F (x; t) =
1
2
B(x)
@P
@x
+
h
  A(x) + 1
2
@B(x)
@x
i
P (7.41)
which means the ux F (x; t) is a function of the drift term A(x), the diusion term
B(x), the unknown density P (x; t) and two partial derivatives @P=@x and @B=@x.
Hence we are able to use the half-step values to construct a numerical expression for
F
m(+1)
n1=2 :
Fmn+1=2 =
1
2
Bn+1=2P
0m
n+1=2 + ( An+1=2 +
1
2
B
0
n+1=2)P
m
n+1=2 (7.42)
Fmn 1=2 =
1
2
Bn 1=2P
0m
n 1=2 + ( An 1=2 +
1
2
B
0
n 1=2)P
m
n 1=2 (7.43)
Fm+1n+1=2 =
1
2
Bn+1=2P
0m+1
n+1=2 + ( An+1=2 +
1
2
B
0
n+1=2)P
m+1
n+1=2 (7.44)
Fm+1n 1=2 =
1
2
Bn 1=2P
0m+1
n 1=2 + ( An 1=2 +
1
2
B
0
n 1=2)P
m+1
n 1=2 (7.45)
Similarly, when the dierence quotient is applied, the derivative of P
0m(+1)
n1=2 can be
approximately calculated as:
P
0m
n1=2 = 
Pmn1   Pmn
xn1=2
(7.46)
P
0m+1
n1=2 = 
Pm+1n1   Pm+1n
xn1=2
(7.47)
B
0
n1=2 = 
Bn1  Bn
xn1=2
(7.48)
Using half-step methods from Eq. 7.26 to Eq. 7.36 and substituting Eq. 7.40 by the
corresponding values dened in Eq. 7.42 to Eq. 7.48, we can reformulate Eq. 7.40 into
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a two level, six-point Crank-Nicolson scheme of the form:
anP
m+1
n 1 + bnP
m+1
n + cnP
m+1
n+1 = anP
m
n 1 +bnP
m
n + cnP
m
n+1; (7.49)
for n = 0; 1; : : : N , where
an =  1
2
tm+1=2
xn
"
1=2 Bn 1=2
xn 1=2
   An 1=2 + 1=2 B
0
n 1=2
2
#
an =
1
2
tm+1=2
xn
"
1=2 Bn 1=2
xn 1=2
   An 1=2 + 1=2 B
0
n 1=2
2
#
=  an
bn = 1 +
1
2
tm+1=2
xn
"
1=2 Bn 1=2
xn 1=2
+
 An 1=2 + 1=2 B0n 1=2
2
+
1=2 Bn+1=2
xn+1=2
+
 An+1=2 + 1=2 B0n+1=2
2
#
bn = 1  1
2
tm+1=2
xn
"
1=2 Bn 1=2
xn 1=2
+
 An 1=2 + 1=2 B0n 1=2
2
+
1=2 Bn+1=2
xn+1=2
+
 An+1=2 + 1=2 B0n+1=2
2
#
cn =  1
2
tm+1=2
xn
"
1=2 Bn+1=2
xn+1=2
+
 An+1=2 + 1=2 B0n+1=2
2
#
cn =
1
2
tm+1=2
xn
"
1=2 Bn+1=2
xn+1=2
+
 An+1=2 + 1=2 B0n+1=2
2
#
=  cn
One motivation of ordering Eq. 7.49 is that it tends to average the eect of the variable
diusivity over the entire region (cf. Douglas (1962b)). For simplicity, Eq. 7.49 can be
also rewritten in a computationally ecient linear system of equations in a matrix
form:
RPm+1 = Qm (7.50)
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where the coecient matrices R and Q are dened as follows:
R =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
b0 c0 0       0
a1 b1 c1 0
. . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
...
. . . . . . an 1 bn 1 cn 1
0       0 an bn
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
; Pm+1 =
0BBBBBBBBB@
Pm+10
Pm+11
...
Pm+1n 1
Pm+1n
1CCCCCCCCCA
Qm =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
b0 c0 0       0
a1 b1 c1 0
. . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
...
. . . . . . an 1 bn 1 cn 1
0       0 an bn
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA

0BBBBBBBBB@
Pm0
Pm1
...
Pmn 1
Pmn
1CCCCCCCCCA
Note that R and the rst element of Q have the property that they are tri-diagonal,
which means only the diagonal, super-diagonal and sub-diagonal elements are non-
zero. The transition density p(x; t) can be generated through time from a given initial
condition by repeated solution of the linear system of equations in Eq. 7.50 using the
Cholesky Method6. Furthermore, the Crank-Nicolson scheme is known to have local
truncation error which is proportional to square of both space step size and time step
size, O(x2) +O(t2) (cf. Douglas (1961b)).
As a matter of fact, in one dimension, using the method shown in Eq. 7.49 is compu-
tationally very ecient. However, in two or more dimensions this is no longer true.
Although this method is still stable without restriction on the time step, the extra
6Some call it LU -method. The LU factorization is usually applied for Cholesky decomposition of
a matrix. It writes a matrix as the product of a lower triangular matrix and an upper triangular
matrix. This decomposition is used in numerical analysis to solve systems of linear equations. For
more details on solving the tri-diagonal system of the Crank-Nicolson Scheme, refer to Wang (2007)
Appendix A. 3.
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computational burden involved turns out to be very considerable: as the matrices of
the system do not have tri-diagonal form anymore, solving this equation becomes very
time consuming. Therefore, we shall look for other numerical schemes for parabolic
equations in more than one dimension cases, which will be discussed in the later sec-
tions.
7.2.2 Estimation Results
The main objective of this study is to estimate the parameters of our opinion model in
either one dimension or (later) two dimensions. Since this stochastic model measures
the aggregate behavior of a number of respondents, in order to have a characterization
of the outcome, it requires tracking the transient density P (x; t) as in the Fokker-Planck
equation 7.14, conditional on some initial value. Unfortunately, with highly non-linear
drift and diusion terms of the system, no closed-form solution to Eq. 7.14 is available,
we therefore, rely on numerical approximation of the Fokker-Planck equation using the
Crank-Nicolson FDS in empirical application.
The structures of our models follow the companion study by Lux (2009a), which exam-
ines the causation from sentiment indices on stock returns in nancial markets. As a
matter of fact, some recent literature has documented causality among sentiment and
returns as well. For instance, Brown and Cli (2004) report Granger-causality from
returns on sentiment, but not vice versa; Kling and Gao (2008) nd similar causal
structure for Shanghai stock market; Lux (2010) shows causality from sentiment on
returns of German stock market but not the other way round; our previous VAR anal-
ysis reveals a clear causation from industrial sentiment to the output, however, the
sentiment from the consumers is relatively independent of the industrial output.
Apart from that, previous experience from Lux (2009a,b) and Ghonghadze and Lux
(2009) indicates that it is convenient to consider dierent versions of the basic opinion
dynamic models. The following are selected sets of forcing function U and parameter
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vectors to be estimated:
 Agent-based Model of CCI:
Model I : UC = 0 + 1xC + 2xI + 3y;  = (C ; 0; 1; 2; 3; NC)
0
Model II : UC = 0 + 1xC + 2xI ;  = (C ; 0; 1; 2)
0
Model III : UC = 0 + 1xC ;  = (C ; 0; 1)
0
 Agent-based Model of ICI:
Model I : UI = 0 + 1xI + 2xC + 3y;  = (I ; 0; 1; 2; 3; NI)
0
Model II : UI = 1xI ;  = (I ; 1; NI)
0
Model III : UI = 1xI ;  = (I ; 1)
0
Model I is considered as the baseline model of our estimation experiment as dened in
Eq. 7.22. We use the U-functions in Eq. 7.22, which consider not only self-dependency
(1, 1), but also cross-dependency on the other indices (2, 2), as well as additional
possible inuence from industrial output on condence indices (3, 3). The last two
inuences are added, since we have observed signicant causal relations among our
indices in the previous VAR analysis. In the next step, since some of the estimated
parameters are not signicant (or there are cases that the standard errors of estimates
are not computed), we follow the standard procedure and leave out these parameters
step by step to see how the overall result improves with less parameters.
[Table 7.1 about here]
The estimation results are shown in Table 7.1. All experiments are carried out with a
width x = 0:01 in the space direction and t = 1=6 in the time direction. Panel A
shows the estimation results for CCI indices. The baseline Model I includes not only
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self-dependency 1, but also the the cross-dependency on ICI indices 2 and IP in-
dices 3. Estimation shows that the exibility parameter C is very low, which means
the opinion switching occurs at a relatively low frequency. Despite the impression
of a dominance of negative assessment over the whole sample period, the bias term
0 points slightly to \positive". The \herding intensity" parameter 1 is larger than
unity, indicating CCI indices are characterized by strong interaction in itself. Accord-
ing to the model property, which have been thoroughly investigated in the literature
(cf. Weidlich and Haag (1983), Lux (2009a,b)), the nite dierence approximation of
transient density for such model will display a typical bimodal form. The parameter
2 explains that the change of the ICI opinion will have a positive eect to the entire
opinion formation process, in the mean time, the feedback eect from IP seems not
signicant. The estimated \eective" numbers of agents for CCI opinion indices turn
out to be around NC  63, meaning that a model with 2  N independent agents
would get closest to the dynamic structure of this dataset. In the next step, we x
the number of agents to NC = 63, drop the insignicant parameter 3, and repeat the
estimation in Model II. It is observed that the likelihood function falls down with the
\herding intensity" parameter 1 slightly increased, and 2 becomes insignicant, indi-
cating low causal relation from ICI in the current opinion formation process. Model III
further discards the insignicant parameter 2, it is displayed that except for 1, all
other parameters are barely aected. In general, the loglikelihood function favors the
more complete Model I, while both AIC and BIC information criteria favor the more
parsimonious Model III, which takes only the self-interaction of the index itself into
account.
Panel B of Table 7.1 shows the estimation results for the ICI indices. When comparing
Model I with the previous CCI estimation, we observe a modest rise in both I and 1,
which means ICI indices have a higher switching tendency (or exibility) and stronger
intensity of interaction. Like with the CCI indices, 1 > 1 means the transient density
of this model will display bimodality in its opinion formation process. The bias term 0
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as well as 2 and 3 are not very signicant, indicating ICI is not easily aected by other
variables. The estimated eective number of participants isNI  138, which turns to be
signicant and much higher than the CCI estimation. After eliminating all insignicant
parameters in Model I, Model II provides much better estimation outcomes, and we
have the loglikelihood function slightly increased (in absolute value), while all remaining
parameters stay signicant with only marginal adjustments. In Model III, we make the
number of agents to be endogenous and xed at NI = 138. Simulation again conrms
our conjecture that without the bias term, the estimation remains its accuracy, and
the loglikelihood function is barely changed. In the end, in accordance with the CCI
estimation, the loglikelihood function and the other two information criteria choose
dierent models: the former favors the complete Model I, while the later prefer the
more parsimonious one.
Figure 7.1: Finite dierence approximation of the transient distribution for ICI index after T periods.
In this exercise, I = 0:02, 0 = 0, 1 = 1:4, NI = 138 and a relatively large T (T = 200) is applied.
The initial condition x0 has been approximated by a Normal distribution with small standard deviation
and mean x0.
Figure 7.1 displays the stationary distribution of the transient density for ICI index.
The simulation is done with the estimates: I = 0:02, 0 = 0, 1 = 1:4, NI = 138,
and h = 0:0025, k = 0:01 for the discretization in "space" and "time" direction. A
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relative long T (T = 200) is applied for the time horizon of the numerical integration,
and the space grid  1 to 1 is extended in accordance with the possible range of x
dened in Eq. 7.3. For simplicity, we use the rst-order Euler approximation using
the known drift and diusion functions for the initialization of the approximation, so
that initial state x0 = 0 has been approximated by a Normal distribution with density
N(x0 + A(x)k;B(x)k) evaluated at grid points  1 + nh; n = 0; 1; : : : N in the x
direction for the rst time increment k. The nal distribution shows non-negligible
probabilities along the whole range with two peaks at around  0:7 and 0:7. As the
exercise has excluded the insignicant bias term 0, we arrive at a symmetric bimodal
distribution.
Following Lux (2009a,b), we estimate IP dynamics in a form of diusion process:
dyt = (0 + 1xC + 2xI)dt+ ydW (7.51)
where W is the Wiener process7. Note that IP indices are assumed to be related with
both the consumer sentiment indices CCI and the industry sentiment indices ICI. When
1 = 2 = 0, this process becomes a standard Brownian motion with drift.
The estimated parameter set for the baseline diusion model IP is  = (0; 1; 2; y)
0,
and the estimation results are reported in Panel C of Table 7.1. In the more complete
Model I, we observe that except 1, all parameter estimates are highly signicant. This
result is in harmony with the previous nding that CCI indices are relatively indepen-
dent with the IP indices. In the next step, we drop out the insignicant parameter
and repeat the estimation in Model II, so that we have the following parameter set:
 = (0; 2; y)
0. It shows that the rest of parameters are still signicant and only
slightly aected, in particular, a strong positive 2 indicates a possible causal relation
between ICI and IP. This is again fully consistent with the results of our previous VAR
analysis that the industrial sentiment should inuence the output to some extent.
7Wiener process is also called Brownian motion, and it is a time-continuous process which is
normally distributed, with mean W = 0, and variance 2W = t.
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7.3 Model Estimation in Two Dimensions
7.3.1 Alternative Direction Implicit Scheme in 2-D
In this section, we proceed to estimate bivariate models for CCI & IP and ICI & IP.
As we already learned, for the one dimensional problem, the Crank-Nicolson method
is an unconditionally stable, implicit numerical scheme with second-order accuracy in
both time and space. However, when applying it to two-dimensional problems, the
traditional Crank-Nicolson method becomes quite costly as the resulting matrix in
Eq. 7.50 is block tri-diagonal. To overcome this problem, the Alternative Direction
Implicit (ADI) method can be used to solve the Fokker-Planck equation for diusion
equations in two or more dimensions.
The ADI scheme is a nite dierence method designed for parabolic and elliptic partial
dierence equations, it was rst suggested by companion papers, i.e., Peaceman and
Rachford (1955), Douglas and Peaceman (1955), Douglas (1955), for solving the heat
equation in two dimensions. Since then, the ADI method has been applied to various
physical problems8, such as in Vries (1984), Chin et al. (1984), Jarzebsky and Thullie
(1986), Abarbanel et al. (1986), among others. Later on, Douglas and his colleagues
show how it relates to the Crank-Nicolson method and backward dierence equations
in Douglas (1961a, 1962a), Douglas and Gunn (1963). A general formulation for ADI
methods for parabolic and hyperbolic problems can be found in Douglas and Gunn
(1964), Varga (1962) Chap. 7, or Strikwerda (1989), Chap. 7.3.
The idea behind ADI method is to reduce the two-dimensional problem to two one-
dimensional problems, then the original FDE is split into two, one with the rst space
dimension taken implicitly and the next with the second space dimension taken implic-
itly. By simplifying the two-dimensional problem, the systems of equations involved are
8Most physical problems leading to parabolic and elliptic dierential equations give rise to more
general equations than the one that we present in this discussion, which can be found in, e.g., Douglas
(1962b), Douglas and Gunn (1964), among others.
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again symmetric, tri-diagonal and cheap to be solved by the Choleski decomposition
method. In other words, when applying the ADI method to the iterative solution of
dierence equations for bivariate problems, the equations that have to be solved in ev-
ery iteration have a simpler structure and thus require much less arithmetic operations
than other iterative implicit methods. Apart from computational eciency, Douglas
(1955) proves how the ADI method relates to Crank-Nicolson dierence equation, and
for some particular cases, the ADI process can be considered as a perturbation of
Crank-Nicolson dierence equation, having second-order accuracy both in space and
time (Douglas and Kim (1999)).
The bivariate Fokker-Planck equation can be written similarly as the expression in
Eq. 7.17 of one-dimensional system:
@P (x1; x2; t)
@t
=
 @F (x1; x2; t)
@x1
+
 @F (x1; x2; t)
@x2
(7.52)
where x1 and x2 are two space variables with the grids: x1;n = x1;0 + n  h1; n =
0; 1; : : : ; Nx1 and x2;l = x2;0 + l  h2; l = 0; 1; : : : ; Nx2 . We evaluate rst implicitly the
x1 derivative and then also implicitly the x2 derivative with a tri-diagonal scheme:
P
m+1=2
n   Pmn
tm
=
F
m+1=2
n+1=2   Fm+1=2n 1=2
xn
: (7.53)
The ux of Eq. 7.52 becomes:
Fr(x1; x2; t) =
X
s
Brs(x1; x2; t)
@P (x1; x2; t)
@xs
+

Ar(x1; x2) +
X
s
@Brs(x1; x2)
@xs

P (x1; x2; t) (7.54)
Brs = 0 for r 6= s
The o-diagonal terms of B12() and B21() are set to zero for simplicity, since it would
be very dicult to dene explicitly the dependency in innovations between opinions
from industry and from the consumer, it is reasonable to treat them as coming from
independent surveys. The other reason to maintain the assumption of independent
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Markov process for the two data-generating opinion processes is computational con-
venience: as the strong o-diagonal inuence will compromise the positivity of the
solutions, the accuracy of simple ADI schemes can be only achieved in the absence of
cross-derivatives. The following version of the ADI scheme is based on Peaceman and
Rachford (1955), for 2-D cases without cross-dependency among the variables9.
Denoting the nite dierence approximation of the transient density in 2-D by Pmn;l, i.e.,
P (x1; x2; t) conditional on x1;n, x2;l and t, we rst evaluate the derivative with respect
to x1 and x2 implicitly using a time step k=2:
P
m+1=2
n;l   Pmn;l
k=2
=
1
h1
 
F
m+1=2
1;n+1=2;l   Fm+1=21;n 1=2;l

+
1
h2
 
Fm2;n;l+1=2   Fm2;n;l 1=2

(7.55)
The function for the next half step can be written as:
Pm+1n;l   Pm+1=2n;l
k=2
=
1
h1
 
Fm+11;n+1=2;l   Fm+11;n 1=2;l

+
1
h2
 
F
m+1=2
2;n;l+1=2   Fm+1=22;n;l 1=2

(7.56)
Both half-steps of Eq. 7.55 and Eq. 7.56 will lead to a tri-diagonal system of equations
similar to Eq. 7.50. In other words, if we subdivide the update procedure into two
sub-steps, at each sub-step only one tri-diagonal matrix needs to be solved for one
component, so that the 2-dimensional problem becomes no longer expensive. Boundary
conditions can be imposed by setting Fm1; 1=2;l = F
m
1;Nx+1=2;l
= 0, for all m, l, and
Fm2;n; 1=2 = F
m
2;n;Ny+1=2
= 0, for all m, n.
Meanwhile, like the Crank-Nicolson scheme, the ADI scheme is unconditionally stable
too. It is also second-order accurate in time and space (i.e., 4t, 4x1 and 4x2) as long
as cross-derivatives are all equal to zero and there is no dependency between two space
variables (cf. Mohanty and Jain (2001), among others).
7.3.2 Estimation Results
In two dimensional estimation exercises, our interest is to see how robust the parameter
estimates are, under inclusion of a second simultaneous dynamic process. We will study
9Refer to Strikwerda (1989) Chap. 7, or Thomas (1995) Chap. 4 for detailed descriptions.
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each pair of the variables separately, so that Panel A of Table 7.2 reports the bivariate
model of CCI & IP, and Panel B records simultaneous dynamics for ICI & IP model.
Below is a short review of model settings and parameter vectors to be estimated:
[Table 7.2 about here]
 Bivariate Model CCI & IP:
Model I : UC = 0 + 1xC + 2y; dyt = (0 + 1xC)dt+ ydW;
)  = (C ; 0; 1; 2; NC ; 0; 1; y)0
Model II : UC = 0 + 1xC ; dyt = (0 + 1xC)dt+ ydW;
)  = (C ; 0; 1; NC ; 0; 1; y)0
Model III : UC = 0 + 1xC ; dyt = (0 + 1xC)dt+ ydW;
)  = (C ; 0; 1; 0; 1; y)0; NC = 64
 Bivariate Model ICI & IP:
Model I : UI = 0 + 1xI + 2y; dyt = (0 + 2xI)dt+ ydW;
)  = (I ; 0; 1; 2; NI ; 0; 2; y)0
Model II : UI = 0 + 1xI + 2y; dyt = (0 + 2xI)dt+ ydW;
)  = (I ; 0; 1; 2; 0; 2; y)0; NI = 141
Model III : UI = 1xI ; dyt = (0 + 2xI)dt+ ydW;
)  = (I ; 1; 0; 2; y)0; NI = 141
Table 7.2 records the estimation results for the two-dimensional CCI & IP models
and ICI & IP models, respectively. Panel A considers the model for CCI indices
together with the diusion model for IP indices. Simulations are carried out with width
x = 0:01 in the space domain and t = 1=6 in the time domain. For the baseline CCI
& IP model, we estimate a model with unrestricted number of agents. It is observed
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that when compared with the one-dimensional cases, we arrive at a little larger bias
term 0 and a little lower \herding" parameter 1. The cross dependency parameter 2
is quite small and insignicant, indicating that the inuence from IP on CCI is hardly
detectable under current settings, and the eective number of agents is around NC 
69. Meanwhile, the main estimates for the diusion IP process 0 and 1 become much
smaller than in the 1D case with  slightly increased, and the insignicant parameter 1
only turns to be marginally signicant, but remains very small. In Model II, discarding
the insignicant parameter 2, we see that the bias term 0 becomes smaller while the
\herding" parameter 1 gets a little higher, and the estimates in the diusion part have
a larger variation when compared with the previous model. The loglikelihood function
is only slightly aected, with the estimated number of participants reduces to NC  64,
close to the 1D case. Finally in Model III, we set NC = 64, which will lower down
the number of free parameters. The exercise conrms our Model II estimates with all
parameters signicant and even a little improved loglikelihood function. In overall,
among the three models, the loglikelihood function chooses the complete model, while
the AIC and BIC information criteria prefer the model in a reduced form.
Panel B of Table 7.2 shows the estimation results for bivariate ICI & IP models. For the
baseline ICI & IP model, the standard errors are not computed since the covariances
of the parameters fail to invert, which might be due to a multi-collinearity problem.
In Model II, we set NI = 141 according to the Model I estimation. As a result, all
parameters vary a little bit, and the maximum likelihood gets immediately higher (in
absolute value). The adaptation parameter 1 of the ICI dynamics is much higher than
unity, corresponding to a bimodal equilibrium distribution of the transient density. In
the mean time, there is certain kind of interaction among ICI and IP detected, but not
very signicant. The estimated eective number of agent is very close to the 1D cases,
and the estimates for the diusion IP process are not far from their 1D counterparts
as well. Further discarding the insignicant bias 0 and 2 and re-estimating the
model in Model III leads to slight increase in the \herding intensity" 1 as well as the
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loglikelihood function (in absolute value), while the other parameters are less aected.
Like in the previous bivariate models, the loglikelihood favors a more complete Model II,
but both information criteria favor the more parsimonious Model III.
To sum up, in spite of a long interest in business climate and economic sentiment, the
empirical research on testing behavioral models for survey data is surprisingly scarce.
This chapter explores the explanatory power of a behavioral model of opinion for-
mation, based on the canonical model by Weidlich and Haag (1983), and follows the
methodology introduced in the pioneering paper Lux (2009a). The models are esti-
mated using a numerical maximum likelihood approach. It has been shown by Lux
(2009b) that the Monto Carlo simulation performs relative well at a medium sample
size like ours. We use the sentiment indices for German industrial output from both
consumer (CCI) and industry (ICI) collected by the European Commission, and study
their dynamics together with industrial output (IP). It turns out that sentiment ap-
pears to have signicant explanatory power for the ups and downs of the industrial
output under investigation. Our aim is to contribute to a behavioral theory of senti-
ment formation, by providing an explicit model of how the opinion interaction eects
(through surveys) may help to explain certain economic activity. The overall results
in this chapter are also in accordance with the VAR studies in the previous chapter.
Surprisingly, consumer sentiment seems to be relatively independent, it does not aect
either industry sentiment nor industrial output. In contrast, industrial sentiment ICI
exhibits strong bimodality which reects high interactions among its respondents.
Regarding to future research, there are a few interesting ways to explore our behavioral
model further. In particular, one might be interested in the predictability between VAR
models and opinion formation models. Besides, extending the current model into three-
dimensional format in order to check whether the 3D models outperform the 2D cases
(or standard VAR models) is also a fascinating topic. A successful application can be
found in Lux (2009a). Other extensions or modications can be adopted in the forcing
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function U , such as introducing a \momentum" eect, as discussed in Lux (2009b) and
Ghonghadze and Lux (2009). In addition, this methodology can also be easily applied
to similar datasets for other countries, or other interaction patterns. Some comparative
projects have been carried out by other researchers of our group10.
10Available under http://www.bwl.uni-kiel.de/vwlinstitute/gwif/team lux.php?lang=de.
216
T
a
b
le
7
.1
:
P
ar
am
et
er
E
st
im
at
es
of
U
n
iv
ar
ia
te
M
o
d
el
s
A
:
S
o
ci
al
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
m
o
d
el
of
C
C
I
 C

0

1

2

3
N
C
lo
gL
A
IC
B
IC
M
o
d
el
I
0.
01
7
0.
01
4
1.
02
6
0.
32
2
-1
.2
32
62
.6
84
-6
96
.6
55
14
05
.3
10
14
27
.4
12
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.3
8
6
.)
(0
.1
6
6
)
(0
.7
1
9
)
(2
1
.0
8
9
)
M
o
d
el
II
0.
01
6
0.
01
3
1.
04
2
0.
33
8
63
-6
97
.6
61
14
03
.3
22
14
18
.0
83
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.4
0
9
)
(0
.1
8
4
)
M
o
d
el
II
I
0.
01
6
0.
01
3
1.
05
1
63
-6
98
.1
18
14
02
.2
36
14
13
.3
17
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.4
3
5
)
B
:
S
o
ci
al
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
m
o
d
el
of
IC
I
 I

0

1

2

3
N
I
lo
gL
A
IC
B
IC
M
o
d
el
I
0.
02
1
0.
09
3
1.
47
9
-2
.9
66
-3
.8
22
13
8.
22
0
-5
85
.2
73
11
82
.5
46
12
04
.6
48
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
8
2
)
(0
.4
0
6
)
(2
.1
7
3
)
(2
.2
4
8
)
(6
1
.3
3
1
)
M
o
d
el
II
0.
02
0
1.
48
5
13
8.
05
7
-5
87
.4
54
11
80
.9
08
11
91
.9
89
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.3
8
2
)
(5
9
.7
4
7
)
M
o
d
el
II
I
0.
02
0
1.
49
6
13
8
-5
87
.3
35
11
78
.6
70
11
86
.0
64
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.3
4
3
)
C
:
D
i
u
si
on
m
o
d
el
of
IP

0

1

2

lo
gL
A
IC
B
IC
M
o
d
el
I
-0
.2
19
-0
.0
39
0.
44
1
0.
00
3
-2
65
.3
96
53
8.
79
2
55
3.
55
3
(0
.0
6
2
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.1
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
M
o
d
el
II
-0
.2
15
0.
43
2
0.
00
3
-2
67
.2
35
54
0.
47
0
55
1.
55
1
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.1
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
N
ot
e:
R
es
u
lt
s
in
P
a
n
el
A
an
d
P
an
el
B
h
av
e
b
ee
n
es
ti
m
at
ed
v
ia
n
u
m
er
ic
al
in
te
gr
at
io
n
of
th
e
tr
a
n
si
en
t
d
en
si
ty
w
it
h

x
=
0
:0
1
an
d

t
=
1
=6
.
F
or
th
e
d
i
u
si
on
m
o
d
el
in
P
an
el
C
,
th
e
ex
ac
t
so
lu
ti
on
s
fo
r
th
e
tr
an
si
en
t
d
en
si
ty
ar
e
d
is
p
la
ye
d
.
T
h
e
u
n
d
er
li
n
ed
p
a
ra
m
et
er
s
a
re

x
ed
p
ri
or
to
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
on
s,
in
or
d
er
to
re
d
u
ce
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
fr
ee
p
ar
am
et
er
s.
217
T
a
b
le
7
.2
:
P
ar
am
et
er
E
st
im
at
es
of
B
iv
ar
ia
te
M
o
d
el
s
A
:
S
o
ci
al
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
m
o
d
el
C
C
I+
IP
 C

0

1

2
N
C

0

1

lo
gL
A
IC
B
IC
M
o
d
el
I
0.
02
0
0.
01
9
1.
01
7
0.
43
5
69
.7
5
4
-0
.1
3
8
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
04
-1
1
05
.3
2
4
22
26
.6
4
8
22
56
.0
6
2
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.4
5
3
)
(0
.3
7
7
)
(2
5
.4
9
6
)
(0
.0
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
M
o
d
el
II
0.
01
9
0.
01
7
1.
01
9
64
.3
5
1
-0
.1
2
1
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
04
-1
1
05
.4
0
5
22
24
.8
1
0
22
50
.5
7
1
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.3
9
2
)
(2
1
.3
3
7
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
M
o
d
el
II
I
0.
01
9
0.
01
7
1.
02
0
64
-0
.1
2
5
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
0
4
-1
1
05
.4
0
1
22
22
.8
0
2
22
44
.9
0
3
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.3
9
5
)
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
B
:
S
o
ci
al
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
m
o
d
el
IC
I+
IP
 I

0

1

2
N
I

0

2

lo
gL
A
IC
B
IC
M
o
d
el
I
0.
02
5
0.
06
2
1.
56
8
-3
.3
05
14
1.
02
3
-0
.2
1
1
0
.4
5
2
0
.0
0
3
-1
0
08
.1
5
5
20
32
.3
1
0
20
61
.7
2
4
(.
)
(.
)
(.
)
(.
)
(.
)
(.
)
(.
)
(.
)
M
o
d
el
II
0.
02
4
0.
06
5
1.
56
6
-3
.3
08
14
1
-0
.2
1
3
0
.4
5
7
0
.0
0
3
-1
0
07
.8
8
3
22
29
.7
6
6
22
55
.5
2
7
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.4
1
1
)
(1
.9
2
6
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
(0
.1
8
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
M
o
d
el
II
I
0.
02
6
1.
56
9
14
1
-0
.2
1
6
-0
.4
6
5
0
.0
0
3
-1
0
08
.2
1
0
20
26
.4
2
0
20
44
.8
5
5
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.4
1
5
)
(0
.0
7
9
)
(0
.2
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
N
ot
e:
T
h
e
m
o
d
el
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
v
ia
n
u
m
er
ic
a
l
in
te
gr
at
io
n
of
th
e
tr
an
si
ti
on
al
d
en
si
ty
u
si
n
g
A
D
I
al
g
or
it
h
m
.
T
h
e
d
is
cr
et
iz
at
io
n
o
f
th
e

n
it
e
d
i
er
en
ce
sc
h
em
es
u
se
s
st
ep
s
of

x
=
0
:0
1
a
n
d

t
=
1
=6
.
T
h
e
d
is
cr
et
iz
at
io
n
of
IP
sp
ac
e
d
im
en
si
o
n
is
ch
os
en
in
a
w
ay
to
g
en
er
at
e
th
e
sa
m
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
gr
id
p
oi
n
ts
a
s
in
th
e

rs
t
d
im
en
si
o
n
,
w
h
ic
h
m
ea
n
s
N
C
=
N
IP
or
N
I
=
N
IP
.
\(
.)
"
sh
ow
s
th
e
ca
se
s
w
h
en
st
a
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
n
ot
g
en
er
at
ed
b
ec
au
se
co
va
ri
an
ce
s
o
f
th
e
p
ar
am
et
er
es
ti
m
at
es
fa
il
to
in
ve
rt
.
218
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Social relations are hard to model, since the relationship between individual behavior
and macroscopic regularities can be quite involved. However, even if in principle ev-
erything can be described by equations, the complexity of a system may easily raise
exponentially as the complexity of behavior increases. Sometimes, even several steps
beyond existing simplied macroeconomic models, the job of solving a system with
complex and stochastic individual behavior using systems of parallel equations be-
comes almost intractable. Thanks to the development of computer science, adopting
fast-speed computer simulations, agent-based modeling becomes a exible and powerful
technique in dealing with some real-world problems.
Agent-based modeling has been proved already to be quite successful in exploring
market and industry dynamics. In some ways, it complements traditional analytic
methods. Agent-based modeling not only enables us to characterize the equilibria of
certain economic system, but also permits the generalization of a system. Moreover,
agent-based models are able to explain the emergence of higher order patterns based on
intelligent \learning" individuals and scaling laws, which might result in more complex
and robust outcomes.
The purpose of this thesis was to show that a certain kind of agent-based model can
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generate a series of social phenomena, and many of them may be quite close to reality.
Instead of emphasizing the microscopic aspect of \utility maximization", we emphasize
more that of a \statistical equilibrium", a stage that economy will generally uctuate
around. Through agent-based simulations, some seemingly puzzling stylized facts in
macroeconomics can be replicated without too much eort.
The rst part of the thesis has introduced an agent-based model describing the social
production process, which consists of employment, production and consumption. The
biggest advantage of this model is that: it generates many macroscopic regularities
from microscopic behavior within a single framework, involving intricate interactions
among simple micro-economic entities. In particular, the model is capable of explaining
stylized facts, such as:
(1) Frictional unemployment population contains agents who have just been red and
start searching for the next job. In reality, the unemployment ratio varies from
country to country. However, as frictional unemployment always exists, the gov-
ernment could treat the lowest unemployment rate in history as a reference base
line for a country's target unemployment rate. In other words, the remaining
exceeding rates from this lowest unemployment rate (i.e., frictional unemploy-
ment rate) can be treated as unemployment that occurred due to macroeconomic
factors.
(2) Many of the \size distribution" will display power laws in the upper tails. The
\size" in our simulation ranges from rm size measured by total employees or
sales, the life expectancies of rms, the duration of recessions, the wealth or
income of rm owners, and so on.
(3) Growth is usually measured by the logarithm on the size increment. We observe
that the growth rate distribution is close to the Subbotin class distribution (i.e.,
a bell-shaped distribution such as Gaussian or a tent-shaped distribution such
as Laplace). Typical examples include the rm growth distribution, the GDP
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growth distribution, among others.
(4) The 80/20 rule (or the \Pareto principle") is ubiquitous in nature. As a matter
of fact, the existence of not only the power law and Lognormal, but also the
exponential law proves the 80/20 rule. Through simulations, we show that a
majority of small rms are coexisting with a minority of large rms; a large
amount of wealth is concentrated at the hands of a few very rich agents; most of
the entries and exits happen with small rms; and etc.
(5) \Statistical equilibrium" emphasizes the \stability" of a system. Agent-based
modeling argues that xed-point equilibria are unrealistic descriptions of macro-
scopic properties of economic systems. Interestingly, if we analyze the distribu-
tion of our key variate, the resulting distribution will often (but not always) be
a Gaussian. We show that the number of workers/unemployees, the number of
rm demises, the wage/prot share in GDP, satisfy this condition.
(6) Since the Gaussian distribution is quite common in life, a mixture of Gaussian
distributions may be also widespread. For example, the income distribution can
be treated as an aggregate of income from dierent groups of agents, who may
have a large income dierential. If the income of each subgroup is Gaussian-like
distributed, the overall income distribution can be understood as aggregation
of multiple Gaussians which may overlap with each other and display either
multimodal or unimodal shape.
The second part of the thesis looks into models of \sentiment dynamics", both with
a traditional quantitative approach and with an agent-based approach. Under an
\ecient market" hypothesis, sentiment or mood should not aect economic activity.
However, there is long lasting discussion that people's \animal spirits" will inuence
business or investment uctuations. We explore the German monthly survey data from
consumer condence index (CCI) and industrial condence index (ICI) in order to study
the possible causal relationship between the sentiment and subsequent industrial output
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changes. Chap. 6 builds up a simultaneous system of a tri-variate vector autoregression
(VAR). Depending on the chosen VAR specication, industrial output is found to follow
a feedback process caused by at least one of the sentiment indices. The causality tests
show that the industrial sentiment ICI has direct and signicant inuence on industrial
output, whereas the consumer sentiment CCI is found to be relatively independent. The
out-of-sample forecasting experiments based on the VAR models (incorporating ICI)
indicate signicant predictive power for both the near-term and long-term industrial
output development.
The observed strong inuence from sentiment on industrial output data motivates us
to adopt an agent-based model of dynamic opinion or expectation formation processes
with social interactions. We create a simple stochastic framework of opinion formation
by a group of agents who face a binary decision following the pioneering work from
Weidlich and Haag (1983) and Lux (1995, 1997, 1998). The model parameters are
estimated using maximum likelihood and numerical solutions of the transient proba-
bility density function for the resulting stochastic process. We have also extended the
univariate approach into two dimensions following the methodology introduced in Lux
(2009b). During the simulation, we nd some evidence of social interactions in both
the consumer sentiment indices CCI and the industrial sentiment indices ICI. However,
our results are generally in harmony with the previous VAR tests that CCI indices are
relatively independent, and the ICI indices are closely related to the IP indices.
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Appendix A
MATLAB Code for the SA Model
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Core code for the SA model (Replication of Wright(2005)) %%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% by Lin Lin, July 2008
clear all;
close all;
% Parameter specification
N = 1000; % number of agents in the economy
M = 100000; % total capital/money stock by the agents
w_a = 10; % minimum wage
w_b = 90; % maximum wage
w_avg = (w_a + w_b) / 2; % average wage
V = 0; % initial market value is 0
nYear = 10; % number of years
% Initialization
e = zeros(N,1); % employer index
m = (M/N) * ones(N,1); % equal money holdings
employeeSet(1:N,1:N-1) = zeros(N,N-1); % employee list
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employeeNum(1:N,1) = zeros(N,1); % number of employees
cnum = []; % array of capitalists amount
wnum = []; % array of workers amount
unum = []; % array of unemployed amount
emNumMonth = []; % calculate the number of employee at the end of each month
for yidx = 1:nYear,
for midx = 1:12,
for repidx = 1:N,
%%%%%%% Seclection rule %%%%%%%
a = randint(1,1,[1,N]); % index of active actor
%%%%%%% Hiring rule %%%%%%%
if e(a) == 0 && employeeNum(a) == 0, % check if actor a is unemployed
% form the set of potential employers
H = [];
for i = 1:N,
if e(i) == 0 && i ~= a,
H = [H,i];
end
end
% select an employer, weights potential employers by their wealth
rNum = rand; % uniformly distributed random number
nPem = length(H); % amount of potential employers
sPem = sum(m(H)); % total capital of potential employers
thrs = 0; % threshold for selection
for i = 1:nPem,
thrs = thrs + m(H(i))/sPem; % select employer
if rNum < thrs,
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tidx = H(i);
break;
end
end
% check if it employs
if m(tidx) > w_avg,
e(a) = tidx;
employeeNum(tidx) = employeeNum(tidx) + 1;
employeeSet(tidx,employeeNum(tidx)) = a;
end
end
%%%%%%% Expenditure rule %%%%%%%%
B = [1:a-1,a+1:N]';
b = B(randint(1,1,[1,N-1]));
expAmount = randint(1,1,[0,m(b)]);
V = V + expAmount;
m(b) = m(b) - expAmount;
%%%%%%% Revenue rule %%%%%%%
if e(a) ~= 0 || employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
rev = randint(1,1,[0,V]);
V = V - rev;
if e(a) ~= 0,
m(e(a)) = m(e(a)) + rev;
end
if employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
m(a) = m(a) + rev;
end
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end
%%%%%%% Firing rule %%%%%%%
if employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
u = max(ceil(employeeNum(a) - m(a)/w_avg), 0);
for uu = 1:u,
uidx = randint(1,1,[1,employeeNum(a)]);
aidx = employeeSet(a,uidx);
e(aidx) = 0;
if uidx == employeeNum(a),
employeeSet(a,employeeNum(a)) = 0;
else
employeeSet(a,uidx:employeeNum(a)-1) =
employeeSet(a,uidx+1:employeeNum(a));
employeeSet(a,employeeNum(a)) = 0;
end
employeeNum(a) = employeeNum(a) - 1;
end
end
%%%%%%% Payment rule %%%%%%%
if employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
for i = 1:employeeNum(a),
numCoin = randint(1,1,[w_a,w_b]);
if m(a) >= numCoin,
m(employeeSet(a,i)) = m(employeeSet(a,i)) + numCoin;
m(a) = m(a) - numCoin;
else
numCoin = randint(1,1,[0,m(a)]);
m(employeeSet(a,i)) = m(employeeSet(a,i)) + numCoin;
m(a) = m(a) - numCoin;
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end
end
end
end
% Above is the main program code, you can run the program and plot figures.
% For example, uncheck the following to see the amount of each class
% cnum = [cnum,length(find(employeeNum > 0))];
% wnum = [wnum,length(find(e>0))];
% unum = [unum,N - cnum - wnum];
end
disp(['Year ',num2str(yidx),' finished.']); % display yearly calculation
end
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Appendix B
MATLAB Code for the EPC Model
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% MatLab Program Code for the EPC Model %%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% by Lin Lin, Oct. 2008
clear all;
close all;
% Parameter specification
N = 1000; % number of agents in the economy
M = 100000; % total capital/money stock by the agents
w_a = 10; % minimum wage
w_b = 90; % maximum wage
w_avg = (w_a + w_b) / 2; % average wage
V = 100; % initial market value
nYear = 100; % number of years
% initialization
e = zeros(N,1); % employer index
m = (M/N) * ones(N,1); % equal money holdings
employeeSet(1:N,1:N-1) = zeros(N,N-1); % employee list
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employeeNum(1:N,1) = zeros(N,1); % number of employees
cnum = []; % array of capitalists amount
wnum = []; % array of workers amount
unum = []; % array of unemployers amount
enum = []; % array of employee amount -- firm size
money_M = []; % collect the money holding of each actor at the end of each month
money_Y = []; % collect the money holding of each actor at the end of each year
sales_Y = []; % array of total revenue collected by firms each year
coins_Y = zeros(1,nYear); % array of total money per year received by the workers
income_Y = zeros(N,nYear); % yearly income of each actor
income_Y_W = zeros(N,nYear); % yearly income of each worker
income_Y_C = zeros(N,nYear); % yearly income of each capitalist
wage_Y_C = zeros(N,nYear); % yearly wage paid by each capitalist
wage = []; % record the wage amount paid to all workers
profit_rate = []; % record the profit rate of all firms
for yidx = 1:nYear,
sales_M = zeros(N,12); % record the monthly sales of firms
coins_M = zeros(1,12); % total money per month received by the workers
gdp_growth = zeros(1,1);
for midx = 1:12,
aa = randperm(N);
for x = 1:N,
a = aa(x);
%%%%%%% Hiring rule %%%%%%%
if e(a) == 0 && employeeNum(a) == 0, % check if actor a is unemployed
if e(a) == 0 && employeeNum(a) == 0, % check if actor a is unemployed
H = []; % form the set of potential employers
for i = 1:N,
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if e(i) == 0 && i ~= a,
H = [H,i];
end
end
% select an employer, weights potential employers by their wealth
rNum = rand; % uniformly distributed random number
nPem = length(H); % amount of potential employers
sPem = sum(m(H)); % total capital of potential employers
thrs = 0; % threshold for selection
for i = 1:nPem,
thrs = thrs + m(H(i))/sPem; % select employer
if rNum < thrs,
tidx = H(i); % the chosen employer is indexed as tidx
break;
end
end
% check if it employs
if m(tidx) > w_avg, % if m_tidx exceeds average wage, he hires a
e(a) = tidx; % tidx hires employee a
employeeNum(tidx) = employeeNum(tidx) + 1;
employeeSet(tidx,employeeNum(tidx)) = a;
end
end
%%%%%%% revenue rule %%%%%%%
% the precondition is that a is not unemployed
if e(a) ~= 0 || employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
rev = trirnd(0,V/2,V,1); % choose revenue from triangular distr.
V = V - rev; % the market value is reduced
% if actor a is employee, then transfer m=rev coins to the employer
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if e(a) ~= 0,
m(e(a)) = m(e(a)) + rev;
sales_M(e(a),midx) = sales_M(e(a),midx) + rev;
end
% if actor a is an employer, transfer m=rev coins to actor a
if employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
m(a) = m(a) + rev;
sales_M(a,midx) = sales_M(a,midx) + rev;
end
end
%%%%%%% Firing rule %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
if employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
u = max(employeeNum(a) - floor(m(a)/w_avg), 0);
for uu = 1:u,
uidx = randint(1,1,[1,employeeNum(a)]);
aidx = employeeSet(a,uidx);
e(aidx) = 0;
if uidx == employeeNum(a),
employeeSet(a,employeeNum(a)) = 0;
else
employeeSet(a,uidx:employeeNum(a)-1) = employeeSet(a,uidx+1:employeeNum(a));
employeeSet(a,employeeNum(a)) = 0;
end
employeeNum(a) = employeeNum(a) - 1;
end
end
%%%%%%% Payment rule %%%%%%%%%%%%%
if employeeNum(a) ~= 0,
for i = 1:employeeNum(a),
numCoin = trirnd(10,50,90,1);
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if m(a) >= numCoin,
m(employeeSet(a,i)) = m(employeeSet(a,i)) + numCoin;
m(a) = m(a) - numCoin;
elseif 10 < m(a) < numCoin,
numCoin = trirnd(10, (m(a)+10)/2, m(a), 1);
m(employeeSet(a,i)) = m(employeeSet(a,i)) + numCoin;
m(a) = m(a) - numCoin;
elseif m(a) <= 10,
numCoin = m(a);
m(employeeSet(a,i)) = m(employeeSet(a,i)) + numCoin;
m(a) = 0;
end
end
end
%%%%%%% Expenditure rule %%%%%%%
expAmount = trirnd(0,m(a)/2,m(a),1); % select according to tri. distr.
V = V + expAmount; % add the available market value V
m(a) = m(a) - expAmount; % money holding of a is reduced by m
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% MONTHLY STATISTICS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% monthly data can be recorded here, for example: amount of each class
cnum = [cnum,length(find(employeeNum > 0))];
wnum = [wnum,length(find(e>0))];
unum = [unum,N - cnum - wnum];
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% YEARLY STATISTICS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% yearly data can be recorded here, for example: GDP = Yearly sales
sales_Y = [sales_Y,sum(sales_M,2)];
sumSales_M = [];
sumSales_M = [sumSales_M, sales_M];
sumSales_Y = sum(sales_Y); % GDP in a year
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% calculate GDP growth by yearly the revenue growth
if yidx == 1, % first year GDP growth is 1
gdp_growth =1;
else
gdp_growth = sumSales_Y(:,end)./sumSales_Y(:,end-1);
end
%let market value to grow at the rate of GDP growth rate
V = V * gdp_growth;
disp(['Year ',num2str(yidx),' finished.']);
save(['sim-result-N',int2str(N),'-M',int2str(M),'-T',int2str(nYear),'EPC']);
end
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Appendix C
List of Abbreviations
ABM Agent-Based Model
AIC Akaike Information Criterion
ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller (test)
ADI Alternative Direction Implicit (scheme)
AR Autoregressive (method/model)
ARMA Autoregressive Moving Average (model)
BIC Bayesian Information Criterion
CCDF Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
CCI Consumer Condence Indicator
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
CLT Central Limit Theorem
DM Diebold-Mariano Test
EPC Employment, Production and Consumption (model)
EPCE Employment, Production and Consumption Model with Endogenous Wages (model)
FDE Finite Dierence Equation
FDS Finite Dierence Schemes
FP Fokker-Planck (equation)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
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GDP Gross Domestic Products
HQ Hannan-Quinn (information criterion)
ICI Industry Condence Indicator
IP Industrial Production
LTV Labor Theories of Value
LS Least Squares
logL Loglikelihood (result)
MAS Multi-Agent Systems
ML Maximum Likelihood
MLEs Maximum Likelihood Estimates
MSE Mean Squared Error
NAICS North American Industry Classication Systems
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
NHANE National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
OU Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (process)
PHID Pharmaceutical Industry Database
PDE Partial Dierence Equation
PDF Probability Density Function
RMSE Root Mean Squared Error
SBO Survey of Business Owners
SA Social Architecture (model)
VAR Vector Autoregressive (method/model)
WDI World Distribution of Income
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Appendix D
List of Symbols
C capitalist
E employer
N number of agents
O rm owner
U the unemployed or forcing function
V the market value
W worker or the total wage bill
W Wiener process
Z positive integer
Ai coecient matrices of lag i
Bq coecient matrices of lag q
Xw the wage share
Xp the prot share
Xt the yearly GDP at time t
W the Brownian motion
S(t) the state evolution rule at time t
ei the employer of actor i
mi the money holding of actor i
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ma the minimum wage boundary
mb the maximum wage boundary
wi monthly wage bill of rm i
wa the wage expectation of actor a
ri monthly revenue of rm i
pi monthly prot rate of rm i
gt the growth rate of GDP at year t
n socio-conguration
x opinion index
u white noise process
s the rm size at time t
w (expected/negociated) wage or transition rates
" white noise process
 vector of intercept term or exibility parameter
 speed o f reversionP
" covariance matrix of "
 parameter set to be estimated
 standard deviation
A(x) the drift term
B(x) the diusion term
P (x) the unknown probability density
F (x) the ux
x the divided width in the space direction
t the divided width in the time direction
x long-term equilibrium
R-sq value of R-squared
R-sq(adj) value of adjusted R-squared
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